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Editorial

Change has come to the Mediterranean. Many seem to have been taken by surprise by the 'Mediterranean Spring', having started with demonstrations and protests in Tunisia in late 2010. Only half a year later, the political landscape of the Mediterranean and – in a broader perspective – the Middle East has already been fundamentally altered: As Ben Ali's reign in Tunisia has come to an end and Hosni Mubarak had to step down in Egypt, other regimes in the region come increasingly under popular pressure. With some regimes turning to violence, as is particularly the case in Libya and Syria, the final outcome of the 'Mediterranean Spring' is all but clear. It is obvious, however, that the events have irrevocable implications for the entire region, including its Euro-Mediterranean, Turkish-Mediterranean and even EU-Turkish dimensions.

This issue of the *ZEI EU-Turkey-Monitor* focuses on different aspects of the radical change in the region and reflects development perspectives with particular focus on the European Union on the one hand and Turkey on the other. German MEP Ismail Ertug discusses in how far Turkey can serve as inspiration for transformative processes in the Southern Mediterranean. His analysis is complemented by reflections of Thomas Demmelhuber on the particular lessons Egypt could learn from Turkey, whereas Nalan Demiral and Andreas Marchetti address the European Union's – actual and potential – role in the Southern Mediterranean.



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14 April 2011, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon (centre) speaks with the heads of major regional organizations at a meeting on Libya in Cairo, including High Representative Catherine Ashton (right).
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TURKEY-EU COOPERATION IN LIGHT OF A CHANGING MEDITERRANEAN

Ismail Ertug

Revolutions in North Africa

The upheavals in North Africa, which started on 19 December 2010 in Tunisia after Mohamed Bouazizi set himself on fire, rapidly spread to other countries and are promising a new political future and the realization of such fundamental principles as democracy, rule of law, and human rights to the Mediterranean. For now, there are only two countries in which the revolutions have already resulted in concrete change: Tunisia and Egypt. Tunisian President Ben Ali left his country 25 days after the breakout of protests began. In Egypt, Hosni Mubarak transferred his executive authority to the army after several weeks of ongoing demonstrations on the Tahrir Square in downtown Cairo. While demonstrations are continuing in countries such as Algeria and Yemen, the international community has taken action in response to Muammar al'Gaddafi's use of force against demonst-

rators by intervening militarily, based on UN Security Council Resolution 1973 (2011).

Inspiration Turkey

Yet it is not certain, neither in Tunisia nor in Egypt, to what extent the demands of the people will eventually be met. The results of the revolts will only be identifiable after some time; especially the establishment of democratic structures cannot be achieved in the short term. What is certain, however, is that the countries will undergo substantial transformations. Accordingly, the path that will be followed in the transformation process is an issue of utmost interest to the European Union. Hence, it closely follows the debate on whether or not candidate country Turkey, being geographically, historically and culturally close to the countries of North Africa, could serve as a role-model for these states and thereby for the coexistence of democracy and Islam.

As a matter of fact, democracy in Turkey can be considered as an *examp-*

► *le*, rather than a *model* for the region, and neighboring countries should benefit from its experience. It is certainly true that Turkey shares common cultural values as well as a history of co-existence under Ottoman rule with the countries in Northern Africa. With reference to these times, it is worth noting that the history of efforts to establish democracy and to ensure the respect of human rights in Turkey is older than the history of the Turkish Republic itself. Ever since the Tanzimat Fermani – the Imperial Edict of Reorganization – in the early 19th century, restricting the authority of sultans and starting the movement of Westernization in the Ottoman Empire, Turkey has been striving for the realization of Western principles. One of the most dynamic periods of Turkey’s continuous drive towards democratization – filled with ups and downs, struggles, and coup d’états over time – started 12 years ago with Turkey initialing reforms in order to comply with the Copenhagen Criteria in view of an eventual accession to the EU. Hence, Turkish democracy is the result of an explicit Turkish choice, supported by an EU that serves, as it is suggested and formulated in the literature, as an *anchor* for democracy in Turkey.

Surely, the Turkish side of the equation should not be underestimated: The impact of the AKP-led government on the advancement of the Turkish economy and Turkey’s relations with the EU over the past eight years can hardly be neglected. Structural reconfigurations, fiscal discipline, increased political stability, and the conduct of a zero-problem policy with neighbors stimulated high economic growth and allowed Turkey to deal with the repercussions of the global economic crisis more smoothly than other European countries. Turkey has already come a long way these past years: Today, Turkey can discuss the launch of a civil constitution, people can freely talk about ending militarism and the judiciary can even hold members of the military responsible for past actions. The demands, the warnings, and the support of the EU continue to have a serious impact on all these developments.

Despite this positive assessment, developments in Turkey still need to be closely monitored. In the latest European Parliament Report on Turkey, there are several concerns when it comes to human rights, rights of minorities, rights of women, and freedom of press. The EU has repeatedly urged the Turkish government and non-governmental organizations to take initiatives on these issues and needs to continue to do so. Accordingly, although the Turkish example might be inspiring many people in the Arab world more than ever before, its own system is not that well established that it could serve as a blueprint for reform. But it certainly is a source of inspiration as we have seen in the declarations of many leaders in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen and Morocco.

The security-political dimension of EU-Turkey relations

When looking at the revolutions and the changes from a security-political perspective, the added value of Turkey to the European Union’s Common Security and Defense Policy and its energy security becomes evident. On the other hand, one must bear in mind that the conflict over Cyprus still remains unsolved and continues to constitute an obstacle to further deepen EU-Turkey cooperation. This is a matter of concern and must be an item of utmost importance on the bilateral agenda.



Ismail Ertug. © European Parliament

With regard to the revolutions in North Africa, however, the stance of the EU towards Turkey may evolve. Historical as well as recent experiences of Europe with North African and Middle Eastern countries are not favorable for the establishment of a successful and sustainable partnership. The psychological influence of colonialism, local leaders that seem to serve Western interests more than those of their own people and the recent military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq draw many dividing lines between the West and Muslim countries. Certainly, there is no evidence that new governments, constituted after democratic elections, will be fundamentalist and therefore hostile to Europe. Yet, it remains difficult to forecast their attitude towards the EU that for long had turned a blind eye to the deficiencies of governance in the region. Nevertheless, it is very likely that the EU will play an important role in projects to modernize North African economies to establish the basis for prosperity for the people. Not every step of this process will be in line with Turkey’s preferences, but the overall direction certainly is in her interest. Anyhow, Turkey – trying to conduct a pro-active foreign policy in its region and therefore endowed with new and impressive self-confidence – will increase its influence when the Arab countries turn to Turkey to seek support. If both – the EU and Turkey – can agree on accelerating the

stagnant accession negotiations and on supporting the democratic reforms in Turkey, they would send a clear message to the Arab countries. In essence, the message is that the EU and Turkey give concrete proof that democracy and Islam are not mutually exclusive. The influence of both actors in the region will considerably be determined by the credibility and the effect of this message.

The revolutions have another dimension, related to the EU’s Common Security and Defense Policy. After the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1973 (2011), preparations were launched to take measures to protect civilians in Libya. Under the leadership of France, the country which had first started discussing the possibility of a military intervention, the participating countries favored a coalition command and intended a restricted role for NATO. Turkey expressed its concern that such a command structure might lead to mistakes such as those made in Afghanistan or Iraq, and underlined that for a more legitimate intervention, all responsibilities should be given to NATO. Eventually, the insistence of Turkey won ground and the general command was transferred to NATO. This case again revealed the powerful position of Turkey within NATO. The EU, largely depending on access to NATO military bases, needs to take this into consideration; if not, it may run the risk of being vetoed by Turkey in the North Atlantic Council (e.g. if Turkey may not want to see Cypriot troops joining forces in an intervention). Hence, for a successful EU Common Security and Defense Policy, Turkey needs to be persuaded to be more cooperative and the EU needs to act more inclusively with respect to its Mediterranean candidate country and NATO ally. Only then can the EU expect to dispose of the full range of tools to influence developments in the region.

Conclusion

Turkey is an inspiration for Arab people, it is the proof that Islam and democracy are compatible. The effects of the “Arabellion” will surely have an impact on EU-Turkey relations. Taking into account the future needs of the EU and the fact that democracy in Turkey still has deficiencies, both parties will have to work together more closely in the post-revolution period. Closer cooperation would strengthen Turkey’s continuing transformation and its regional clout, but would also enhance the position of the EU in dealing with current challenges – from assisting the transformation of governance systems in North Africa to supporting the conduct of concrete policies such as security or migration.

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EGYPT'S UNCERTAIN JOURNEY TO DEMOCRACY

Lessons to learn from Turkey

Thomas Demmelhuber

In reaction to the popular revolts that are still reverberating in the Middle East a vivid debate has begun in Turkish, Arabic and international media whether Turkey can serve as a role model for the Middle Eastern countries. In regards to this context analysts regularly refer to Turkey as a Muslim country with a widely consolidated democratic system, strong economic growth rates and a governing party from the spectrum of Political Islam which is challenging the strong legacy of the Turkish armed forces in politics. The Egyptian revolution of the 'free officers' in 1952 was also led by the army, an institution that has been playing a decisive role in Egyptian politics and the economy ever since. At the same time, we also witness a strong presence of Political Islam, that is to say the Muslim Brotherhood, in politics (parliament and professional associations) and society (charity) despite having been banned in 1954. After the forced resignation of former President Mubarak in February 2011 the military has entered the scene once again and become the pivotal actor in Egypt's uncertain journey to democracy. Egypt's current bumpy path towards a more liberal political system offers an illuminating example to discuss how much Egypt and other Middle Eastern countries can indeed learn from Turkey or whether this question is nothing more than a wishful narrative of Western countries that are afraid of what might come after the fall of autocracies that were for too long regarded as bulwarks of stability.

What happened to the Egyptians?

The military has taken over in Egypt. All presidential powers have been transferred from the former President Hosni Mubarak to the highest military council under the leadership of long-serving Defense Minister and Field Marshal Muhammad Hussein Tantawi. The armed forces have promised to introduce radical democratic change and fulfilled key demands of the protest movement by dissolving the parliament, announcing new elections and establishing a commission to reform the constitution. After heated rounds of debate, the proposed amendments of the constitution were finally approved in a public referendum in March. Presidential and parliamentary elections shall follow in the second half of 2011.

Languages of democracy

During almost three weeks of protest in Egypt, the protesters regarded the armed forces as their honest partner in the country's transition process. This perception was fostered even more when the army leadership explained in an address on state television

shortly after the beginning of the riots that the claims of the protesters were legitimate and that it would not use force against the people. However, questions remain as to whether the military is really interested in a democratic opening or whether the guiding motive behind their actions is the safeguarding of their own economic interests and assets. The main objective of the Egyptian military is to safeguard its privileged role in the country. This includes, *first*, retaining the annual military aid from the USA, which constitutes almost half of the country's military budget. *Second*, protecting its profitable role in the Egyptian economy and, *third*, swiftly transferring governmental responsibility to civilian hands in order to avoid shouldering responsibility for unpopular decisions in day-to-day politics. A democratic opening seems to be one among several acceptable models for the armed forces as long as their mentioned three-fold agenda remains untouched.

Case of Turkey

Looking for historic analogies the Turkish example almost immediately comes to mind. Analysts particularly highlight four Turkish features: *First*, modern Turkey was founded around a strong army which later acted as a praetorian guardian and moderator in the aftermath of Atatürk's reign. Although the Turkish army is still seen by many as the main pillar in the political system of the country, the armed forces have been cut down to size by the government of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's Justice and Development Party (AKP), very much based on the popular success of the AKP in elections since 2002. *Second*, the AKP government successfully encompasses moderate forces of Political Islam with the market liberalism of a newly emerging bourgeoisie, initially coming from central Anatolia. Supporters of the argument that Turkey could be a role model emphasize that the AKP is a party rooted in Political Islam, and hence might be an example for other Islamist movements in the Middle East to reinvent themselves as genuine democratic parties. *Third*, comprehensive political and economic reform packages are underway despite critics saying that those reform efforts do not go far enough. *Fourth*, in particular under the AKP government and its foreign policy architect Ahmet Davutoğlu Turkey has strengthened its ties with the Arab countries of the region at the expense of traditionally good relations with Israel. Some even regard Prime Minister Erdoğan as perhaps the Middle East's most influential figure (New York Times, 5 February 2011).

Egyptian specifics

Turkey matters to the Egyptians and Egypt

is an important partner for Turkey. For example, President Abdullah Gül was the first foreign head of state to pay an official visit to post-Mubarak Egypt. During his visit he underlined Turkey's commitment to further its cooperation network with Egypt. Bilateral trade was boosted significantly after the ratification of a free trade agreement between both countries in 2007. Nonetheless, even more important to Egypt is its immediate, still volatile neighbourhood than a country on the northern shore of the Mediterranean with which one shares a complicated history. Century-long Ottoman rule throughout the Levant and southern Mediterranean remains a difficult chapter in the relations of Turkey with its Arab neighbours although this stands in stark contrast to the ideological compatibility between the AKP in Turkey and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. In a comment for the International Herald Tribune, Tariq Ramadan, well-known grandson of Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood's founder, Hassan al-Banna, argues that the younger members of the Muslim Brotherhood are much more open to the world, 'anxious to bring about internal reform and fascinated by the Turkish example' (International Herald Tribune, 9 February 2011). In principle this might be true for some actor groups out of the spectrum of Political Islam but should not underestimate the different political, strategic and economic conditions in Turkey compared to Egypt.

Geopolitics and cooperation

When trying to estimate the chances of a democratic breakthrough during the breakup of authoritarianism, a decisive variable is the geopolitical proximity of a democratic neighbourhood. One of the main triggers for Turkey's unprecedented democratic reform agenda was the objective to fulfil the Copenhagen Criteria set by the European Union in order to become a candidate country and later to launch negotiations for full EU membership. No matter whether the negotiations are currently stuck due to shortcomings on *both* sides, the years prior to the beginning of accession talks were a unique chance for the Turkish government, with its comfortable majority in parliament, to push forward with a highly ambitious agenda that otherwise might have been downgraded in political compromise. In addition to that, Turkey is a NATO member with the Turkish military being comprehensively incorporated in European and transatlantic security and defence networks. In Egypt there is hardly any equivalent constellation, apart from long-established US-Egyptian military cooperation networks. Though Egypt and Europe are connected through a wide array of cooperation mechanisms, the long-term perspective is limited to the maximum of privileged neighbourly relations; far

▶ away from the customs union Turkey has already established with the EU since 1995.

Whereas the Turkish armed forces have always been preserving the secularist principles of modern Turkey's founder Atatürk, the Egyptian military is not widely known for its secularist beliefs. The praetorian role of the Turkish army, which led to several coups since the founding of modern Turkey, forced Islamists to make some ideological concessions that resulted in the establishment of the AKP after prior established parties had been scrapped by the regime (for example Refah party and Fazilet party). The AKP was hailed internationally as a promising example of moderate Islamic politics that has successfully cut down to size the military's role in politics. In Egypt, the situation is completely different: On the one hand, much depends in Egypt on the strategy of the armed forces in dealing with the officially still banned Muslim Brotherhood. Will they be allowed to translate their powerful social force into political power? It is certainly

more likely than one year ago, but too early to predict the further genesis of this social movement in view of recent attempts to form more than one political party within the realm of the Brotherhood. On the other hand, Egypt's revised constitution is far from being the secular pendant of Turkey's constitution, with Article 2 of the constitution stressing Islam as state religion and Islamic law as the principal source of legislation.

Limits of Turkey's example

The Egyptian people are very proud of their moment of history in which they got rid of the Mubarak regime, the symbol of corruption, repression and abuse of power. However, this was only the first step in a revolution which is open-ended and not finished yet. The breakdown of authoritarian rule in Egypt marks the beginning of a long and uncertain journey considering that consolidated democracy is only one of several possible outcomes following collapsing authoritarian regimes. However, Turkey certainly matters alone due to its political, strategic and eco-

nomical involvement in Middle Eastern politics. This got further momentum under the realignment of Turkish foreign policy ('zero problem policy') since 2002. In conclusion, Turkey was and still is an important partner for Egypt, for some actors it even serves as a role model. Nonetheless, to throw Turkey as a one-size-fits-all model into the ring – following recent upheavals in the region – sounds rather like wishful thinking on behalf of Western countries' decision makers who are constantly afraid of instability after the break-down of autocracies that were too long regarded as a bulwark of stability in a volatile region. It is a simple and naïve belief that Turkey's historic choices can be imposed on to other Arab countries. In the end, the stimulus for a comprehensive reconfiguration of Egypt's 'sick political system', its elites and institutions must come from within.

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CHRONOLOGY

compiled by Dr. Volkan Altintas

9 November 2010: The European Commission publishes its annual Progress Report on Turkey.

17 December 2010: Mohamed Bouazizi sets himself on fire out of protest against police action. His self-immolation starts a wave of protests in Tunisia.

1 January 2011: Hungary takes over the Council Presidency.

14 January 2011: Tunisian President Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali flees with his family to Saudi Arabia.

25 January 2011: Regular, coordinated protests start in Egypt.

1 February 2011: In light of recent protests, King Abdullah II of Jordan dismisses Prime Minister Samir Rifai and entrusts Marouf Bakhit to form a new government, tasked with realising "genuine political and economic reforms".

11 February 2011: After continuous demonstrations, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak resigns and hands power over to the military.

12 February 2011: After some demonstrations in January, security forces clash with a considerable number of anti-government protesters in Algiers.

14 February 2011: The violent death of a pro-democracy protester in Bahrain sets off a wave of protests in the Gulf kingdom.

15 February 2011: Libyan security forces turn to violence against protesters. Following the severe repression by the regime, civil war breaks out in Libya.

21 February 2011: Thousands protest in several cities of Morocco. King Mohammed VI promises political reforms.

8 March 2011: In reacting to a 'changing Mediterranean', the European Commission and High Representative Catherine Ashton propose a "Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean", COM (2011) 200.

9 March 2011: The European Parliament adopts a resolution on the 2010 Progress Report on Turkey, commenting particularly critical on the "deterioration in freedom of the press" in Turkey.

15 March 2011: Protests take place in several cities of Syria. President Bashar al-Assad's regime turns to violence, trying to suppress protests violently, leading to bloody confrontations during the following months.

17 March 2011: The United Nations Security Council approves Resolution 1973 (2011) to impose a no-fly zone in Libya and permitting "all necessary measures [...] to protect civilians" in Libya.

18 March 2011: In light of recent protests, King Abdullah of Saudi-Arabia announces substantial reforms by at the same time considerably increasing the number of security forces.

19 March 2011: Based on UN Security Council Resolution 1973 (2011), the United States, Great Britain and France commence military operations in Libya.

27 March 2011: NATO decides to take on the whole military operation in Libya under UN Security Council Resolution 1973 (2011).

29 March 2011: The Syrian government resigns.

15 April 2011: In reaction to protests in Algeria, President Abdelaziz Bouteflika promises constitutional change and announces reforms.

25 May 2011: The European Commission and High Representative Catherine Ashton table their review of European Neighbourhood Policy: "A New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood", COM (2011) 303.

12 June 2011: General elections are held in Turkey. The ruling AK Party wins with almost 50% of votes, ensuring a comfortable majority in the Grand National Assembly of Turkey. However, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan fails to ensure a two thirds majority for his AK Party in the Assembly, forcing the party to cooperate with other parliamentary forces to change the constitution.

27 June 2011: The International Criminal Court issues an arrest warrant against Muammar al-Gaddafi.

1 July 2011: Poland takes over the Council Presidency from Hungary.

Sources: www.abhaber.com; www.bbc.co.uk; www.cnn.com; www.guardian.co.uk; www.kingabdullah.jo; www.nato.int; www.tagesschau.de; www.time.com; ec.europa.eu.

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LIBYA AND THE EU

Two Sides to the Story

Nalan Demiral

The attitude of the European Union to the latest developments in the Southern Mediterranean may have surprised many people. For years and years, the European Union seemed more or less content with the state of affairs in the Mediterranean. Neither the launch of the “Barcelona Process” in 1995 or the inauguration of the “Union for the Mediterranean” in 2008 have substantially challenged the basis of European Union engagement – or non-engagement – in the region. On the other hand, looking at it more broadly, European reactions might not be that surprising in the end. After all, whenever Europe has strong – economic – interests, it pays particular attention to international developments – also if it comes to its Southern neighbours.

Already the Roman Empire’s conquest of Carthage was motivated by economic interests. But also looking at Libya’s sort in the 20th century, Italy’s annexation of Libya from the Ottoman Empire aimed at supporting Italy’s development. It was only in 1951 that Libya became independent from exterior powers. Although history rarely repeat itself, Libya is again on the European agenda today. This time, the declared reason for Western intervention in Libya is to support the democratic forces in Libya. In this arena, the European Union is one of the leading international actors. Since February 2011, when protests broke out in several parts of Libya to challenge Muammar al’Gaddafi’s 41 year old dictatorship, the EU has been very vocal in promoting its views and opinions on the international stage.

One of the motivations behind this might just be given by the close interconnection of European and Mediterranean interests and the fact that “Europe and the Mediterranean region share a common history and cultural heritage”, as stated by the European Council on 21 February 2011. At this occasion, the European Council also declared: “The Council expressed its support to the peoples of the South Mediterranean and their legitimate hopes and aspirations for democratic change, social justice and economic development. The EU stands ready for a new partnership in its relations with the countries of the region to support the process towards democracy, rule of law, socio-economic development and strengthened regional stability, on the basis of shared principles, cooperation and local ownership. It is for the people of these countries to choose their future.” It concluded that there is “the need for a compre-

hensive approach across all fields of EU engagement building upon the European Neighbourhood Policy and the Union for the Mediterranean with a view to lending more effective support reflecting partners’ commitment for reform.”

Consequently, the European Commission and the High Representative Catherine Ashton underlined in a joint communication on 8 March 2011 (COM (2011) 200) that the “EU is ready to support all its Southern neighbours who are able and willing to embark on [...] reforms through a ‘Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity’”. This partnership should be based on three elements:

- “democratic transformation and institution-building, with a particular focus on fundamental freedoms, constitutional reforms, reform of the judiciary and the fight against corruption
- a stronger partnership with the people, with specific emphasis on support to civil society and on enhanced opportunities for exchanges and people-to-people contacts with a particular focus on the young
- sustainable and inclusive growth and economic development[,] especially support to Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs), vocational and educational training, improving health and education systems and development of the poorer regions.”

Following this joint communication, the European Council held an extraordinary meeting on 11 March 2011. After their meeting, European heads of state and government issued a declaration, stating that “democratic uprisings are bringing dramatic changes to the Southern Neighbourhood, creating a new hope and opportunity to build a future based on democracy, pluralism, the rule of law, human rights and social justice. Progress and democracy go hand in hand. The European Council salutes the courage demonstrated by the people of the region and reaffirms that it is for them to decide their future through peaceful and democratic means.” At the same time, the European Council underscored that the EU “will support all steps towards democratic transformation, political systems that allow for peaceful change, growth and prosperity, and a more proportionate distribution of the benefits of economic performance.”

With respect to the specific developments in neighbouring countries, the European Council welcomed “the announcement that elections for a constituent assembly will be held on 24 July 2011” in Tunisia. It also highlighted its willingness “to provide

the necessary support in this regard” and “to offer support to tackle the economic and social challenges faced by Tunisia.” Just as the European Union underlined its “long term” engagement in Tunisia, it also declared with respect to Egypt that it “supports the democratic transition in Egypt [...] and encourages the Egyptian authorities to continue in their commitment to political reform and create an environment for thorough democratic transformation”.

Whereas the transitions in Tunisia and Egypt seem to be – despite remaining uncertainties – on a positive track, the situation in Libya “remains a cause for grave concern” according to the European Council. In view of “the violent repression the Libyan regime applies against its citizens and the gross and systematic violation of human rights”, the EU explicitly welcomed UN Security Council Resolution 1970. It added that the “safety of people must be ensured by all necessary means” and “in order to protect the civilian population, Member States will examine all necessary options, provided that there is a demonstrable need, a clear legal basis and support from the region.”

Just as the European Council demanded an end to violence exercised by Muammar al’Gaddafi’s regime against the Libyan population, the UN Security Council Resolution 1970, adopted on 26 February 2011, likewise demanded “an immediate end to violence” and urged “Libyan authorities to: a) respect human rights [...]; b) ensure the safety of all foreign nationals [...]; c) ensure the safe passage of humanitarian and medical supplies [...], and d) lift restrictions on all forms of media;” to this end, the Security Council outlined concrete measures, inter alia referral to the International Criminal Court, enforcing an arms embargo and banning several high-ranking Libyan individuals from travelling by at the same time freezing their funds, financial assets and other economic resources.

As Security Council Resolution 1970 failed to stop the violence in Libya, the United Nations Security Council adopted another – more muscled – Resolution on 17 March 2011. In this Resolution 1973, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, the Security Council,

“1. Demands the immediate establishment of a cease-fire and a complete end to violence and all attacks against, and abuses of, civilians;

2. Stresses the need to intensify efforts to find a solution to the crisis

▶ which responds to the legitimate demands of the Libyan people and notes the decisions of the Secretary-General to send his Special Envoy to Libya and of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union to send its ad hoc High Level Committee to Libya with the aim of facilitating dialogue to lead to the political reforms necessary to find a peaceful and sustainable solution;

3. Demands that the Libyan authorities comply with their obligations under international law, including international humanitarian law, human rights and refugee law and take all measures to protect civilians and meet their basic needs, and to ensure the rapid and unimpeded passage of humanitarian assistance; [...]

4. Authorizes Member States that have notified the Secretary-General, acting nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements, and acting in cooperation with the Secretary-General, to take all necessary measures [...] to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack [...], while excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory, and requests the Member States concerned to inform the Secretary-General immediately of the measures they take pursuant to the authorization conferred by this paragraph which shall be immediately reported to the Security Council;

5. Recognizes the important role of the League of Arab States in matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security in the region, and [...] requests the Member States of the League of Arab States to cooperate with other Member States in the implementation of paragraph 4; [...]

6. Decides to establish a ban on all flights in the airspace of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya in order to help protect civilians”.

Ahead of voting the resolution, Alain Juppé, French Minister of Foreign Affairs, highlighted the international communities' obligations in this case. He expressed his conviction that “the world was experiencing ‘a wave of great revolutions that would change the course of history’ [...] throughout North Africa and the Middle East.” These “changes required the international community not to ‘give lessons’, but to help the people of those countries build a new future.”¹

The Security Council then adopted Resolution 1973, 10 member states voting in favour, none opposing, but Brazil, China, Germany, India, and the Russian Federation abstaining. As Germany is considered one of the most important members of the EU, its position raised eyebrows throughout the world. Hence, Germany's Representative to the United Nations, Ambassador Peter Wittig, declared that Germany “was particularly concerned by the plight of the Libyan people and believed it was crucial to tighten existing sanctions to ‘cut [the Libyan regime] off’ from the funds that had propped it up for so long. Decisions regarding the use of military force were always extremely difficult to take.” Accordingly, he explained that “in the implementation of the resolution [...], Germany saw great risks, and the likelihood of large-scale loss of life should not be underestimated. Those that participated in its implementation could be drawn into a protracted military conflict that could draw in the wider region. If the resolution failed, it would be wrong to assume that any military intervention would be quickly and efficiently carried out. Germany had decided not to

support the resolution and would not contribute its own forces to any military effort that arose from its implementation.”²

In light of the adoption of Resolution 1973, the EU's international figureheads, European Council President Herman Van Rompuy and High Representative Catherine Ashton immediately declared in a joint statement that they “fully endorse the UN demand for a complete end to the violence and all attacks against, and abuses of, civilians, and finding a solution to the crisis.” After recalling the European Council's declaration on Libya, they underlined that the “European Union is ready to implement this Resolution within its mandate and competences.”

Although on 18 March 2011, hours after the Resolution 1973 was adopted, Gaddafi called a cease-fire, the main supporters of the Resolution considered his move insufficient. Accordingly, the United States, Great Britain and France started a military intervention on 19 March 2011 with French planes flying for reconnaissance.

While the military intervention continued and following the spring European Council, Herman Van Rompuy remarked that the political objectives, as set by the extraordinary European Council on 11 March, remained unchanged: “Kadhafi must go, and we want a political transition, led by Libyans themselves, and based on a broad based political dialogue.” Although the outcome remained uncertain, he underscored that a “bloodbath has been avoided, thousands of lives have been saved.” Hence, the “military operations should cease as soon as the civil population is safe.” In order to facilitate transition in Libya, he recalled the EU's readiness to “stand ready to help a new Libya, both economically, and in building its new institutions.”

In sum, these and other statements highlight the European Union's vocal commitment to realizing democratic transformation and institution-building, with a particular focus on fundamental freedoms, in order to also facilitate the establishment of sustainable and inclusive growth and economic development.

However, looking at the past and other examples, the EU's aim to foster and support democratic change seems less evident in its concrete policies. For more than one decade, the Union has always underlined the importance of its core values – democracy, human rights – in its declarations concerning the Mediterranean. However, as most governments it was dealing with did not subscribe to European interpretations of these values, the EU did not push the agenda too hard and rather accepted the state of affairs as basis for cooperation. In addition, the US-led interventi- ▶



On 17 March 2011, the UN Security Council authorizes a no-fly zone over Libya.

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▶ on in Iraq – with support of European allies – toppled Saddam Hussein but did not at all manage to ensure a stable and peaceful environment in the country. With the situation in Libya still being in limbo – and European criticism of the Syrian regime being in stark contrast to the interventionist policy in Libya – even European politicians have criticized the intervention as another example of European duplicity:

Green MEP Daniel Cohn-Bendit even went as far as stating that European governments have long been “complicit” with dictators in the entire region. MEP Miguel Portas from the European United Left (GUE/NGL) also criticized “the European countries that for years had been exporting weapons to North African dictators.” He called on “Europe to change and understand its past.” In addition, Conservative MEP Charles Tannock pointed to the fact that it was due to “vast energy revenues” that Gaddafi could “court other countries and cow his own population.”³

Last, but not least, even the Polish Prime

Minister Donald Tusk – head of the upcoming Presidency of the Council of the European Union – pointed to the fact that it was not for the first time that Gaddafi had killed civilians and if the EU really wanted to protect civilians in general, it should apply general principles, independent of specific conditions and cases. After all, similar developments have been taking place in Bahrain, Syria and Yemen, however, Europeans do not act the same way as they do in Libya.⁴ If one looks at the interlinkages between these countries and Europe, one can still get the impression, that the EU does not mainly act to promote universal principles but rather to protect its economic interests. Although these principles might be of importance, they do not seem to be the only – and sufficient – motivation for European action. Hence, despite an offensive information policy and numerous official statements, some questions remain: What is the central aim of Europe in Libya? Why did some European countries – especially France – act so quickly after the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1973 to start military actions? Who is the

main beneficiary – the European Union or the Libyan people? What will the final result of the intervention be? Regardless of the concrete answers to these questions, it is a certain and inevitable truth that Libya will never be the same again. Hopefully, this time it will not be for the worse but for the better.

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CURRENT NEGOTIATING STATUS

No.	Title of Chapter	Status
1	Free movement of goods	●
2	Freedom of movement for workers	●
3	Right of establishment and freedom to provide services	●
4	Free movement of capital	●
5	Public procurement	●
6	Company law	●
7	Intellectual property law	●
8	Competition policy	●
9	Financial services	●
10	Information society and media	●
11	Agriculture and rural development	●
12	Food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary policy	●
13	Fisheries	●
14	Transport policy	●
15	Energy	●
16	Taxation	●
17	Economic and monetary policy	●
18	Statistics	●
19	Social policy and employment	●
20	Enterprise and industrial policy	●
21	Trans-European networks	●
22	Regional policy and coordination of structural instruments	●
23	Judiciary and fundamental rights	●
24	Justice, freedom and security	●
25	Science and research	●
26	Education and culture	●
27	Environment	●
28	Consumer and health protection	●
29	Customs union	●
30	External relations	●
31	Foreign, security and defence policy	●
32	Financial control	●
33	Financial and budgetary provisions	●
34	Institutions	●
35	Other issues	●

Legend: ● not yet opened ● suspended
 ● opened
 ● provisionally closed

Data as of July 2011

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FROM 'FAILURE' TO 'FAILURE' TO SUCCESS?

Adapting European Mediterranean Policy

Andreas Marchetti

The Barcelona Process: too ambitious?

In the wake of political thaw setting in the Middle East with the Oslo Accords in the 1990s, enthusiasm was high to give Euro-Mediterranean relations a new basis. The Barcelona Conference in late 1995 brought together the EU and Southern Mediterranean countries to mark the beginning of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (Barcelona Process). The Declaration adopted at the Conference stressed that “the general objective of turning the Mediterranean basin into an area of dialogue, exchange and cooperation guaranteeing peace, stability and prosperity requires a strengthening of democracy and respect for human rights, sustainable and balanced economic and social development, measures to combat poverty and promotion of greater understanding between cultures, which are all essential aspects of partnership.” In order to achieve these ambitious objectives, three partnerships were formulated within the Barcelona Process: a Political and Security Partnership aiming at ensuring peace, stability and security but also promoting certain values such as human rights, the rule of law and democracy, an Economic and Financial Partnership with the central objective of establishing a free-trade area, and a Partnership in Social, Cultural and Human Affairs, intending to push dialogue beyond the official government level.

With Eastern EU enlargement approaching, the – regional – Barcelona Process was eventually – bilaterally – complemented by the European Neighbourhood Policy. Despite this supplement to the formal policy framework and the general acknowledgement of the usefulness of the policy network, ‘Barcelona’ hardly fulfilled the expectations as formulated in 1995.¹ Hence, at its tenth anniversary, efforts for a Euro-Mediterranean relaunch were undertaken. With responsiveness of partners being low, however, France soon articulated its assessment of a ‘failure’ of the Barcelona Process (*échec de Barcelone*).

The Union for the Mediterranean: not sufficiently ambitious?

Together with its reiteration of ‘Barcelona’ as ‘failure’, France advanced the idea to estab-

lish a ‘Mediterranean Union’. As the initial idea excluded non-riparian EU members, objections were raised within the Union, forcing a reconfiguration of the original plans to finally materialize into the ‘Union for the Mediterranean’ (UfM) in July 2008, including all EU member states and non-member Mediterranean countries. Although officially based on the ‘Barcelona’ *acquis*, the UfM follows a rather pragmatic, project-oriented approach, intending to surpass the shortcomings of ‘Barcelona’ by making a difference in concrete fields. Accordingly, the UfM – realising formal co-ownership by installing a North-South co-presidency – put less emphasis on the normative agenda of Barcelona’s Political and Security Partnership, but on six key initiatives: De-pollution of the Mediterranean, maritime and land highways, civil protection, alternative energies, a Euro-Mediterranean University, and a Mediterranean Business Development Initiative. However, the UfM saw itself politically ‘hijacked’ by Mediterranean partners, preventing substantial progress.² With the unprecedented – and unexpected – events of the ‘Mediterranean Spring’ unfolding in the Southern Mediterranean, the European Union maintained that the “idea behind the establishment of the Union for the Mediterranean was a positive one”, by at the same time acknowledging “that its implementation did not deliver the results we expected.”³ Without spelling out the word ‘failure’, the message is clear: the UfM did also not live up to expectations and evidently did not respond to the true needs and aspirations of the people as articulated in their protests.

Correct ambitions – or just changing labels?

Past ‘failures’ seem to pave the way of Europe’s Mediterranean policies.⁴ But where to go from here? In early March 2011, the European Commission and High Representative Catherine Ashton proposed the establishment of a “Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity”⁵. The European Council soon joined in by expressing the Union’s ambition to “develop a new partnership with the region.”⁶ Eventually, in May 2011, the Commission and the High Representative tabled “A New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood”⁷ as strategic orientation for the future: Recognizing – once more – the necessity to increase the Union’s offer, the

EU – again – emphasizes that “EU support to its neighbours is conditional.” In light of the ‘Mediterranean Spring’, the Union – now again – underlines the importance of democracy by spelling out its concept of “deep and sustainable democracy.”⁸ As appealing such a new label might seem at first sight, as vague is its content and distinctiveness, especially if one considers that – much more widely used – terms like “liberal democracy” would have served just as well to elaborate on basic democratic requisites such as “free and fair elections”, “freedom of association, expression and assembly and a free press and media”, “rule of law”, etc. However, beyond an obvious obsession with ‘innovative language’, the Union is right to adapt its Mediterranean policy. This might – within the European Neighbourhood Policy – indeed lead to a more positive Euro-Mediterranean relationship, if the EU is really serious about substantially increasing its offer to Southern Mediterranean partners and if it is really capable of reducing inconsistencies and double standards in its own policy conduct.

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