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Editorial

The financial and budgetary problems of several member states appear to be the centre of attention of the entire European Union. In this situation, actors and the public alike tend to neglect the importance of Europe's international interconnectedness beyond these issues. However, just as current challenges have domestic as well as international origins, remedies to some of Europe's current problems might not only be found within its own geographic limitations. Development perspectives go well beyond its own boundaries. This is particularly highlighted by the European Union's continuous commitment to enlargement, despite a considerable slowdown of this policy over the past years.

Many have already commented on the so-called enlargement fatigue, while the ongoing debate for or against Turkish membership in the Union in particular has hardly produced any new arguments. However, if one takes interdependencies and interconnectedness seriously, the debate needs to take on a specific angle by asking what benefits can be expected of Turkish membership - for the EU and for Turkey. To phrase it differently: What are the "costs" of preventing Turkey from being integrated into the European Union? Just as the Cecchini Report in 1988 argued the case for the completion of the internal market, enlargement can also be - and needs to be - addressed from such a point of view. This issue of the *ZEI EU-Turkey-Monitor* features reflections on exactly these "costs" of non-integration, together with an article highlighting the potential of integration by looking at Science and Research as a positive example - the only chapter in accession negotiations with Turkey so far that has been opened and (provisionally) closed.



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Ahmet Davutoglu, Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Janos Martonyi, Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs, meet at the EU-Turkey Association Council on 19 April 2011 under Hungarian Presidency.
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THE "COST" OF TURKEY'S NON-INTEGRATION INTO THE EUROPEAN UNION

William Chislett

In the six years since Turkey started its EU accession negotiations, the country has only opened 13 of the 35 'chapters' or areas of EU law and policy needed to complete the process, and closed just one of them (science and research). About 18 chapters (the key ones) are blocked or frozen, by the EU as a whole, by France or by Cyprus for a variety of reasons. On the one hand, Turkey still refuses to extend its customs union with the EU (in effect since 1996) and allow Greek Cypriot vessels access to its ports and airports, thereby recognizing the state of Cyprus (an EU member since 2004) and has yet to replace its authoritarian 1982 constitution, drawn up after a military coup, with one that reflects democratic and liberal values. On the other hand, France is blocking five chapters related to economic and monetary union, on the grounds that this opens the door to full EU membership and together with Germany is offering Turkey a "privileged partnership" without defining what this means. Meanwhile support inside

and outside of Turkey for the country's full EU membership continues to decline.

It is thus by no means certain that Turkey will one day join the EU. What would be the "cost" for Europe of Turkey never joining the EU, either because it decides not to or because it never makes the grade because of its own failures or rejection by some countries? This article looks briefly at the various areas that would be affected. While the name of the game in the EU as a whole seems to be to do the minimum to keep Turkey on board in the accession negotiations, there is no guarantee that this policy will succeed. Neither side wants to make the first move and throw in the towel, particularly Turkey. Moreover, a decision to terminate Turkey's EU accession process would require unanimity among the 27 EU governments, something that would be extremely difficult to achieve.

Economic consequences

It is a measure of the success of the Turkish economy in recent years that

▶ British Prime Minister David Cameron regards Turkey as the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, China) of Europe. With an annual average real GDP growth rate of close to 6% between 2003 and 2010 (an annual rate of 8.8% in the second quarter of 2011), Turkey is the fastest growing G20 economy after China and is slated to be the second largest economy in Europe by 2050. It is currently the 16th largest economy in the world and the sixth as compared to EU countries (in purchasing power parity). Per capita GDP increased from \$3,500 in 2002 to more than \$9,000 in 2010.

As a result of much better macroeconomic management than during the 1990s, regarded as a 'lost decade', the country currently meets the Maastricht criteria in terms of the budget deficit and the stock of public debt (below 3% of GDP in the first case and less than 60% in the second). Thanks to structural reforms introduced in 2001, no Turkish bank has had to be rescued as a result of the global financial crisis. A strong and stable Turkish economy is very much in the EU's interests, as this would enhance business opportunities and reduce the need for Turks to migrate and find jobs elsewhere. Fears, particularly in France and Germany, of a massive influx of Turks into the EU were the country to join the Union are one of the main factors behind opposition to membership.

Over the last 30 years, Turkey has become a much more open economy. Exports and imports of goods and services have grown from 17% of GDP in 1980 to more than 50%, although compared to other countries with a similar level of development, it is still modest (see Figure 1).

The EU is by far Turkey's most important trade partner and supplies more than three-quarters of the country's foreign direct investment (FDI). Turkey has great potential for European business, with its young and fast-growing market (half of the 75 million population is under the age of 29), its proven base for high-quality manufacturing and its companies familiar with a wide and deve-

loping region of which Turkey is a principal commercial hub.

The strong growth in FDI is testimony to Turkey's attractiveness. For decades Turkey received no more than \$1 billion of inward FDI a year. As a result of the decision taken in December 2004 to open accession negotiations in October 2005, FDI surged (see Figure 2). Failure to join the EU would clearly harm European companies and probably put them at a disadvantage in their attempts to win contracts.

The energy impact

Turkey is set to play a major role in the EU's future energy needs and diversification policy. This is better done with the country inside the Union as security of Europe's supply would be enhanced.

The European Commission estimates the EU's overall import dependency will rise from more than 53% to around 70% by 2026, despite the efforts directed at saving energy and improved energy efficiency.¹ In the case of natural gas and oil, import dependency levels are forecast to reach more than 80% and 90%, respectively.

Turkey itself has no oil or natural gas of its own, but it is ideally placed as an energy corridor between Central Asia and Europe.² EU countries obtain oil from a large number of sources, but in the case of natural gas there is a very high level of dependency on Russia. This is neither politically wise nor economically advantageous, particularly in the case of authoritarian Russia. When Moscow turned off the gas to Ukraine in 2006, it sent shudders across Europe as customers are increasingly dependent on Russia to keep warm.

The 2008 EU Energy Security and Solidarity Action Plan emphasizes the central role of Turkey for secure gas supplies to Europe. There are currently seven pipelines in operation in Turkey and seven planned. The 3,300km Nabucco pipeline, in particu-

lar, is of crucial importance as it is designed to bring gas from Central Asia, one of the world's richest gas regions, to Austria via Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary. The pipeline is aimed at meeting 5% to 10% of European gas requirements as well as functioning as an alternative supply route that would end the complete dependency of some eastern European member states on Russia. The main supplier countries in this project are Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan (both of which have close relations with Turkey as they are part of the Turkic world) and Iraq.

The agreement for the Nabucco pipeline was signed in July 2009 and it would not cross Russian territory. Construction is due to start in 2012, with the first gas flowing in 2015. When operating at full capacity, Nabucco would transport 1,550 bcm to Europe over 50 years. This means that an economy the size of Germany could be supplied solely with Nabucco gas for over 16 years.

In the words of Ruprecht Polenz, the Christian Democrat Union (CDU) chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the German parliament, 'the supreme importance of secure energy supplies for our economic development now and in future makes it seem sensible to incorporate Turkey into the EU, and thus make it part of the common energy supply area into which the EU ought to develop.'³ Polenz is one of the few CDU leaders who strongly supports Turkey's full EU membership, and for many other reasons other than energy.

The migration impact

One of the main reasons for opposition to Turkey's EU membership is the fear that this would lead to a massive influx of Turks into the Union. The same scare tactic was used to oppose Spain's membership, particularly in France. It proved to be unfounded. Just as Spaniards did not migrate on mass to European countries after joining the EU in 1986 – they began to return to their own country before then when membership was in sight – so something similar is already happening in Turkey. The number of Turks who have returned home from Germany, the EU country with by far the largest Turkish community (an estimated 3.5 million people of Turkish origin live there), now exceeds the number of Turkish migrants arriving in Germany. This is not because Turkey's EU membership is around the corner, far from it, but because the Turkish economy is stronger, as a result of the reforms triggered by the process of joining the EU,⁴ and job prospects there are thus better than they were a decade ago.

The way to reduce the flow of Turkish migrants to Europe is to lock the country into the EU's macroeconomic framework and not to shut the country out.

Figure 1. Degree of Openness of the Turkish Economy, 1980-2008 (% of GDP)

	1980	1990	2000	2008
Turkey	17.1	31.0	43.2	52.3
Euro area	52.8	54.7	72.9	80.1
Middle income countries	32.5	39.3	52.8	59.7

Source: World Bank, Quick Query Data Source.

Figure 2. Foreign Direct Investment Flows in Turkey (\$million) and Stock (% of GDP)

1995-2004 (annual average)	2005-2007 annual average	2008	2009	2010
1,404	17,421	19,504	8,411	9,071
Stock as % of GDP 6.6 (1995)				24.5

Source: World Investment Report 2011, UNCTAD.

▶ European Security and Defence Policy

The friction between Turkey and the EU, and in particular between Turkey and Cyprus, is a major barrier to closer links between the EU and NATO. The strains between the two blocs would worsen if Turkey never joined the EU, to the detriment of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).

While Turkey, with NATO's second-largest standing army after the US and an early member of the Alliance (in 1952) vetoes any attempt at allowing Greek Cypriot authorities to access classified NATO documents, Cyprus (not a member of NATO) blocks Turkish participation in EU defence bodies. Turkey has no access to EU documents relating to military missions (even those in which it participates), and is not even allowed as an observer in relevant decision-making processes. It is the only NATO member not to have signed a security agreement with the EU. However, these obstacles to NATO-EU cooperation cannot be solely attributed to the Cyprus problem; there is a lack of political will to include non-EU allies.

Turkey has long been part of the European security architecture. More than a decade ago it obtained a virtual member status within the Western European Union (WEU), but this proved to be of a temporary nature as the 1998 agreement between the UK and France, which paved the way for the establishment of a European Security and Defence Policy within EU structures, led to the disbanding of the WEU as the EU's security institution. It also meant the sudden vanishing of all the hard fought *acquis* regarding the foundation of the security relationship between Turkey and the EU.

The security relationship between Turkey and the EU that then emerged was influenced to a large extent by the EU's internal political dynamics and, as of 2004, compounded by the EU enlargement and the entry of Cyprus, which, because it is not a member of NATO nor of the Partnership for Peace (PfP), cannot participate in EU missions drawn on NATO capabilities. Two years before Cyprus joined the EU, the European Council decided that only the member states that are simultaneously members of either NATO or the Partnership for Peace were eligible for ESDP operations that use NATO assets. Turkey strictly interprets a parallel North Atlantic Council decision of 2002 and blocks the participation of Cyprus in NATO-EU strategic cooperation.

Turkey's contribution to the ESDP surpasses that of several EU member states and it is the most active participant in ESDP missions among third countries. Turkey is the second largest troop contributor to Operation Althea in Bosnia-Herzegovina, despite the decision-making body – the European Defence Agency (EDA) – being completely off-limits to Ankara. Given the size of Turkey's

army (the largest among European members of NATO) and of its defence budget, the country's non-participation in the EDA is a serious liability for this body.

Turkey also has more peacekeeping troops in Afghanistan than most EU countries, such as Spain, and is the only Muslim country to participate in the NATO-led mission.

Turkey's more assertive foreign policy: an asset not a liability

Unsurprisingly, Ankara's foreign policy is more assertive and increasingly looks toward the east. Since the end of the Cold War, when Turkey ceased to be the sentinel on the front line, it was only natural that the country should choose to forge a more independent foreign policy towards its backyard that reflected its own interests and not just those of its NATO allies, as well as its burgeoning economic strength. Now, given the pace of accession talks, Ankara is understandably even keener to keep all options open.

There has been a lot of silly talk about Turkey turning its back on the west in favour of re-engagement with the lands once ruled by its sultans during the Ottoman Empire.⁵ However, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan's belligerent rhetoric – which plays to the gallery of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), a party with Islamist roots, – does not help matters as it antagonises people in the US and the EU.

Many of the steps taken under Ankara's 'zero-problem' foreign policy, a broad initiative to develop good relations with all of Turkey's neighbours and countries beyond, are clearly positive: mending fences with Syria (the old risk of war over issues such as Syria's backing of the PKK terrorist group during the 1990s has given way to visa-free travel); signing a landmark deal with Armenia to open the shared border (yet to happen) closed by Ankara since 1993 in support of its ally Azerbaijan (in conflict with Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh); hosting talks between Afghanistan and Pakistan; and liaising with Sunni militants in Iraq. Relations with

Georgia and Greece have greatly improved, and Russia has become Turkey's leading trading partner and one of its top suppliers of tourists. A Turk, Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu, won the first democratically contested election to lead the 57-member Organisation of the Islamic Conference.

Relations with Israel, however, have severely deteriorated since 2010 when Israeli soldiers stormed the Mavi Marmara, a ship that was trying to break Israel's blockade of Gaza – some eight Turkish citizens were killed during the attack. Israel has refused to apologise and pay compensation. In September 2011, Turkey expelled Israel's top diplomats in Ankara and suspended military ties with the Jewish state.

Turkey is becoming an influential actor with considerable 'soft power' in the Western Balkans and the Middle East. It is shaping up to be a significant actor in the region. This can only benefit European security in the broadest sense and enhances Turkish claims for EU admission. And Turkey's greatly increased volume of trade with its neighbours is helping, albeit very modestly so far, to integrate the region more into the global system.

Turkey's foreign policy would not be an easy fit within the EU, but in the words of a report by the Transatlantic Academy, it is 'an asset to the Western Alliance precisely because its policies in the neighbourhood are distinct and not simply a replica of (often unsuccessful) American and EU policies in these regions.'⁶

The Cyprus problem

Turkey's failure to join the EU for whatever reason would most probably leave Cyprus permanently divided between the Turkish Cypriot north of the island and the Greek Cypriot south (see Figure 3), although there is no direct linkage between the EU membership and reunification issues. The country has already been divided for 37 years, since Turkey's invasion in 1974.

The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyp-

Figure 3. Cyprus



Source: CIA.

► rus could then either become a separate and possibly recognised country or consolidate itself as the 82nd province of Turkey, which is what effectively it is at the moment. In this scenario, Greek Cypriots would forego the economic boost of reunification over the long term and tensions would rise in the eastern Mediterranean.

The loss of a beacon for the Middle East?

Turkey's EU accession process is engineering a political and economic transformation of the country, albeit in fits and starts, which is being closely watched in the Middle East, particularly in the "Arab spring" countries. Judging by Erdogan's triumphal tour of Egypt, Tunisia and Libya earlier this month, the Turkish Prime Minister is the most popular politician in the Arab world. According to the latest Arab Attitudes, the annual survey carried out by Zogby International for the Arab American Institute Foundation, Erdogan's ratings are very high from Morocco (80% approval) to Saudi Arabia (98%).

Were Turkey to join the EU, the country would be consolidated as a beacon for the spreading of liberal ideas and practices in its neighbourhood. It would show that democracy and the Islamic faith are compatible. Failure to enter the EU would run the risk of dampening the reformist spirit in Turkey and diminishing the country's positive influence in its region.

Just as the EU's soft power – defined by Joseph Nye, the inventor of the term, as the 'ability to shape the preferences of others' – is credited with transforming eight formerly communist Eastern and Central European countries into democracies and free market economies and for acting as a catalyst for the modernisation of Turkey, so too Turkey's own emerging soft power is beginning to be felt in its region.⁷ Soft power has proved to be much more effective in shaping societies than US hard (military) power.

Halkan Altınay, who heads the Open Society Institute in Istanbul, part of the Soros Foundations Network, which is particularly active in promoting civil society, likens Turkey's soft power to an unpolished gem. As progress is made in the EU accession negotia-

tions and Turkey becomes more democratic and wealthier so the gem will sparkle more. If the country does not join the EU, the gem will lose lustre.

Conclusion: kick-starting negotiations

EU governments should come clean and start 'talking Turkey'. So far, there has been little more than double-talk and evasiveness, even among its supporters. A confidence-building measure would be to invite the Turkish president or prime minister to EU summits, which was the case before 2007 for the leaders of candidate countries.

The EU should give Turkey a firm target date for accession. This should be 2023, to mark the 100th anniversary of the founding of the republic. Turkish disillusionment and EU prevarication is creating a vicious circle that needs to be broken and, in its place, the previous virtuous circle of Turkey-EU convergence re-established.

References

- 1) European Commission, Green Paper. *A European Strategy for sustainable, competitive and secure energy*, 2006.
- 2) Exploration is underway in the Black Sea and the results are yet to be announced.
- 3) Ruprecht Polenz, *Better for both of them. Turkey ought to be in the EU*, Körber Foundation, 2010, p. 57 (http://www.koerber-stiftung.de/fileadmin/user_upload/internationale_politik/pdf/2010/Koerber_Policy_Paper_No_12.pdf).
- 4) The stand-by agreements of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have also played a significantly positive role.
- 5) The *New York Times* ran an article on 8 June, 2010 with the headline 'Turkey Goes from Pliable Ally to Thorn for the US' and its columnist Thomas Friedman, describing a trip to Istanbul, found 'Turkey's Islamist government seemingly focused not on joining the European Union but the Arab league – no, scratch that, on joining the Hamas-Hezbollah-Iran resistance front against Israel ... I exaggerate, but not that much.'
- 6) Ahmet Evin et al., *Getting to Zero. Turkey, its Neighbours and the West*, Transatlantic Academy, 2010, p. 29 (http://www.bosch-stiftung.de/content/language1/downloads/Report_TA_GettingtoZeroFINAL.pdf).
- 7) See Hakan Altınay, 'Turkey's Soft Power: An Unpolished Gem or an Elusive Mirage?', *Insight Turkey*, Vol. 10, No. 2, p. 55-66.

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CHRONOLOGY

compiled by Dr. Volkan Altıntaş

1 July 2011: Poland takes over the Council Presidency from Hungary.

29 July 2011: Turkey's Chief of the General Staff, General Isik Kosaner, resigns along with the chiefs of the air force, the army and the navy in another round of irritations between the secular military and the current Turkish government under AK Party rule.

2 September 2011: Following the publication of a UN report accusing Israel of "excessive and unreasonable" action in the raid on the "Freedom Flotilla" on 31 May 2010, Turkey expels Gabby Levi, the Israeli ambassador to Turkey.

12 September 2011: Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan starts his tour to the "Arab Spring" countries Egypt, Tunisia and Libya, underscoring Turkey's ambition to play a leading role in the region.

18 September 2011: Turkish Deputy Prime Minister Besir Atalay states that Turkey will

ZEI ACTIVITIES

On 17 January 2011, ZEI, together with the Mediterranean Academy of Diplomatic Studies (MEDAC) Malta, organized a workshop discussing "Germany in the EU and the Mediterranean" in Bonn. The workshop brought together ZEI Fellows and researchers with more than a dozen young diplomats from Arab, Caucasian and African countries currently studying at MEDAC. In a key-note speech, Marc Jan Eumann, State Secretary for European Affairs in the Northrhine-Westphalian Ministry for Federal and European affairs, called for a clear continuation of a proactive European policy of Germany. Karl Xuereb, Ambassador of Malta to the Federal Republic of Germany, and ZEI Senior Fellow Dr. Andreas Marchetti discussed the current developments of the Union for the Mediterranean in a panel presided by Prof. Dr. Stephen Calleya, Director of MEDAC. Together with ZEI Director Prof. Dr. Ludger Kühnhardt, he expressed his gratitude to the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) to have made the academic exchange possible in the context of the DAAD sponsored German Chair in Peace and Conflict Prevention held at MEDAC by Prof. Dr. Monika Wohlfeld. More information on this and other events is available at www.zei.uni-bonn.de.

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ZEI Senior Fellow Dr. Andreas Marchetti, editor of the ZEI EU-Turkey-Monitor, is currently taking part in "likeminds – german-turkish junior expert initiative", a bilateral exchange programme realized by the Robert Bosch Stiftung, the European Academy of Berlin and the Istanbul Policy Center at Sabanci University. The programme brings together young German and Turkish professionals in order to discuss and exchange ideas, to inter-link participants with different backgrounds and to foster mutual understanding. By doing so, "likeminds" aims at the creation and deepening of professional and personal networks. More information can be found on the European Academy's website: www.eab-berlin.de.

freeze relations with the EU if Cyprus takes over the rotating EU presidency, scheduled for the second half of 2012.

18 September 2011: Turkish President Abdullah Gül heads for a four-day-visit to Germany. He meets with German President Christian Wulf and other high ranking politicians.

Sources: www.bbc.co.uk, www.guardian.co.uk, www.spiegel.de, www.focus.de.

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THE SCIENCE AND RESEARCH DIMENSION IN THE EUROPEAN INTEGRATION PROCESS

The Case of Turkey

Elif Özkaragöz

Introduction

In today's globalized world, one must use different forms and tools for international cooperation to resolve the global problems and "scientific and technical cooperation is one important way to avoid wars in crisis and to realize positive outcomes in an otherwise downward-spiralling policy environment."¹

Science has no boundaries and even the scientists coming from regions that are in conflict with each other can sit around the same table and join forces in common research. The European Union (EU) is no exception in this respect. It has used and still is using the international cooperation in Science, Technology (S&T) and Development as a soft power tool of diplomacy in its relations with both the developed and developing countries. It brings representatives of the member states, research institutions as well as industry together to realize this aim with the help of its institutions, especially the European Commission (in the case of S&T) and the EU Framework Programmes (FP) as its main instrument of European S&T cooperation with the rest of the world.²

Science and Research was the first chapter (no. 25 out of a total of 35 chapters) which was opened and provisionally closed successfully in 2006 within the negotiation process for Turkey's EU membership in line with the EU *acquis*. In terms of the *acquis*, Science and Research "as laid down in Title XV of the Treaty requires the Member States to ensure the necessary implementing capacities to pursue the Community objectives and activities in the field of research and technological development, including adequate staffing".³ Already from its provisional closure, it can be considered as one of the most successful areas and an example of best practice in EU-Turkey relations. This progress has also been reflected in the annual Progress Reports on Turkey published by the European Commission and in the increasing success rates of Turkey in FP7. In this sense, the positive impetus of Turkey in its integration in the European Research Area (ERA) can be seen as a spillover from its path to EU integration – and vice versa.

The European Research Area (ERA) and the Science and Research *acquis* of the EU

In 2000, the European Research Area (ERA) was initialized in order to encourage the free movement of researchers, to share knowledge effectively, to globally open national, regional and European research programmes and to develop strong links with the rest of the world. Hence, "the European Union decided that investment in research should increase in Europe. At present, less than 2% of Europe's wealth (GDP) is devoted to research, which compares poorly with 2.5% in the USA and more than 3% in Japan."⁴ Until now, progress has been slow, but concrete steps and measures have been taken in order to reach the 'Lisbon' objective of devoting 3% of GDP to research in Europe.

The European Research Area is comprised of all research and development related activities, programmes and policies in Europe that have a transnational perspective. The goal is to support the transnational cooperation and circulation of not only the researchers and research institutions, but also the business sector as well. "The aim is to give them access to a Europe-wide open space for knowledge and technologies in which transnational synergies and complementarities are fully exploited".⁵

In order to have a more effective European Research Area, the 'Ljubljana Process' was initiated in May 2008 with the aim of developing the governance structures in ERA. This process was further enhanced by the adoption of the 2020 Vision for ERA in December 2008.⁶ In addition, "[i]n 2010 the *Innovation Union Communication* has given a new strength to the ERA 2020 vision. By calling for the creation of a common framework of principles and objectives by 2014 the Union seeks to avoid the remaining fragmentation in its research systems."⁷

EU Framework Programmes

In 1984, the EU initiated the Framework Programmes (FP) with the aim of S&T integration of the European countries, to increase the scientific research and technology development capacity and to provide social and economic development. The FPs are the European Union's main financial instrument and therefore a key pillar for ERA and its declared goals.

The current Seventh Framework Programme (FP7) convenes together all research-related EU initiatives under a common roof. It plays an important role in reaching set goals of growth, competitiveness and employment, along with other European programmes such as the Competitiveness and Innovation Framework Programme (CIP), Education and Training programmes, and Structural and Cohesion Funds for regional convergence and competitiveness.⁸ FP7 has two major strategic objectives, namely strengthening the scientific and technological base of the European industry, and encouraging its international competitiveness through research.

Integration of Turkey into FPs

Turkey was already involved in the FP4 (1992-1998) and FP5 (1998-2002) on a project basis without making financial contributions. At the time, project expenses could be covered by own national resources and researchers could not coordinate projects and participate in all areas of FPs. However, the participation of Turkey in FP4 and FP5 on project basis paved the way to participation in later FPs on a full associated country basis.⁹

Starting from the FP6 (2002-2006), Turkey was involved in FPs as an associated partner. In 2002, the European Community and the Republic of Turkey signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on Turkey's association with the FP6. This meant that Turkey could now participate in the FPs on an equal basis with EU member states and coordinate projects. According to this MoU, Turkey established in 2003 the EU FP6 National Coordination Office (NCO) under the Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey (TÜBİTAK).

Following the FP6, on 1 June 2007 the European Community and the Republic of Turkey signed a new MoU on Turkey's association with the FP7 (2007-2013). Accordingly, Turkey participates in the FP7 under the same conditions applicable to EU member states and makes financial contributions to the FP7 as an associated country.¹⁰ As part of this MoU, a Joint EC-Turkey Research Committee was established as a means to monitor Turkey's association to the FP7.

Moreover, Turkey has prepared an Action Plan to increase the participa- 

► tion rates of Turkish researchers in the FP7 and to overcome obstacles still faced in FP6. It also aims at facilitating Turkey's integration into the European Research Area. The Action Plan also analyzed Turkey's involvement in FPs so far. According to this evaluation, Turkey's participation in the FPs also had a positive impact on the overall EU membership process between the EU and Turkey. By participating, Turkey could also improve its international scientific and technological capacity and – as a consequence – collaborations.

Science and Research in the Screening and Negotiation Processes

As stated, the Science and Research chapter was the first – and so far only – chapter which was opened *and* provisionally closed in EU-Turkey accession negotiations: It was opened during the Austrian Presidency on 12 June 2006 and provisionally closed the same day. The relevant *acquis* is composed of the Commis-

sion and Council decisions on the EU FP activities and the signed science and technology agreements with third countries.

The main issue in the Science and Research negotiations with Turkey was the active participation of Turkey in the FPs and if it sustained the necessary conditions in this respect.¹¹ Turkey's already existing scientific and technological collaboration with Europe under FP6, EUREKA, COST and bilateral agreements proved to be influential in the success of the negotiations on Chapter 25.

Already on 6 February 2006, the Screening Report for Turkey in the area of Science and Research had been published by the Commission. At the date of its publication, Turkey had around 220 scientific and technological bilateral cooperation agreements with 80 countries at both inter-governmental and inter-institutional level (21 of them being with EU member states), as well as a diversified cooperation with regional and international struc-

tures (such as COST, EUREKA, ESA, ESF, EMBC, NATO, OECD, UNESCO)¹² and two agreements with the European Community. Turkey additionally stated its willingness to fully accept all existing EC cooperation agreements.¹³

According to the Screening Report, Turkey overall recorded a good level of alignment with and capacity to implement the *acquis*.¹⁴ However, Turkey would need to ensure and demonstrate scientific freedom regarding all relevant scientific institutions and continuous and adequate availability of budgetary resources for the full application of the *acquis*.

Turkey should also “encourage participation of industry in research projects, to create the necessary conditions to stimulate investment in research by the private sector, to undertake actions to increase human resource capacities and to streamline research actions among universities”. Of course, Turkey's full association ► to all Framework Programmes (inclu-

CURRENT NEGOTIATING STATUS

No. Title of Chapter

1	Free movement of goods	●
2	Freedom of movement for workers	●
3	Right of establishment and freedom to provide services	●
4	Free movement of capital	●
5	Public procurement	●
6	Company law	●
7	Intellectual property law	●
8	Competition policy	●
9	Financial services	●
10	Information society and media	●
11	Agriculture and rural development	●
12	Food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary policy	●
13	Fisheries	●
14	Transport policy	●
15	Energy	●
16	Taxation	●
17	Economic and monetary policy	●
18	Statistics	●
19	Social policy and employment	●
20	Enterprise and industrial policy	●
21	Trans-European networks	●
22	Regional policy and coordination of structural instruments	●
23	Judiciary and fundamental rights	●
24	Justice, freedom and security	●
25	Science and research	●
26	Education and culture	●
27	Environment	●
28	Consumer and health protection	●
29	Customs union	●
30	External relations	●
31	Foreign, security and defence policy	●
32	Financial control	●
33	Financial and budgetary provisions	●
34	Institutions	●
35	Other issues	●

Legend: ● not yet opened ● suspended
 ● opened
 ● provisionally closed

Data as of September 2011

ZEI ACTIVITIES

From 5 to 16 September 2011, ZEI organized its fifth “ZEI Academy in Comparative Regional Integration”. 19 young professionals coming from universities, research institutes and institutions of regional integration schemes from all over the world enjoyed the opportunity to learn about various aspects of regional integration on the basis of the European example, to discuss and exchange with experts from academia and practice and also to present their own integration schemes to each other.

Although it is facing big challenges, the European integration process - because of its experience collected in the course of the last 60 years - is still a source of inspiration for integration schemes outside of Europe. The efforts for regional integration in Africa, Latin America, the Caribbean and Asia are different among each other as they are different from the European experience. Thus it would be wrong to just copy the European model. Still, with regard to the success in the fields of peace, stability and economic prosperity as well as with regard to the crises it has gone through, Europe is a frontrunner, an example from which other regions can learn. In this spirit, the “ZEI Academy” was a forum to enhance the knowledge about integration in the EU but especially also to debate other approaches to integration. The “ZEI Academy” is supported by the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) with funds of the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the “Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit” (GIZ).

▶ ding FP7/EURATOM) and improving the necessary capacity in this respect was also necessary. It was also reassured that Turkey's targets and concrete actions were in compliance with those of the Lisbon Strategy and would help to increase Turkey's Gross Expenditure on Research and Development (GERD) as a percentage of GDP.

Turkey's Science and Technology Landscape and Harmonization with the EU *acquis*

Turkey is also part of other European Science and Technology programmes other than the EU Framework Programmes, namely:¹⁵ Turkey participates as an observer to the EU Scientific and Technological Research Committee (CREST). Turkey is one of the founding members of the Cooperation in the Field of Scientific and Technological Research (COST). TÜBİTAK and the European Space Agency (ESA) signed a framework agreement on 15 July 2004. Turkey is also a member of the European Science Foundation (ESF), Competitiveness and Innovation Programme (CIP), European Molecular Biology Conference (EMBC), European Research Coordination Agency (EUREKA).

In the latest 2010 Progress Report,¹⁶ good progress was reported in the area of science and research policy. Certain regulatory arrangements were made in order to encourage international researchers to stay longer or permanently in Turkey. Moreover a "new support programme was launched to encourage the return to Turkey of Turkish researchers who have completed their doctoral studies but currently live abroad". The increasing success rates of Turkey in the FP7 were mentioned, but its research capacity and scientific excellence should be further improved.

In terms of research policy, the Turkish Supreme Council for Science and Technology (SCST) decided in December 2009 to begin preparing a national science, technology and innovation action plan for the 2011-2016 period. Turkey also started preparations for the FP8 and in this regard an online consultation process targeting the Turkish research community was laun-

ched. As a result, Turkey is well prepared in the area of science and research and good progress has been achieved towards future integration into the European Research Area.

Given a fast-paced level of growth, Turkey met its initial national target of 40,000 FTE (Full Time Equivalent) researchers – set for 2010 – much earlier; hence, the Supreme Council of Science and Technology (SCST) raised the national target to 150,000 FTE R&D personnel by 2013.

Turkey has long been and continues to be an advocate of raising science and technology to new heights, and has constantly driven science, technology and innovation (STI) forward. Even in the present global economic crisis, political as well as economic actors continue to invest in R&D and innovation, which is a key driver of future sustainable growth. The overall number of the people, universities and firms supported by national funds under Individual Grants, the Academic R&D funding and Technology and Innovation Grants has increased over the years.

Turkey has also recorded progress in its bilateral and multilateral scientific cooperation with an increase of 14% in bilateral scientific projects compared to the last reporting period. Moreover under the COST programme, the number of Actions has increased by 14% and the number of projects has increased by 18%.

Conclusion: Assessment of Turkey's EU Integration and the role of Science and Research

Given the figures and reports, it is evident that the Science and Research dimension is one of the most successful and fruitful areas in the Turkey-EU relationship for both sides. It can even be argued that Turkey is already part of the EU in this specific area.

In addition, in the case of Turkey's overall integration in the EU, the successful negotiations and integration process in the case of Science and Research can possibly generate spillover effects in other related fields of cooperation. After all, the conclusion of the respective chapter in

2006 had – to a certain degree – already paved the way for opening other chapters in the accession negotiations with the EU.

As a result, it can be argued that science and technology can be used as an effective soft power instrument in international cooperation and for a constructive foreign policy. In history, there are many examples of this kind of cooperation, which in the end yielded fruitful and peaceful results.¹⁷ The case of Turkey vis-à-vis the EU is a good example and such positive bilateral experiences should continue to structure and foster future cooperation.

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