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**Regional Institutions and
Policy Formulation
Processes**

**A Comparative Assessment of
ECOWAS, the EU
and ASEAN**

SPONSORED BY THE



Federal Ministry
of Education
and Research

ISBN 978-3-941928-21-3

WAI-ZEI PAPER

**No.1
2013**

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Regional Institutions and Policy Formulation Processes

A Comparative Assessment of ECOWAS, the EU and ASEAN

Introduction

While the concepts of regionalism and economic integration are not new in economic and political literature, the renewed interests in both the theoretical and empirical work on regional integration have assumed a new dimension. The emergence and dynamism of regional integration across regions has been a source of intense debate for both policy makers and academics (Fawcett and Hurrell, 1996; Farell, Hettne and van Langenhove, 2005; Kühnhardt, 2010; van Langenhove 2011). In the new order of global interaction, regionalism can be described as a dynamic process that entails a country's willingness to share or unify into a larger whole. According to Hass (1971, p. 3) regional integration can be said to be "the voluntary creation of larger political units, each of which self-consciously eschews the use of force in the relations between the participating units and groups." Based on the rationale of functional cooperation with an emphasis on economic, social and political aspects, regional integration/regionalism offers benefits through the economies of scale.

Meanwhile, the attainment of regional goals and objectives is premised on policy formulation and prudent policy implementation. A clear policy framework is fundamental to an efficient policy formulation process and efficient regional policy formulation and design are crucial preconditions and determinants of policy

outcomes. Indeed, the efficiency of any regional scheme, with respect to the actualization of its strategic goals, significantly depends on the quality of its policy framework, policy formulation and implementation processes (O'Toole, 2000). This truly represents a yardstick for measuring regional development performance and dynamism. This explains why the process of formulating regional policy is becoming more and more complex in the wake of growing interdependence of global economic and political institutions. Just as policy formulation forms an integral part in any institution, by ensuring actualization of goals, the role of quality and efficient regional policy formulation, especially within regional institutions cannot be downplayed.¹

The policy formulation process is critical to the regional institutional policy framework. In fact, ultimate achievement of regional goals and objectives depends on the quality of the policy framework, the decisions taken and the processes involved in the formulation of each decision (Wayne, 2001). Regional institutions such as commissions, regional parliaments, courts of justice and different regional agencies are fundamentally entrusted with various developmental policies which are paramount to the achievement of regional goals and objectives. The quality of these policies, therefore, depends upon the capacity and efficiency of these institutions to manage the policy making processes. Whereas the centrality of a 'good' policy making process is adjured to be fundamentally enshrined in quality and efficient decisions, inefficiencies in the policy formulation process can be broadly categorized as structural weaknesses and capacity deficiencies. Although, regional integration as such has become an important research topic, the relevance of understanding the fundamentals and dynamics of the regional policy formulation process in West Africa, is still underestimated. Therefore, it is imperative to underscore the processes that generate policy making and to analyze them from a comparative perspective.

The resurgence of regional supra-nationalism in West Africa has been further compelled by the need for a thorough reevaluation of the policy making process paradigm of/within ECOWAS. In this context, a comparative view also appears helpful in revealing the differences between West African, European and Sou-

¹ The policy formulation process can be said to comprise of the identification of the policy issue, specification of policy goals, the development of policy options, decision-making and implementation (Corkery, J. et al, 1995).

theast Asian regional integration schemes, in order to draw some policy lessons and prepare the ground for further studies (Bach, 2005). Most studies on regionalism especially in developing countries are based on case studies, rather than comparative analysis (Esteradeordal, Goto and Saez, 2001; Yeats, 1997; Jens, 1997; Bryan and Roget, 1999). Hence, comparative policy formulation of regional institutions with the aim of examining the driving forces and shaping factors that determine the regional policy formulation process, are often neglected. Against this background, beyond the case study assessment of regionalism and regional institutions, the efficiency of regional policy, with respect to core policy issues, can be better explored in comparative context (Kühnhardt, 2010). Given the fact that different regions are faced with different institutional environments which are comprised of different socio-cultural, political and economic orientations, a comparative assessment of the policy formulation processes presents a fundamental challenge. However, valuable lessons can be taken from this exercise (Scheingold, 1971). This paper is motivated by the incessant problem of policy somersaults associated with African regionalism, with a special emphasis on the West African regional scheme, ECOWAS. While there is a large body of research on comparative regionalism, there is still only a weak systematic debate regarding policy formulation processes (Axline, 1994; de Lombaerde, Söderbaum, van Langenhove and Baert, 2010; Warleigh and Rosamond, 2006; Malamud, 2003; Laursen, 2003 and Acharya and Alastair, 2007). This paper builds on the existing literature on policy formulation processes and charts its path differently by reviewing the comparative structures, features and policy formulation processes of selected regional schemes, with a view to identifying the various challenges to efficient policy formulation in ECOWAS.

The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section two discusses the institutional structures, features and policy formulation processes of ECOWAS, the EU and ASEAN regional integration schemes. Section three is concerned with West African regional institutions and the challenges of policy formulation. Section four offers policy advice for a more efficient and effective policy formulation process in West Africa. Finally, in section five, policy lessons are drawn and relevant recommendations are offered for moving towards a more dynamic and efficient regional policy formulation in West Africa.

Institutional Structures, Features and Policy Formulation Processes of ECOWAS, EU and ASEAN

This section reviews the institutional structures, basic features and policy formulation processes of different regional integration schemes with the aim of underscoring the peculiarities and differences between these regional schemes, as far as policy formulation and implementation processes are concerned.²

Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)

The ECOWAS was established in May 1975, with the task of promoting cooperation, economic development and harmonizing regional sectoral policies. It is comprised of 15 member states namely Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Ivory Coast, the Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo.³ The current institutional structure and characteristics of ECOWAS are more or less identical to those of the European Union (EU) model from which most international integration schemes draw inspiration (Bilal, S., 2005). The ECOWAS institutional arrangement is comprised of the Authority of Heads of States, the Commission, the Council, the Parliament and the Court of Justice.⁴

The Conference of Heads of State and Government is the supreme decision-making authority of the Community. While the Commission located in Abuja, Nigeria, consists of the President, Vice President and seven Commissioners who are charged with the primary function of overseeing the activities of the organization. Its sole responsibility is the execution of and monitoring of ECO-

2 The EU is undoubtedly seen as the global role model for regional economic and political integration. See Table1 for details.

3 The major objectives remain the constitution of a vast West African Common Market and creation of a Monetary Union.

4 This is laid down in Chapter III, Art. 6 of the Treaty of ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States, 1993). Of course, alongside these major institutions, there is a multitude of additional autonomous institutions which draw their legitimacy from ECOWAS. At the administrative level, there are many technical commissions, comprising of experts in various fields, who meet and prepare the ground for ECOWAS meetings. They summarize research and make recommendations for policy decisions. Also, there is 'Council of the Wise' who are elder statesmen or well-regarded individuals who take part in "quiet diplomacy" in order to help resolve disputes.

WAS policies and programs. It is also responsible for the preparation and implementation of decisions of the Conference of Heads of State and Government and the rules of the Council of Ministers. The Council of Ministers, which is comprised of ministers from member states, is responsible for the smooth running and development of the Community. The ECOWAS Parliament, on the other hand, is made up of 120 members appointed from the respective parliaments of the Member-States and has the responsibility of taking up all matters of concern to the Community, especially with regard to human rights and fundamental freedoms. The ECOWAS Court of Justice ensures respect of the law and principles of equity, in the interpretation and application of the Treaty. It deals with all matters between member states relating to the ECOWAS treaty such as interpretation of the treaty (Akinbobola, 2001).

On a general note, African regionalism has been mostly described as symbolic, discursive and 'summitry.' This 'shadow regionalization' draws attention to the possibility of public officials, within the state, to be active in informal market activities which promote either their political goals or their private economic interests. Thus, regionalism is used as a discursive and image-boosting exercise (Söderbaum 2012, p. 4).

The European Union (EU)

The signing of Treaty of Rome on March 25, 1957 by six countries namely, France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, The Netherlands and Luxemburg marked the beginning of economic cooperation and integration in Europe.⁵ More precisely, the European Union was formally established in November 1993 after the signing of the Treaty of Maastricht with twenty-seven member states as at today. Its mission is to organize relations among member states in different policy fields in a coherent manner on the basis of solidarity. This mission can be further encapsulated by the objectives of promoting economic and social advancement, developing an area of freedom, security and justice and maintaining and building on established European Union laws (Mayoral, 2010).

The institutional structure of the EU is mainly comprised of the Council, the Par-

liament and the Commission. The Council of the European Union symbolises the Union's main decision-making body and is composed of one representative from each national government, with each Minister politically accountable to his home government. Meanwhile, the European Parliament which is the main body that directly represents the people of the member states consists of 754 members and has legislative, budgetary and supervisory power. The European Commission on the other hand, represents and upholds the interests of the EU. The Commissioners, who are usually appointed to a five-year term, can be said to be the driving force within the EU's institutional system, through monitoring compliance with the EU Treaties (Bomberg, Peterson and Richard, 2012; Corbett, Jacobs, and Shackleton, 2011). Basically, the structure of the EU has been characterised as formal, legalistic and bureaucratic regionalism (Fjader, 2012). Of course, the multilevel institutional characteristics and framework of the EU are fundamentally structured around its supranational sovereignty. This multilevel governance posits that power and decision-making in Europe are not concentrated at one level (Hooghe and Marks, 2001).

With respect to policy formulation and implementation, the European Union policies are developed through a sharing of responsibilities between the Council, the Parliament and the Commission. Regarding the EU policy formulation process, the rules and procedures are well detailed in the treaties. The Treaty of Lisbon or Reform Treaty aimed at strengthening the capacity of the EU to decide and to reform the EU's decision-making process, in particular by amending legislative procedures.

Today, there are three decision-making procedures as envisioned in the Treaty of the Functioning of the EU. The decision-making process in general starts with the Commission which creates a draft and submits a legislative proposal for common action in a selected policy field to the Parliament and Council for consultation and further action. While this proposal is to be attended to by both the Council and the Parliament, the final decision is taken by the Council alone or together with the Parliament, depending on which decision-making procedure is prescribed. Meanwhile, the legislative processes of EU policy making are two-fold namely, the ordinary and special procedures. With the Treaty of Lisbon the ordinary legislative procedure which replaces the co-decision procedure.⁶

⁵ The formation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951 actually creates the foundation for the now European Union (Gibert and Large 1991, p. 437).

⁶ The procedure is laid down in Art. 294 of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union (Official Journal of the European Union, 2010).

It involves joint decisions and agreement by the Council and the Parliament before a decision can be formulated (Piattoni, 2009).

In addition, the voting rule under the ordinary legislative procedure is that of qualified majority (Steunenberg and Selck, 2006).⁷ Meanwhile, with regard to the special legislative procedures, the consultative and assent procedures still exist.⁸ The cooperation procedure was abolished with the Treaty of Lisbon. This structure is justified on the basis that it makes the EU's decision-making process more simplified, clearer and efficient.

For the consultation procedure, the Council is expected to consult the European Parliament before a policy can be decided upon and consequently formulated.⁹ In the assent procedure, the Council may take a decision if it has the express approval of the European Parliament. The assent procedure allows the Council to only obtain the Parliament's assent, before an important decision is taken.

Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)

The 'Bangkok declaration' (Bangkok Declaration, 1967) issued on August 1967 in Bangkok, by the Foreign Ministers of Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand and the Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia led to the establishment of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). ASEAN is a political and economic regional scheme in Southeast Asia, with currently ten member states and was formed for the overall purpose of merging economic, social and political national and regional interests. The regional scheme works within the political sphere, attempting to establish regional solidarity through unified actions. Basically, the objectives behind the establishment of ASEAN are aimed at accelerating economic growth and promoting regional peace and stability (Guangsheng, 2006). In the institutional structure of ASEAN, the highest decision-making body is the annual meeting of the ASEAN Heads of State and Government, which rotates its chairmanship annually between member

states in alphabetical order. The ASEAN Summit is preceded by a Joint Ministerial Meeting (JMM) composed of Foreign and Economic Ministers.

While the ASEAN Standing Committee is mandated to harmonize the work of the Association in between the annual ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM). The Chair and Vice Chair are elected based on alphabetical rotation of all ASEAN Member Countries. Also, the ASEAN Secretariat, headed by the Secretary-General of ASEAN, is mandated to "initiate, advise, coordinate and implement ASEAN activities." The operational budget of the ASEAN Secretariat is prepared annually and funded by the equal contribution of all ASEAN Member Countries (Angeles, 2000). The ASEAN regional focus is divided into three central Community Councils, each of which presides over different sectoral ministerial bodies. The political-security community adopts peaceful processes in the settlement of intra-regional differences, while the economic community creates a stable and highly competitive ASEAN economic region with free flow of goods, equitable economic growth and development. The socio-cultural community, on the other hand, relates to a community of caring societies and is founded on common regional identity (Angeles, 2000).

The structure of ASEAN regionalism is characterized by soft and minimal institutionalization with low levels of supranationalism. In fact, the 'ASEAN Way' which implies that the norms and values of ASEAN regionalism give preference to consensus building by encouraging the member countries to pursue informal and incremental approaches towards co-operation, through lengthy consultations and dialogues (Acharya, 2002).¹⁰ Again, despite the deepening of the integration process, national interests and 'sovereignty' still prevail with the limited participation of civil society in its decision-making processes. Throughout its history, ASEAN has based its decisions on consensus and consultation, producing a loosely defined and weak regional organization (Ahmad and Baladas, 1999). ASEAN's non-legalistic style of decision-making and the fact that there is no transfer of national sovereignty to a supranational authority, form the informal structure of its policy formulation process (Soesastro, 1995). This policy formulation mechanism allows member states to base their actions on how they as individual nations perceive their interests would be best served by group

7 The qualified majority is laid down in Art. 16, Paragraph 4 of the Treaty of the European Union (Official Journal of the European Union, 2010).

8 The procedure is laid down in Art. 289 of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union (Official Journal of the European Union, 2010).

9 Here, the opinion of the Parliament is not necessarily binding.

10The so-called "ASEAN Way" of regional cooperation emphasizes constitutive norms characterized by a low degree of institutional formalization.

resolutions. Hence, the constraints of group decision-making and divergent interests between member states play a major role in shaping the effectiveness of resolutions.¹¹

In summary, the comparative differences regarding the institutional structure, characteristics and policy formulation processes of the regional schemes under consideration are clear. Firstly, the EU institutions create a formidable institutional infrastructure which supports the European policy-making process. This is in contrast to the ASEAN structure which relies solely on the ideas and practices of the 'ASEAN way' (Acharya 2001, p. 6). In other words, rather than making binding regional decisions, regional institutions have been built on the basis of intergovernmental agreement and consensus. Hence, in its commitment to becoming a more structured organization, ASEAN continues to engage in regional cooperation, primarily through a complex system of consultations, dialogues and decision making. Comparing these experiences with what is obtainable in ECOWAS, leads to the indisputable conclusion that the inefficient policy formulation processes of ECOWAS can be traced to the weak structure of its institutions.

West African Regional Institutions and Challenge of Policy Formulation

The different factors which inhibit the efficient regional policy formulation and implementation processes in ECOWAS are enumerated and discussed with reference to the structures and experiences of the other regional schemes under consideration, the EU and ASEAN. The following factors are identified as crucial for efficient regional policy formulation and implementation in ECOWAS.

¹¹The hierarchy of ASEAN's decision-making process is divided into 'Tracks.' Track I encompasses all official decisions made by diplomatic representatives of the member states. Track II deals with hypothetical policies proposed mainly by think tanks and academic institutions, essentially serving as a forum for potential ideas. Track III is also a forum, one that consists of civil society groups and special-interest lobbies.

Inclusive Policy Formulation Process

As the quality of policy depends on the institutional capacity to manage policy-making processes in order for every region to enhance its competitiveness, its institutions must be efficient, transparent and inclusive during its processes of policy formulation. The current structure of the ECOWAS policy formulation process is characterized by a lack of non-governmental inputs and informed debate. Not only would the participation of non-state actors (NSAs) in the policy formulation process foster policy implementation and of course, promote checks and balances, it would also foster 'bottom-up' consultative policy formulation mechanisms, which fundamentally defines the renewed vision 2020 of ECOWAS (ECOWAS Vision 2020, 2010). Private participation in the ECOWAS policy process is lacking due to the fact that individuals have no place in the minds of the policy framers, unlike the EU example, where policy formulation mostly evolves from study groups and informal meetings of stakeholders and corporate organizations (Aspinwall, 1998). In the absence of policy formulation inclusiveness, interest groups may not always be aware of the nature and contents of policy until implementation begins. As these 'informal' actors have vested interests in the outcomes of regional policy and hence are not a passive component in the policy formulation process, undermining their inputs would be detrimental. This, of course, results in a poor pre-policy consultative process and policy implementation. Therefore, inclusive policy formulation helps in attaining the ECOWAS Vision 2020. This vision is focused upon providing "ownership" of institutional policies, which provides policy space for member states to design national strategies, within the regional development framework. As, the vision 2020 reflects a "bottom-up" approach, involving a large number of citizens through consultative mechanisms, the awareness and participation of citizens in the design and execution of ECOWAS policy and programs are critical to the success of regional integration efforts. Further, research institutions have been marginalized to the extent that their findings do not meaningfully impact on the policy process. This inability to mobilize and utilize the available capacities renders policy making a purely symbolic exercise. Again, consultation on draft impact assessments, feedback from national parliaments and consultation with regional and local governments would ensure a more balanced and effective participation of all stakeholders in ECOWAS policy making.

Weak Institutional Capacity

The need to consider policy formulation processes within the context of the national and regional institutional environment (political, economic, cultural and social) cannot be over emphasized. One fact that cannot be overlooked with respect to West African regionalism is that the institutional capacity, which is required to generate and drive efficient and effective policy formulation, is weak (African Development Bank and African Development Fund 2011, p. 12).

The policy process can be placed in three stages, namely, policy making processes, policy implementation processes and policy analysis and evaluation processes (Birkland, 2011). The institutional culture of policy evaluation, monitoring of implementation and feedback mechanisms are further problem areas in West African regionalism. With the absence of proper policy implementation monitoring, previous mistakes remain undetected and uncorrected. Hence, there would be no meaningful lessons drawn from past performance. While financial commitments are always an indicator of political commitment, another significant indicator is the level of ratification of community decisions (protocols and conventions). As a majority of ECOWAS member states are more or less democratic, ratification is an important step. Therefore, the level of ratification indicates how seriously a member state takes the decisions made during summits among heads of state. In conclusion, these challenges represent the internal management weaknesses within the ECOWAS institutions, leading to poor linkages within and between the ECOWAS institutions. This, therefore, reinforces the need for efficient and effective networking and partnerships.

Ethnicity and Weak National Allegiances

Many West African countries are composed of several large cultural groups, each with its own language and practices. Such polarized societies may be more prone to competitive rent-seeking behaviors, as each group tries to extract resources. A specific example is Nigeria. With over 260 tribal and cultural groups, one of the fundamental developmental challenges facing Nigeria is the huge disconnect from national identity and orientation (Suberu and Osaghae, 2005). Historically, ethnicity and tribal predicaments are known to be major underlying factors fueling different national upheavals ranging from resource control tensions, land/territorial disputes, political and religious conflicts. Of course, the consequent result of weak national allegiance is obvious. This is one of the

salient features of West African integration. Thus, if the centre 'fails to hold' on a national scale, how strong and smooth would the integration process be on a regional level? Given the fact that the passion for territorial identity among member states has failed to give way to pan-territorialism, most of the leaders tend to value their economic sovereignty more than any program or policy aimed at developing the integration. The monologue of 'to your tent oh Israel!' is more audible than the chorus of 'together we stand!'

Away from the ethnicity problem, external dictates and/or dominance is another factor inhibiting the West African regional policy making process. The practice has often been that external organizations set the pace and direction of development policies, thus, adding an international dimension to the national policy-making processes (Mutahaba, Baguma and Halfani, 1993). Unfortunately, little progress has been recorded on increasing the efficiency of policy formulation and implementation, due to factors related to the wide economic disparity which exists in the ECOWAS sub-region.

Policy Advice and Recommendation

Following this description of the conditions which are contributing to an ineffective and inefficient policy formulation process in ECOWAS, this section attempts to advance some policy advice and recommendations for more successful policy formulation in West Africa. First of all, a more efficient ECOWAS policy formulation process can be attained through efficient and effective structural coordination and synergy between the internal institutional structures. This could be achieved through an improved allocation of roles and competences, shared tasks on the national level and a reduction in institutional fragmentation. Of course, keeping in mind, that extreme institutional fragmentation can be detrimental to efficient policy coordination, integration and implementation. There is also the need for renewed efforts towards impact assessment (IA) ideology. The institutional structure of ECOWAS does not really reflect democracy as there is no separation of powers. The treaty of ECOWAS provides that the Authority of Heads of State is the supreme body. Meanwhile, drawn from the EU pluralistic co-decision procedure, where policy formulation focuses principally around the Commission, Parliament and the Judiciary, the ECOWAS policy formulation structure needs to be reviewed to make it more pluralistic in the sense of civil participation and separation of powers.

Though the theoretical approaches to the study of regional integration, based on readings of the European Union model, may offer an insight into the processes of integration in the West African sub region, there is no doubt that the historical, political, and cultural contexts are sufficiently different as to ensure different paths towards regional cooperation. While ECOWAS and other regional integration schemes are often compared in most comparative regional studies with the successes and achievements of the EU, it is unhelpful to draw too many comparisons between the EU and ECOWAS, as EU institutions fulfill different or more extensive roles than their equivalents in West Africa. Though ECOWAS and ASEAN regional blocks have a different socio-economic and political background with many intricate realities that affect them, a clear comparison between them is possible for different reasons which include similarities in the diversity of cultures, multiple languages, traditions and the fragmented political structures. To this end, ECOWAS can learn a lot from the ASEAN integration process, especially with respects to the nature of the decision making process. The policy formulation process characterized by consultation, regional cooperation and dialogue has been identified as one of the driving forces of ASEAN integration. The rich socio-cultural and political landscapes which exist among most ECOWAS member states can be explored to further encourage mutual agreement and consensus building as against the current strict and legalistic institutional structure.

The above, therefore, reinforces the need for efficient and effective networking and partnerships between ECOWAS and ASEAN regional blocks. This is achievable through: (i) increasing periodic interaction between the two regions by creating exchange experiences and best practices; (ii) establishing and strengthening regular mechanisms for training, consultation, communication and sharing of information, experience and expertise; and (iii) identifying and implementing of joint concrete projects and activities. While ECOWAS and other regional integration schemes are often compared in most comparative regional studies with the successes and achievements of the EU, it is inapt to draw too many comparisons between the EU and ECOWAS since EU institutions fulfill different or more extensive roles than their equivalents in West Africa. Due to the different structural background, and varying challenges been face by these regional schemes, any comparisons must therefore be made with great care. Any useful comparison must, therefore, focus on areas where institutional arrangements and configuration appear similar.

Summary and Conclusion

The importance of the policy formulation process cannot be overemphasized given the dynamism of regional integration in the word. The success of any regional integration scheme can be said to be founded on efficient policy making and implementation. Comparative regionalism offers a great deal of inferences as it helps in reviewing policy formulation processes of regional schemes, with the aim of deducing valuable lessons. Drawing from the still limited interest of researchers to understand the fundamentals and dynamics of the regional policy formulation process in West Africa, it is important to underline the comparative inquiry of regional policy formulation processes vis-à-vis ECOWAS, EU and ASEAN. Consequently, this paper has identified some policy formulation challenges in ECOWAS such as a lack of inclusive policy formulation processes, weak policy evaluation and feedback mechanisms, political and financial commitment and problems of ethnicity and weak national allegiances. To improve its policy formulation and implementation for the benefit of regional development and dynamism, ECOWAS should address the factors and issues raised in this paper. Finally, clarity and consistency in management policies and procedures would promote greater institutional development.

| | EU (27) | ECOWAS (15) | ASEAN (10) |
|-------------------------------------|---|--|------------------------------------|
| Regional Structure | Highly structured & 'complex' | 'Shadow' institutions | Soft /Minimal institutionalization |
| Policy Formulation Process Ideology | Multi-level, clear & well spelt out rules in the treaties | No clear rules | No clear rules |
| Regional Sovereignty | Supranationalism | Nationalism | Nationalism |
| NSAs Participation | Full | Limited | Limited |
| Institutional Governance | Formal, legalistic and bureaucratic regionalism | Monopolistic, discursive and low formalisation | 'ASEAN Way' (consensus building) |

Table 1: Comparative Structure of Regional Scheme: ECOWAS, EU and ASEAN. Source: Compiled by author.

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