Editorial

“Yes, we can” had been the uniting slogan of President Barack Obama’s electoral campaign. And “Yes, we can” will be the touch-stone for the performance of his administration. High have been the hopes associated with the change in the White House – inside the United States as well as throughout the world. After the first 100 days, reality has already stricken back to a certain extent, without, however, diminishing neither the hopes nor the tasks for the years to come.

Within the European Union, rejection of the Bush administration had become a uniting factor over the past years, giving way to an almost unprecedented estrangement in transatlantic relations. Likewise, Turkey had experienced an almost historic coolness in its relations to the United States. Accordingly, the European Union, Turkey and the new administration in Washington are now asked to revitalise Euro- and Turkish-American relations in view of the common challenges ahead. In the environment of uncertainty, mainly caused by the ongoing international financial and economic crisis, the stakes are high. “Yes, we can” should therefore be the guiding idea behind the revitalisation of our relations because the uniting factors are still much stronger and numerous than the dividing ones.

In this spirit, “Yes, we can” could also serve as the guiding slogan to overcome some of the still unsolved issues in EU-Turkey relations: The slow pace of reforms as well as of negotiations continuously challenges the negotiation process. Cyprus remains high on the agenda as well as the rejection of Turkey’s membership bid by a majority of EU citizens. New approaches and strategies are needed to eventually tackle and overcome these challenges as can be seen from the analyses in this issue of the ZEI EU-Turkey-Monitor.

Mehmet Öcal

On the right track to the EU?

After a period of inactivity on reforms due to some turbulence in domestic politics such as parliamentary and presidential elections, and party closure cases, Turkey launched its third national program at the end of 2008, one that had been revised in accordance with the concerns and recommendations of both Turkish political parties and over eighty-four NGOs. It is indeed a new ambitious road map in the process toward the full membership into the EU. This program also indicates the willingness of the Ankara government to continue with reforms despite the increasing skepticism of Turkish people towards the EU. It contains many adjustment reforms. Accordingly, about 131 legal changes should be made and 342 new decrees should be adopted in the Turkish legal system within four years. In addition to these reforms, about 473 new regulations should be adopted in accordance with the EU acquis.

To meet the standards of the acquis, Ankara has completed comprehensive constitutional and legislative reforms and has taken necessary steps in order to implement these reforms. Within this context, legislative and administrative measures and a “zero tolerance policy” against both torture and ill-treatment have been put into practice. The death penalty has been abolished under all circumstances; moreover, freedom of thought and expression and freedom of press have been expanded in line with the European Court of Human Rights’ case law and the provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights. Furthermore, provisions concerning associations, foundations and the right to assembly and demonstration have been advanced. Another significant improvement concerns guaranteeing the cultural rights of all Turkish citizens, and by extension the resulting cultural diversity. The right to learn and broadcast in different languages and dialects used traditionally by Turkish citizens in their daily lives has also been ensured. As a con-
cretes example, in 2009 Turkey’s state-run media network TRT began 24-hour broadcast in Kurdish, and TRT is planning to launch TV programs in other languages. Also improvements on the legislation concerning non-Muslim Turkish citizens’ rights such as in the field of religious education have been made. Other reforms concern expanding trade unions rights as well as legal changes on both financing and defining relatively strict rules to close political parties.

Functionality of Public Administration

To achieve a transparent and effective state administration system, the Turkish government works toward adopting a law on “General Administrative Procedures”. The “Board of Ethics” has already been established to determine a code of ethical conduct to be respected by public servants (that includes transparency, neutrality, honesty, accountability, and safeguarding public interest) and to supervise the implementation. Furthermore, comprehensive works will be launched to fight against corruption and informal economy. For that reason an inspection mechanism for the public administration will be provided.

EU foreign policy in the Southern Mediterranean aims at fostering prosperity, stability, and democratic reform, based on a consensus with the Arab partner countries in the region. In the Barcelona Declaration of 1995 and in various documents of the European Neighbourhood Policy both parties have formulated common objectives and established mechanisms to ensure their sound implementation. To achieve these ambitious interests there is widespread consensus in academics and politics that a comprehensive socio-economic development and eventually democratic reform in the authoritarian strip of the Southern Mediterranean are essential preconditions. However, are the established strategies and instruments on the ground sufficient for the EU to implement this diverse agenda together with its partners in the South? Focusing this core question the book aims at analyzing the genesis and results of EU-Egyptian cooperation since 1995 in the context of Egypt’s political, economic, and social reform process.

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Civil-Military Relations

This is in fact one of the most sensitive issues of the reform process being undertaken by the Turkish Government. The role of the National Security Council (NSC) as an advisory body has already been redefined through the constitutional amendments and the changes in related laws. In accordance with the amended Article 160 of the Constitution, all incomes, expenditures and state properties of Turkish Armed Forces are subject to the audit of the Court of Audits. The new draft Law on the Court of Audits includes two articles aimed at fulfilling all the technical regulations related to the implementation of audits. Another important legal change concerns the definition of tasks and competences of the military courts that will be brought up in line with the principles of a democratic state governed by the rule of law.

Reforms on the Judiciary

To ensure the implementation of the legal provisions and to enlarge the capacity of functionality and efficiency of the Judiciary, a “Judicial Reform Strategy” is being defined by governmental institutions, and these measures may be considered as one of the pillars of the administrative reform process. It includes strengthening and improving impartiality of the judiciary, increasing the efficiency and efficacy of the judiciary and developing alternative means of dispute resolution such as setting up an effective “Ombudsman Institution.” A controversial judicial institution the High Council of Judges and Prosecutors (HSYK) will be restructured on the basis of objectivity, transparency, impartiality, accountability and broad representation. An effective appeal mechanism against the decisions of the Council will also be established.

Women rights

To reinforce gender equality and to fight violence against women and children effectively, legislation has been amended. The status of women in the society including their participation in education, labour force, political and social life will be strengthened. On the other hand the measures on the prevention of violence against women will intensively be monitored and, on the other hand, to raise public awareness, comprehensive and broad campaigns will be organized and conducted. A report prepared by the “Turkish Parliament’s Investigative Commission” recommends the full implementation of measures adopted on combating both honour killings and violence against women.

Economic reforms

In recent years Turkey has realized a serious economic transformation and recorded remarkable improvements in terms of both macroeconomic stability and economic growth. According to the National Program Ankara’s economic priorities are set so as to ensure price stability, fiscal discipline, to pursue an incomes policy, to contribute to the macroeconomic stability, privatization, market liberalization and price reforms in the energy sector, transparency of public expenditures and to strengthen the coordination of economic policies among various institutions.

A fully implemented National Program would bring about further state efficiency and transparency and a stronger democracy. Despite the new legal adjustments passed by the Turkish Parliament, a mental transformation or a mental revolution in Turkish society might take many years. Besides all the reforms mentioned above, following the local elections of March 29, Turkey’s priority should be adopting a new constitution. On this issue the government may start a process of negotiations with other political parties and NGOs. 2009, in fact, can be the “year of reforms” for Ankara. The slogan of the governing “Justice and Development Party” (AKP) during its recent election campaign can also be a good suggestion for future policies toward full EU membership: “Durmak Yok, Yola Devam”, “Don’t Stop, Proceed on the Right Track.”

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Deniz Devrim and Evelina Schulz

Turkey’s aim on its way to the European Union is marked by more than 40 years of mutual relations. Since the Association Agreement was signed in 1963, Turkey’s objective was to be a full EU member. After enlargement to the south (1980s) and to the north (1995), eastern EU enlargement dominated the agenda. At the same time, Turkey made important progress in relation to its membership aspiration. However, since the accession negotiations began in 2005, when enlargement was still en vogue, the general positive connotation concerning enlargement has changed. A more sceptical attitude can be observed, generally known as enlargement fatigue and communication strategies became a bigger challenge in a less welcoming environment. After a slowdown of reforms in Turkey, eight negotiation chapters were frozen in 2006 and Turkey became less present in Brussels. Only at the beginnings of 2009 has Turkey had a small comeback with the high-level visits of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Chief Negotiator Egemem Bağış, main opposition leader Deniz Baykal and President Abdullah Gül to Brussels.

Today, Turkey needs to improve its image among the European citizens as it is no news that its accession generates disapproval among some stakeholders. Opinion polls show a decreasing support for Turkey’s membership. 55% of the EU citizens do not want Turkey to join the EU, 45% not even if all Copenhagen criteria are fulfilled.1 The strongest opposition can be observed in Austria with 84%, followed by Luxembourg (68%), Germany and France (65%). On the contrary, some new member states support Turkey’s EU membership. This idea is supported by 64% of Romanians, 57% of Poles and Slovenians or 53% of Hungarians.

Also support for enlargement in general is low in the old member states but particularly high in the new member states. Whereas only a relatively small percentage of respondents in the old member states (Austria with 27%, followed by France with 31% or Germany and Luxembourg with 33%) support further enlargement in general, the support is stronger in the member states that joined the EU in 2004 and 2007. 74% of respondents in Poland or Slovenia, 69% in Lithuania, 67% in Bulgaria and Romania as well two-thirds of respondents in Hungary are in favour of further enlargements in general.3

The reasons for disapproval are diverse. One explanation can be found interpreting opinion polls that reflect information deficit, indicating that citizens are still not well informed about EU’s enlargement policy.4 Two thirds feel a lack of information concerning enlargement in general. Opinions on enlargement are often formed on the basis of limited knowledge. The Eurobarometer 2008 shows that less than half of Europeans (47%) are in favour of further enlargement, compared with 40% who are against the idea.5

In order to maintain or re-build support for Turkey’s membership, communicating more and informing better is essential. However, the support is not only decreasing in the EU, but also in Turkey itself, especially among its youth. Therefore, new communication strategies are needed for the EU, and for Turkey. Different standpoints in the EU vis-à-vis Turkey indicate that communication has to be differentiated. Identifying the stakeholders, involving them within the communication process and applying the right methods contain the main axes of a more visible and therefore effective communication strategy.

Differentiation among the target groups

A significant factor of a successful communication strategy is to identify the target group. It is important to know who exactly the audience is and which its background, characteristics or attitudes are.

Due to the existence of pro, contra or indifferent attitudes towards enlargement in general, and towards the EU accession of Turkey in particular, three main target groups can be identified. First, the promoters: they have a positive attitude towards enlargement, being convinced about its advantages and considering enlargement as a win-win situation. They support Turkey’s membership. Secondly, the brake-men: being reluctant towards enlargement, underlining the disadvantages rather than the benefits, and often characterised by the symptom of enlargement fatigue. Those are mostly against Turkey’s EU integration. Thirdly, the indifferent: having not made up their mind yet and showing neither a very positive nor a clearly negative approach towards enlargement or Turkey’s place in the EU.

Once having differentiated between these three main currents, communication strategies have to be established accordingly. In practical terms, this means that when communicating to a senior conservative German politician (e.g. brakemen) a different wording has to be applied than when discussing Turkey’s accession with a young progressive politician coming from Romania (e.g. indifferent). In the communication, the right language has to be chosen as well as the adequate cultural or political wording. Effective communication has to apply the principle of differentiation between the stakeholders and consequently the member states and their attitude towards Turkey.

Stopping brakemen, activating promoters and investing in indifferent member states

Applying this triple differentiation to the 27 member states means that reluctant states have to be addressed in a different way than those supporting Turkey’s accession or being indifferent about it. The main protagonists on a European scale are politicians from Austria, Germany and France (brakemen), among them also some British or Spaniards (promoters). But there hardly ever is a Pole or a Romanian (indifferent) expressing his or her views about Turkey. Though the states that joined the EU since 2004 are far more positive towards enlargement and support further enlargement, their population is not as polarized as those in the old member states. Today, the indifferent member states are largely ignored by the Turkish side in their communication strategy. Communication strategies targeting reluctant member states will always be confronted with extreme difficulties, demand additional energy and therefore will have less prospect for success. Whereas developing communication strategies for undecided member states could show more motivating results. Therefore, it is crucial not to focus only on those member states that are reluctant but to address also promoters and the indifferent. An effective communication strategy should tackle this unused potential.

The first operational step should therefore be to target the indifferent with a vast information campaign about Turkey. The establishment of platforms and high level exchange programs with the indifferent member states would allow Turkey to learn from experiences the new members had on the eve of EU enlargement in 2004. However, the promoters have not only to be kept on track but also to be stimulated in order to actively promote their attitudes. Stakeholders in the EU have to speak loudly in favour of Turkey and make the discourse of brakemen more difficult without neglecting problematic facts concerning Turkey. Spillover effects especially on the undecided member states are crucial.

Until now, communication strategies were mostly focussed on reluctant member states. Even though they cannot be
ignored, positive energy should not be wasted on target groups which are already “lost”. There is a potential of finding new promoters in favour of Turkey’s EU accession but they also have to be activated in order to speak in favour of Turkey and not only be in favour. In this regard, the brakemen should be prevented negatively influencing the promoters or pulling the indifferent on their side and allowing negative wording to dominate the communication.

Diversification: Methods for an adequate communication strategy

Besides traditional communication strategies that underline the strategic and economic aspects, there is a growing need to concentrate on soft communication strategies such as culture. Even though it is important to underline the added value of Turkey to EU’s economic and trade relations, its geopolitical importance for the EU or its security role between the continents, topics on culture are too often neglected.

Finding spokespersons for Turkey

A comprehensive communication strategy needs to reach the public as well as the political elites and opinion leaders. On the one hand, elites that promote Turkey’s membership can influence a wide public (top-down). On the other hand, a more positive public opinion vis-à-vis Turkey can put pressure on the elites in order to promote further steps on Turkey’s way into the EU (bottom-up). An important way to influence the public is to mobilize opinion leaders coming from the cultural field. Musicians, artists, sportsmen, authors and also politicians or businessmen supporting Turkey’s EU accession or simply presenting a balanced image, can positively influence the opinions on Turkey among the public. Celebrities in favour of Turkey’s membership such as the former President of Germany, Walter Scheel, the executive director of Oetker, Dr. Arend Oetker, or the director Fatih Akin can be very valuable whenever they speak about Turkey. Communication strategies have to concentrate on making these opinion leaders speak in favour of a fair and comprehensive image of Turkey.

Creating platforms where Turkey can be promoted

Apart from opinion leaders, the establishment of platforms is important to promote and introduce Turkey – still only superficially known to wide parts of the EU society and subject to many prejudices. The Spanish initiative Alliance of Civilizations or the decision to make Istanbul the European Capital of Culture in 2010 are successful examples of platforms where Turkey can be promoted. Attitudes on Turkey’s values show that 57% of EU citizens say that Turkey has such different values that it is not really part of the western world, with the highest agreement in Germany (76%), France (68%), and Italy (61%). Stakeholders that are against Turkey’s EU accession tend to underline the Christian heritage of Europe and use this argument as a proof of incompatibility with EU membership and promote the idea of a privileged partnership. Another crucial platform could be the establishment of a Turkish model of the Alliance Francaise or the Goethe Institut. A Turkish institution with offices worldwide that inform about Turkish heritage, history, language and culture would be a long term investment, reaching not only elites but helping to give comprehensive views of Turkey among the EU citizens. These platforms can and should successfully work against existing prejudices.

Conclusion

A relative majority of EU citizens is generally in favour of enlargement. However, of all the candidate and potential candidate countries, Turkey’s potential membership generates most disapproval. In order to create a balanced image, more communication on enlargement in general as well as on Turkey in particular is essential. Though, the question on how Turkey can be communicated not only to European elites or institutions but also to a wide public remains a challenge. An effective communication strategy needs differentiation and diversification, differentiating among reluctant, promoting or indifferent member states and target groups. None of the groups should be ignored but communicated with adequately. Besides that, a diversification of topics allows a better and more effective communication. Due to the current atmosphere of enlargement fatigue, a stronger concentration on soft communication such as culture will be more fruitful than emphasizing well known arguments where no manoeuvre is further possible. This could be done via finding spokespersons and creating platforms.


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The Order and Change in Cyprus

Kivanç Ulusoy

The EU accession process reveals the structural problems of Turkish democracy. The loss of sovereignty in various key areas of domestic politics and foreign policy undermines the rationality of the EU’s challenge towards Turkey. However, the challenges of the accession negotiations towards the cores of state power are still partial particularly because of the non-conclusive EU startegy towards Turkey. In this context, a foreign policy issue such as the Cyprus problem drives nationalist sentiments and conditions domestic politics. The observed failure of the EU in catalysing a solution to the conflict, coupled with its inability to take an immediate decision to end the isolation of the Turkish Cypriots, has been a dominating issue. This situation seriously hampered the Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) prestige in foreign policy and made it extremely vulnerable to the charges coming from nationalist/eurosceptical circles. However, the EU leverage on Turkey to transform its Cyprus policy along the EU standards has dramatically declined as a result of the current paralysis in the accession process.

AKP’s ascent to power showed its first major impact in a remarkable deviation from the traditional line of thinking in its approach to the Cyprus conflict, one of the most important issues of Turkey's foreign policy. For Turkey, the Cyprus issue has traditionally been considered as “national cause”, a foreign policy matter of absolute priority with clear impacts on domestic politics. The elites in Turkey have tended to interpret the EU’s involvement in the dispute as a threat to country’s strategic interests in the Eastern Mediterranean. Particularly the fear of encirclement by Greece and Cyprus has been at the heart of Turkey’s security discourse. It has affected not only Turkey’s relations with the EU but also the internal dynamism of Turkish democracy because of its high nationalist resonance used by the hardliner circles in Turkey as a populist tool. The Cyprus problem, first as a result of the intervention in 1974 and later with the declaration of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) presided by Rauf Denktas in 1983, was regarded as already resolved and put to a deep-freezer until the EC/EU pressurized Turkey to reconsider its Cyprus policy to progress in its membership bid. Since the official application to the EC in 1987 and the Greek Cypriot application in 1990, Turkey’s policy was based on de-linking the dynamics of its own relations with the EU from the resolution of the dispute.

Turkey and the EU reached a crucial compromise on the Cyprus issue at the Helsinki Summit in 1999. While dropping ‘a political settlement’ as a precondition, the EU guaranteed to ‘take account of all relevant factors’ before deciding on Cyprus’ accession. Greece consented to offering Turkey the status of a ‘candidate state destined to join the Union on the basis of the same criteria as applied to other candidate states’. At the Copenhagen Summit in December 2002, the EU declared that accession negotiations were completed with Cyprus and the country would accede as a new member. It also stated its ‘strong preference for accession to the EU by a united Cyprus’. In light of the submission of UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan of a ‘Plan for a Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem’ in November 2002, and the launch of bi-communal talks, the Council urged the two communities to ‘seize this unique opportunity to reach a settlement’ before accession of the island. Yet, in case a settlement could not be attained, the application of the acquis would be suspended in the North.

From the EU Summit in December 2002 to the submission of the UN-sponsored Annan Plan to a referendum of two communities in the island on 24 April 2004, Turkey’s Cyprus policy followed an interesting trajectory. While the results of the referendum surprised many, the positive stance adopted by the AKP government, its disassociation with Denktas, (the long-lasting leader of the Turkish Cypriots who called for a rejection of the plan) combined with the support of the Turkish-Cypriot community and the rejection by the Greek-Cypriots dismissed the argument that Turkey and its intransigent position was the main obstacle for the resolution of the conflict. The radical shift in Turkey’s Cyprus policy owes much to the changes in domestic politics. The AKP, which came to power in 2002 with an election manifesto of defending the fulfilment of the Copenhagen criteria to join the EU, was quick in realizing that democratization articulated by slight changes in highly sensitive foreign policy issues such as Cyprus and the relations with Greece would consolidate its new political identity. The Cyprus case shows how domestic political transformation towards greater democracy creates a real impact on a sensitive foreign policy issue with high nationalist resonance.

However, in the aftermath of the failed referendum of April 2004, AKP’s policy on Cyprus started to swing back towards a traditional line, indexing any policy change to Turkey’s membership perspective. The Cyprus issue contributed greatly towards the deterioration of Turkey-EU relations in the post-2004 period. This was in spite of the EU decision to start accession negotiations in October 2005. On 29 July 2005, Turkey made a declaration stating that its signature at the EU Summit in December 2004 to extend the Customs Union with the EU to all new Member States – including Cyprus – ‘does not constitute recognition of the divided island’. The EU responded with a ‘counter-declaration’ on 21 September 2005 stating that Turkey is expected to implement ‘fully and non-discriminatory’ its Customs Union agreement and that ‘recognition of all Member States is a necessary component of the accession process’ – meaning that Ankara is required to recognize Cyprus in order to enter the bloc. The framework of negotiations issued in October 2005 expected Turkey to take steps to contribute to a favourable climate for a comprehensive settlement and normalize its bilateral relations with all EU members and to fulfil its obligations under the Association Agreement by extending it to all new member States, including the Republic of Cyprus.

Even after the launch of accession negotiations, Turkish political leaders stated at various times that the EU is not the correct platform to discuss the Cyprus problem and that the implementation of Turkey’s obligations arising from the customs union depends on lifting the embargo towards Turkish Cypriots. Turkey also refused to open its ports and airports to Cypriot-flagged ships and aircraft, and imposed a veto on Cyprus’ membership of some international organizations such as OECD and its participation in the Wassenaar Agreement on the Code of Conduct on Arms Exports and on Dual Use of Goods. The Council, revising Turkey’s Accession Partnership in January 2006, requested that Turkey support efforts to find a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem within the UN framework, implement fully the Protocol adapting the Ankara Agreement and take concrete steps to ensure the normalization of bilateral relations between Turkey and all EU Member States, including the Republic of Cyprus. As a result of this problem, Turkey-EU relations entered a period of paralysis throughout the whole of 2006. The Council meeting in December 2006 where the EU decided to suspend eight chapters of the accession negotiations with Turkey revealed the negative climate dominating Turkey-EU relations and almost reached the level of a “train crash”.

When analyzed closely, even though Turkey fails to comply with the EU requirements, Turkey’s current policy towards Cyprus is far from returning to traditional options such as defending confederation or the annexation of Northern Cyprus. These options have not been completely ruled
out by the hardliners, but the AKP government sustains a policy of defending a solution based on a revised version of the Annan Plan with respect to the changing circumstances of the post-referendum era.10 With the change of government in Southern Cyprus – the ascent of Dimitris Hristofyas, leader of AKEL, to power in February 2008 – and the start of negotiations between two communities, there was an expectation that 2008 would be a crucial year – a year of solution – to progress in the resolution of the conflict. However, facing a closure case in the first half of the year with no sign of progress from the EU side concerning the membership perspective, it was extremely difficult for the AKP to sustain its pro-solution position against the domestic pressure coming from the nationalist/populist demands or to take bold steps on the Cyprus issue throughout 2008.11 Now the hopes have shifted to the year 2009, however, almost one year of negotiations carried out by the two “pro-solution” leaders – M.A. Talat and D. Hristofyas – has shown that there is a serious problem in the power-sharing dimension of a possible solution. In other words, the model of the new state i.e. unitary or federal is under question. While the Greek side have mainly been defending the incorporation of the Turks as minority in the already existing Cypriot state without damaging its uniform decision making and governance structures, the Turkish side (including Turkey) have been arguing the necessity of a transfer of enough political power, administrative capacity and autonomy to communities.

However, the opinion surveys conducted in Cyprus in the aftermath of the failed referendum in April 2004 showed that both sides have been negotiating under a deep time-constraint as the hopes for solution are fading away and the partition is more than a possibility but gradually turning into a reality. Most of those surveys show that while the concerns of security (referring to Turkey’s presence in the island) drive the Greek side, Turkish Cypriots’ insistence on a flexible federation is mainly related to a comparable concern of security and disappointment not only from Greek Cypriots who do not seem to share the same feelings regarding common destiny as the April 2004 referendum and the post-referendum period shows. The Turkish Cypriots are also concerned with the position of the EU, which is not able to overcome the economic difficulties born out of the isolation of the North of the island. Currently Turkish Cypriots are going to early general elections (19 April), but, the power of the pro-solution party CTP, previously headed by M.A. Talat, has been seriously shaken not only because of its poor performance in the domestic reform process but also because of the increasingly gloomy perspective of the solution of the Cyprus problem. On the other hand, Turkey’s position seems to be the determinant in this context. Propagated as a kind of failure by the hardliners, the AKP’s policy shift caused a loss of prestige for the party and its leaders, increased internal frictions and prevented further openings in foreign policy which might have serious repercussions in domestic politics. In fact, the political transformation in Turkey has been facing a clear backlash because of a policy failure of the government in foreign relations and the EU’s ambiguity towards Turkey. The worries of the government increased especially after the local elections which took place on 29 March. Although the AKP did not perform extremely poorly, there is an almost ten percent decrease in its vote share since the last general elections in 2007. This created a kind of disappointment among the leaders and supporters of the party, if not a panic. The election results may hint that for the AKP it would be very difficult to take bold steps which could be considered unpopular in such a delicate issue like the Cyprus one, considered as a national cause in Turkey. Actually significant in terms of reflecting a general shift of the position of the leading circles in the country in the context of a currently rather shaky EU perspective, AKP’s Cyprus policy might inevitably swing back to the traditional line of holding the case as a bargaining chip in EU negotiations.12

2) The Turkish Cypriots voted in favour of the Plan with a 64.9% majority and the Greek-Cypriots rejected it with an emphatic 75.8% majority. Faced with serious pressures from the international community on the eve of the referendum to vote for the Plan, the Greek Cypriots chose to become an EU member on 1 May 2004, representing the whole island.
4) Negotiating Framework for Turkey, October 2005.
5) ‘Erdoğan, Kibris’tan dünyaya seslendi ‘İzolasyonları kaldırın’”, ABhaber, 19 July 2006; ‘Başbakan Erdoğan Kibris’ta AB’ye sert çıkışını sürdürdü’, Zaman (Turkish daily), 3 December 2006.
11) I. Dagi ‘Why there will be no solution in Cyprus’, Today’s Zaman, 19 May 2008.12 For this final assessment, the author mainly relies on a series of interviews, which he conducted between January-December 2008 with leading figures from politics, economy, academia and media in Turkey.

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At the beginning of May 2009, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan announced the most substantial reshuffle of his government ever since AKP’s landslide victory in 2002. Whereas some ministers just changed positions, several posts have been assigned to persons new to the cabinet. The most recognised - and acclaimed - change occurred at the head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Ahmet Davutoglu, so far chief advisor to Prime Minister Erdogan, will now represent Turkey on the international scene.

Cabinet:
- Min. of State: Bulent ARINC*
- Min. of State: Mehmet AYDIN
- Min. of State: Ali BABACAN*
- Min. of State: Egemen BAGIS
- Min. of State: Mehmet Zafer CAGLAYAN*
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- Min. of National Education: Nimet CUBUKCU*
- Min. of Public Works & Housing: Mustafa DEMIR*
- Min. of Transportation: Binali YILDIRIM

Data as of May 2009, Source: www.cia.gov, World Leaders database. All the changes that took place beginning of May are marked by an asterisk (*).
The overall results, for the time being, did not increase but remained at around 39%. Nonetheless, AKP still came out first and received a total of 39% of the votes. However, it also lost some of its supporters for the first time since it came to power in 2002. Although this will – according to a widely shared belief – not cause the AKP to cut reforms, it will urge Prime Minister Erdogan to behave more compromisingly.¹

The overall results,² regarded in a little more detail, reveal the AKP’s dilemma: In 2004, AKP had won mayoralty in 12 metropolises, 46 provinces and 483 districts; it has now won mayoralty in “only” 10 metropolises, 35 provinces and 447 districts. Meanwhile, its most relevant opponent, the Republican People’s Party (CHP) had succeeded in 2 metropolises, 6 provinces and 130 districts in 2004; now, in 2009, it made a great leap forward and won mayoralty in 3 metropolises, 10 provinces and 170 districts.

In the pre-election phase of the 2009 local elections, AKP and CHP especially showed a head to head race in Istanbul and Ankara, which finally fell to the AKP, just as in 2004. Nonetheless, CHP secured again victory in Izmir and in Mersin; it also won over Antalya with a vast increase of its own vote share – CHP managed to secure victory despite a slight increase in AKP’s votes as well. Among the reasons for AKP’s failure to repeat its overwhelming election results of the past in the 2009 local elections feature current problems that effect either the everyday lives of people or their general political sentiments: the international financial and economic crisis, proceedings in the Ergenekon case, transatlantic relations and relations with Armenia feature among the most prominent issues stirring public opinion.

Accordingly, 2009 local elections hint well beyond the local level: Some striking points in these elections will unmistakably set and form the landscape for Turkish politics in the years to come:

• In the aftermath of elections, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan expressed his and the AKP’s willingness to learn from the drop in votes below 40%. This might well imply a renewed, more compromising style in politics, which might eventually profit democratic stability and culture throughout Turkey.³

• By choosing very carefully its candidates and acting more credibly against corruption, the main opposition party CHP managed to raise its votes in the coastal region. This strategy applied in local elections evidently halted its decrease in relevance. This might finally allow CHP to re-attain a more prominent role in national politics in the future.

• With the 2009 local elections, the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) has eventually established itself as the second most important opposition party. The vote rates MHP attained in Central Anatolia and metropolises indicate that besides other political currents, Turkish nationalism will continue to play a major role.

• The Democratic Turkey Party (DTP), which is mostly understood as a regional Kurdish party, again ranks first in Southeast and East Anatolia. AKP’s ambitious attempts of having control over Diyarbakir and neighbouring provinces failed despite major efforts undertaken. DTP proved again to be the strongest party in the region.⁴ In addition to AKP’s failure in the east, also CHP attained only little if any votes. Accordingly, DTP will also continue too play a major role – as “regional” party – in Turkish politics.

• The Felicity Party (SP), drawing much of its political inspiration from Islam, also is one of the winners of local elections, attaining a vote share of over 5%. Besides nationalism, as represented by the MHP, religion will also play a central role in politics in years to come. In how far SP will even constitute a particular challenge for the AKP that is likely to act more and more compromisingly, is still a question of intense debate.

Last but not least, besides these currents of re-equilibrating political powers in Turkey, the local elections also have implications for the future of EU-Turkey relations and the accession process. The central question will be, whether AKP will finally restart reforms comparable to its efforts prior to the official start of negotiations in October 2005 or if it will reduce efforts even more, without totally revoking the EU path. Other tasks related to Turkey’s membership bid lie before the AKP as well: The transatlantic relationship will probably be more favourable with the new administration in Washington, new relations with Armenia – although internally not uncontested – might (re-)open prospects for acceleration in the accession process. The same holds true for any chances to come closer to a solution of conflicting interests in Cyprus. Another point will be how Turkey will position itself as an accepted and searched for power in the region, especially after Erdogan’s performance at the Davos meeting which was heavily criticised internationally.

Bearing in mind these challenges, two interpretations of the 2009 local elections become evident: AKP in fact lost these elections. The decrease in votes – compared to 2004 and 2007 – can only be understood as a warning. Accordingly, AKP will have to act more carefully and be more cautious concerning its next political steps. Nonetheless, AKP is also the winner of the elections, having still won 39% of all votes. Despite its reduced room for manoeuvre, AKP still has a clear mandate to pursue its politics of modernisation and opening up to the world. In pursuing this course, AKP is now obliged to follow a more and more inclusive and balanced approach, just as the main opposition parties are bound to take stock of AKP’s objective strength and their own merits in order to finally play their proper role in a maturing and stabilising democratic Turkey.

¹ http://haber.turk.net/ENG/2249129/-POL--ELEC-TION-RESULTS-INDICATE-CONFIDENCE-IN-AK-PARTY--PM-ERDOGAN
⁵ ZEI EU-Turkey-Monitor is published three times a year. Authors are responsible for the views expressed in their contributions.

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Local elections of 29 March 2009 ended with a surprise: The votes for the Justice and Development Party (AKP) did not increase but decreased. Nonetheless, AKP still came out first and received a total of 39% of the votes. However, it also lost some of its supporters for the first time since it came to power in 2002. Although this will – according to a widely shared belief – not cause the AKP to cut reforms, it will urge Prime Minister Erdogan to behave more compromisingly.

The overall results, regarded in a little more detail, reveal the AKP’s dilemma: In 2004, AKP had won mayoralty in 12 metropolises, 46 provinces and 483 districts; it has now won mayoralty in “only” 10 metropolises, 35 provinces and 447 districts. Meanwhile, its most relevant opponent, the Republican People’s Party (CHP) had succeeded in 2 metropolises, 6 provinces and 130 districts in 2004; now, in 2009, it made a great leap forward and won mayoralty in 3 metropolises, 10 provinces and 170 districts.

In the pre-election phase of the 2009 local elections, AKP and CHP especially showed a head to head race in Istanbul and Ankara, which finally fell to the AKP, just as in 2004. Nonetheless, CHP secured again victory in Izmir and in Mersin; it also won over Antalya with a vast increase of its own vote share – CHP managed to secure victory despite a slight increase in AKP’s votes as well. Among the reasons for AKP’s failure to repeat its overwhelming election results of the past in the 2009 local elections feature current problems that effect either the everyday lives of people or their general political sentiments: the international financial and economic crisis, proceedings in the Ergenekon case, transatlantic relations and relations with Armenia feature among the most prominent issues stirring public opinion.

Accordingly, 2009 local elections hint well beyond the local level: Some striking points in these elections will unmistakably set and form the landscape for Turkish politics in the years to come:

• In the aftermath of elections, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan expressed his and the AKP’s willingness to learn from the drop in votes below 40%. This might well imply a renewed, more compromising style in politics, which might eventually profit democratic stability and culture throughout Turkey.

• By choosing very carefully its candidates and acting more credibly against corruption, the main opposition party CHP managed to raise its votes in the coastal region. This strategy applied in local elections evidently halted its decrease in relevance. This might finally allow CHP to re-attain a more prominent role in national politics in the future.

• With the 2009 local elections, the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) has eventually established itself as the second most important opposition party. The vote rates MHP attained in Central Anatolia and metropolises indicate that besides other political currents, Turkish nationalism will continue to play a major role.

• The Democratic Turkey Party (DTP), which is mostly understood as a regional Kurdish party, again ranks first in Southeast and East Anatolia. AKP’s ambitious attempts of having control over Diyarbakir and neighbouring provinces failed despite major efforts undertaken. DTP proved again to be the strongest party in the region. In addition to AKP’s failure in the east, also CHP attained only little if any votes. Accordingly, DTP will also continue too play a major role – as “regional” party – in Turkish politics.

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