The Long Crisis - Finally a Boost for the European Integration Process?

by Matthias Vogl*

In the second half of 2015, the flow of refugees from the Middle East, the Western Balkans and from Africa to the territory of the European Union (EU) reached unprecedented levels. This situation clearly presents one of the most serious challenges to intra-European cohesion which the European integration process has faced since its initiation. It is the continuation of a state of crisis, in which the has EU found itself in basically since the end of the Cold War. It permanently has had to react and adapt to new challenges, for which it lacks the structures and instruments to cope with, be it the Balkan wars, 9/11, conflicts in Africa or, internally, the constitutional crisis and the economic, financial and sovereign debt crisis. Thus, from a European perspective and referring to historian John Lewis Gaddis, who described the Cold War as the period of a “long peace”, one could see post-Cold War EU history as that of a “long crisis”.

Against this background, the Union has time and again switched on its “learning-through-crises-mode”. In the last 25 years, it has gone through this mode successfully several times. However, a stronger Union was never and will never be achieved for free. The sacrifice of losing national sovereignty in...
Some areas will have to be made on the altar of a more effective management of political challenges. Due to the intensity of the current crisis, many observers predict the end of European integration. The solution, however, is not dissolution. With the terrorist attacks on the heartland of the EU on 13 November 2015, resolve, unity and cooperation are needed more urgently than ever. The type of challenges that the EU faces shows that the “learning results” of the past were not satisfactory.

Looking at the current situation, the so-called Greek problem just seemed to have calmed down in summer 2015, as the EU slipped with eyes opened into the next crisis which had announced itself for some years already. The refugee challenge is so striking because it reveals signs of EU failure as well as clear chances for a strengthened Union. However, the latter are debated too little.

EU Foreign Policy in Times of Interdependence

It is obvious that the refugees, of which, currently the majority are coming from the Middle East, are leaving their home region because of inhuman living conditions in Syria and Iraq and in the refugee camps of the neighbouring countries. A lack of perspectives in the future drives them into the hands of equally inhuman traffickers.

If one frankly looks at how the EU and the West in general have behaved since the uprisings in Syria broke out, this development should not come as a surprise. While not even being able to grant enough help to allow for a decent life in the camps, the EU was far from delivering a hard fight to achieve its declared goals of pushing back ISIL and of removing Assad. It is an open secret that before the situation escalated gradually, with a strengthened ISIL first, then followed by the refugee flows, the Syrian conflict was fairly forgotten. Contributions to its solution were hardly convincing. Now, not only waves of refugees but also ISIL, have arrived in Europe.

Interest Constellations

Although Russia can certainly be blamed for having been an obstacle to more coherent action against Assad in 2011, the destruction of his chemical weapons in 2013 showed that with a little more resolve and a constructive approach, incorporating the interests of all sides, this obstacle could have been overcome or lowered before. Russian interests in the end may not be to protect Assad as the Syrian leader for all time but rather to be accepted as a global power, to secure a strategic foothold in the Middle East and to offensively preempt terrorism at home by fighting ISIL. This is neither something that should impede a closer cooperation nor a reason to fall on knees before Putin. Russia has to be held responsible by the West making feasible proposals and not holding sermons. This would be an efficient way to maintain the prerogative of interpretation. US, the EU and Russia share the goal of destroying ISIL. The EU and the US, however, equally want to get rid of Assad. Unfortunately, especially the EU has put limited effort into both goals so far. Consequently, now, it urgently needs Turkish help to control the refugee flows. Turkey again is not happy to see the West supporting Kurdish fighters. It officially wants to fight terrorism evolving from ISIL but fears any strengthening of the Kurds even more. Finally, Ankara joins the EU and the US in their rejection of the Assad regime.

In this complicated interest constellation, it seems clear that the lowest common denominator is to fight ISIL in a more effective and coordinated way.

However, as basically everybody wants to destroy ISIL, but not with its own land forces, an equally important goal and a precondition for a concentrated action against the terror group, is a ceasefire in Syria, which would serve as the basis for a political process. The way towards this goal is the reinforced Vienna Conference, which should be continued with even more resolve.

While trying to sketch a way to a viable solution, the reality on the ground remains extremely complicated. Every step has to
be cautiously evaluated on the diplomatic stage which slows down the process. Nobody wants to lose face and Europe is obviously the weakest player in the game. In the last years, especially regarding the Middle East, European Foreign Policy suffered not from the divergence of its Member States’ national interests but from their collective absence. Although this is changing now with the Paris attacks, the price for getting the situation under control will be high, no matter in which kind of currency it will have to be paid. In this defensive position, it would be prudent to rediscover time as a self-advantage. Working towards a political system in Syria that reflects an inclusive power sharing without Assad but does not exclude the Alawites should be defined as a goal. But even every day Assad remains in power does not necessarily mean a defeat for the West. It is rather that more European efforts to destroy ISIL which also have to include the fight on the digital frontline and the development of counter-narratives will open space to work for a political Syria without Assad. In the best constellation, strengthened moderate rebels and the Kurds would divide labor with rehabilitated parts of the regime army in destroying ISIL and Islamist terror groups after a ceasefire. However, in order to bring about such a constellation, Europe should prepare itself mentally to deliver more. Apart from coordinated airstrikes in a coalition that includes Russia, the EU and the US should step up their engagement with Kurdish and Arab troops, both to hedge Turkey and Russia, raise the price for playing their geopolitical games and facilitate a political process and to keep on fighting ISIL on the ground. At the same time, they should show openness towards the idea of safe zones. The latter could be part of a political deal and implemented jointly under an UN umbrella with regional and also European participation.

Against the backdrop of all these complex and sometimes frustrating challenges, it is crucial for the EU to start a process of self-reflection and to enhance integration in critical areas like security policy and border pro-

African Regional Integration Studies Association (ARISA) Constitutes Inaugural Assembly

At the invitation of the West Africa Institute (WAI) and the Center for European Integration Studies (ZEI), African researchers met in Bonn from 10-11 November 2015 to facilitate the establishment of the “African Regional Integration Studies Association (ARISA)” in order to foster a critical understanding of the Member States, historical development, institutions, processes, policies, programs, issues, and challenges of African regional integration. The Association will develop a community of academics and practitioners in order to raise the knowledge of and build capacity in African regional integration. The meeting took place within the bi-regional research and consulting project “Sustainable Regional Integration in West Africa and Europe” financed by German Ministry for Education and Research (BMBF) from 2012 until 2016 which was identified as a beacon project in the thematic areas of Education and Transformation within the framework of the Ministry’s Africa Strategy 2014-2018.
tection. Only on this path will it transform obstacles into opportunities. Steps in this direction are, however, hardly debated so far. This lack of debate is disappointing as in the Southern scenario the EU showed that it is able to act in a flexible way. The naval operation called Sophia was one of the fastest established CSDP operations ever. The comparatively short time between decision and action was a progress, technically as well as politically.

On the political side of EU policies to the South, the overall balance remains ambivalent. The EU-Africa Summit on Migration in November 2015 in Valetta was more of a symbolic meeting. African leaders of course accepted the Emergency Trust Fund offered by the EU, but they will most probably be rather lukewarm regarding readmission in practice. Their countries already suffer from extreme youth unemployment and from other problems. Therefore, readmission would only work if it is compensated in an attractive way. In this context, if one looks at the order of priorities in the Valletta Action Plan, the fact that for the first time the development benefits of migration and legal migration are mentioned as the first two points, there seems to be a change of perception in the EU. Obviously, it realizes more than before that migration is a long-term challenge filled with opportunities for “partnerships of exchange” and not something that could be stopped by pushing a button. How can we interpret these contradictory developments?

On the one hand, the EU is learning from past mistakes and advancing slowly but steadily. It is simply not possible to solve any problem bypassing the EU level. The activation of article 42.7 for the first time after the terrorist attacks shows that EU treaty provisions can put pressure on the member states. However, on the other hand, far from enough has been done to make the EU a foreign policy heavyweight in practice. The version of Realpolitik, the Europeans conducted in the Middle East, first by ignoring the Syrian conflict politically and later by opening up for talks with Russia and even “indirectly” with Assad or by paying court to Turkey, is an approach that can be followed. Nevertheless, due to its value-related ambitions, such behaviour will always appear contradictory as long as the EU does not make clear that an interest-driven policy actually forms part of its strategic foreign policy equation. In the current situation, it rather appears as an act of despair and a reflection of missing self-confidence. Until the Paris attacks the EU “big shots” like Merkel and Hollande did not put enough effort into their crisis diplomacy and did not provide enough capacities for joint and preventive EU action. In fact, they did not even communicate what they did as joint European action. As a consequence, the so-called Franco-German tandem was literally invisible. Although engagement steadily increased since mid-2015, the EU remains in a defensive position which is unfavourable in the current environment.

In practice, this means e.g. that when Russia and the US talk about Syria, the EU still sits at the side table.

Against this background the EU has to think about a different approach for the future, rhetorically as well as practically. “Enlightened self-interest” is a term that merges value ambition and the necessity for short term interest-driven policy in some cases. It stands for resolve engagement. American engagement in Europe after World War II was the example. The Union should develop this term into a concept with a long-term perspective and into an approach that matches the provision of capacities with its strategic aspirations. The reformulation of the EU’s Security Strategy which is currently going on may serve as a platform for such debate. Ideally, it would be used for a jump-start in Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). It remains to be seen if the refugee crisis and the Paris attacks will lead to a more active and open discussion into this direction.

EU Domestic Policy

The domestic side of the refugee challenge is equally shows contradictory developments. Geographically, there is a divide between countries with an EU external border who feel overburdened with the never ending flux of people streaming into the EU and with their duty to organize the asylum procedure and the rest of the continent. For a long time, border-states blamed
the other countries in the Northern, Central and Eastern part of Europe for helping them too little with this huge task until they finally surrendered and let greater flows of refugees move on, especially to Austria, Germany and Sweden. This has brought the whole so-called “Common European Asylum System” with the “Dublin procedure” at its core to a complete collapse in the course of only some weeks. There was a chain of problem delegation. Turkey, intentionally or not, facilitated the passage to the Greek islands due to ineffective border controls. Greece opened the gates because of overstretched capacities and is seen as the revolving door into the EU. Hungary builds up a fence to stop the refugee flows which then consequently look for alternative routes, e.g. through Croatia, etc.

Furthermore, there is a conceptual divide between countries which see the refugee challenge as something to be solved by only some EU members and others who demand European solidarity, especially with regard to the distribution of refugees. Especially Slovakia, Poland and Hungary fear changes to their cultural cohesiveness and reject a Europeanized solution. Their governments rather argue for a “closed” Europe and see the responsibility for the existing refugee flows especially with Germany and others who put the humanitarian need of protection at the forefront. Germany has accepted as many refugees as never before and at the same time sees itself forced to reintroduce border controls because of the high numbers of people arriving. Against this background, Berlin and others try to enhance the pressure for a deeper European integration in the field of migration, including distribution and an effective external border protection and management.

Thus, what we can witness is a mixed debate about the relevance of EU values, the role of borders, the added-value of migration and about practical concepts to deal with these issues. The lowest common denominator is that the intensity of the refugee flows have to be reduced and that they have to be managed more effectively.

In spite of the talk of missing European solidarity and of the end of the Schengen area, it is undeniable that the countries that try to block European cooperation are doomed to fail. First, with regard to Schengen, the reintroduction of border controls is legally possible for up to two years in exceptional circumstances, thus there is no reason to talk of an end of Schengen. Schengen continues to exist. Second, with regard to solidarity, EU member states decided by qualified majority to relocate 160,000 refugees. This decision reflects a change in European policy-making. Since the entering into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, decision-making with qualified majority is possible for all aspects of the “Area of Freedom, Security and Justice”. Hence, the EU’s decision was a step towards more competitiveness in a European political system hitherto characterized by strict consensus orientation even in areas where consensus was not necessary. Of course, this was only a first step which was hard to achieve and needs a serious follow-up in order to implement the EU decision in practice. However, even though progress is currently only made at a snail’s pace, spoilers should be warned that the provisions of the Lisbon Treaty is not worthless paper. It allows the formation of majorities that force others to follow or at least to build coalitions of the willing that are able to act on behalf of the EU. As Robert Schumann, one of the founding fathers of European integration stipulated: “de facto
solidarity” is built through concrete achievements, which then advance the integration process. Over time, “de facto solidarity” in the EU will continue to grow.

The European Commission will equally try to make its contribution to the goal of a growing solidarity. It has to present results as migration is one of the top priorities in its political program. With the “European Agenda on Migration” it has elaborated an ambitious approach which it has to be measured against before the next European elections, which might be even more politicized than the last ones. Therefore, it will push hard to enable among others a long-term distribution mechanism and a discussion about more legal ways of migration. Working with threats of exclusion from regional funds in this context is certainly the last step to take. Nevertheless, the pure mentioning of this idea by some European policy-makers makes clear that solidarity is not a one-way-street but a core principle of the EU’s legitimacy. And it is one that especially those states that now deny it which have benefitted in the past ten years. Therefore, if solidarity is continued to be blocked when it comes to the implementation of practical European policies, all possible measures have to be exploited. Going into the other direction, a distribution mechanism might be supported by more financial aid or compensation than before as an incentive to facilitate agreement with the skeptics. Finally, in parallel to containing or encouraging spoilers it would be possible to go ahead in a flexible way with a “coalition of the willing”.

Apart from the solidarity debate, there are also other signs of an ongoing Europeanization in the field of migration policy, like the decision of the Interior Ministers to strengthen Frontex and the discussion about its transformation into a European border protection corps. The establishment of so-called hot spots to register incoming refugees is closely connected to the existence of a distribution mechanism. Although they still have to prove their practicability, which will only be achieved by providing enough capacities, they generally stand for Europeanized solutions and for a softening of national sovereignty in this issue area. They might be

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Learning from European Experiences in Governance and Regulation - ZEI hosts West African Young Professionals

In the context of its research cooperation with the West Africa Institute (WAI) in Praia, Cabo Verde, ZEI hosts three young African professionals in the Master of European Studies - Governance and Regulation Class of 2016. Igantius Olli is from Nigeria. He is active as an election observer for the African Union. He wants to learn from the European experience in regional integration. Faith Gabriel works for the Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation in Abuja. She wants to extend her knowledge about policy-making in the EU because of the growing significance of the Africa-EU relationship. Mariama Ndow Jarju comes from The Gambia, where she works in the Ministry of Environment. Questions regarding governance and regulation are particularly relevant in the area of environmental policy. Therefore, she hopes to broaden her horizon and profit from the Master course in her daily work. The scholarship of the three young West African professionals covers the tuition fee of 6,500€. Learn more about the MES program on: www.zei.de/www.mes.zei.de.
followed some day by a streamlined European asylum law.

All these steps can help to deal with the refugee challenge in a more organized way. However, they need time, which is not available at the moment. Therefore, besides the rather mid- or long-term steps like a more effective European Foreign Policy which is able to tackle the root-causes of forced migration, the opening up of more legal channels of migration or a functioning European border protection system and force, the idea of a resettlement of contingents of refugees still seems the safest and most reasonable short-term approach. The way it was proposed, it would potentially destroy the business idea of the traffickers and take pressure off the hot spots. However, whether this really works depends on Turkey’s political will to contain the traffickers on its own shores. This comes at a time where the internal situation in Turkey remains fragile. It also depends on the EU’s ability to support a joint Turkish-European strategy by delivering the promised financial means and to distribute a great number people within Europe. A European navy presence around the Greek Islands as a further deterrence component has surprisingly never been discussed seriously.

Finally, the amount of time gained by such a step depends on the ability of the refugees that are not included in the contingents and traffickers to find alternative routes. The fact that they shun no danger to reach the destination they dream of is widely known. Therefore, resettlement, even if it might bring relief, cannot be an excuse for long-term solutions to the root-causes of the problem. These solutions have to be worked on with high pressure. As mentioned above, the price for the EU, e.g. to convince Turkey to play a more constructive role, is high. The EU can only blame itself for having driven the price to this stage.

A deepened European Integration
Thus, what we can learn from these complicated developments is that functional necessities are driving the EU towards more European solutions that nobody seemed prepared for. That is why we see a striking asymmetry between the problems and viable solutions. Political leaders in Europe have thought of their continent as a land of bliss that can seal itself off from the rest of the world. They were wrong.

At the same time, the EU seems to slowly “normalize” with regard to the decision-making mechanisms. Differing priorities between EU members regarding the refugee crisis but also regarding the fight against terrorism will certainly remain. However, to overcome these obstacles, EU law offers ways to contain or to encourage spoilers and it allows for mechanisms of flexible cooperation, although the latter have not been effectively exploited so far in times of impasse. This is particularly true for foreign and security policy.

Moreover, what is needed in the first place is an offensive communication policy that turns the picture of a split EU into one of an EU that shows unity (in flexibility) and promises opportunity.

The discussion of long-term Europeanized solutions should be led in a serious way. First, organizing external border management on an EU-level is more effective and more efficient as is a further Europeanized crisis management (civilian and military). Second, an offensive and sufficiently financed integration of refugees into the EU will prevent radicalization and strengthen its overall economy at the same time. Third, constructive approaches for using the development potentials of migration and for offering legal roads to Europe and back are helpful for the EU as well as for the countries of origin. Even though hard-fought negotiations can be expected to ease the refugee problem and its root-causes, the EU has no chance but to face this challenge as a community. It must invest more capacity, communicate more coherently and increase “de facto solidarity”. If such policies are pursued now, the “learning-through-crisis-mode” will not end up in a dissolution of the EU as many predict, but eventually in the end of its “long crisis” and in a stronger Union.

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Africa is one of the most vulnerable continents to changes in the global climate and increased climate variability as, for example, an increase in global average temperatures of 1.5-2°C would cause a reduction of between 40-80% of cultivable lands for maize, millet and sorghum. Agriculture will also be affected by changing precipitation patterns, affecting the large majority of the continent’s population that works in subsistence farming. Another major area of concern will be quickly urbanizing cities in low-lying coastal areas due to the expected sea level rise. Aggravated by other, multiple stress factors, such as widespread poverty and weak adaptive capacity in terms of human and financial resources, climate change will, thus, severely threaten the continent’s food production, infrastructure and economic productivity. The African Development Bank (AfDB) estimates adaptation costs for the continent to be between USD 7-15 billion annually by 2020, with increases expected to be up to USD 35 billion by 2050 (even if global warming stays below 2°C). Overall, the negative effects of climate change are already reducing Africa’s GDP by about 1.4%, and the costs arising from adaptation are set to reach 3% of GDP annually by 2030 which is much higher than in other regions of the world. At the same time, the low development status of most African countries leaves them with little financial and human capacities to counteract this trend, while profiting the least from international climate finance at the same time. Multilateral development banks estimate current amounts of adaptation finance at only USD 3.7 million for Sub-Sahara and only 2% of globally approved projects under the first commitment period of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) are located within the region. The huge gap between financial resources needed and those provided is commonly referred to as the African Adaptation Gap and may well become a do-or-die-issue for the continents future.

Comparing this to Africa’s CO2 emissions which amount for only a tiny fraction of global per capita emissions, the continent’s disproportionally unfavourable position in regard to climate justice becomes even more evident. On the other hand, there is enormous potential for renewable energy production, using wind, solar, thermal energy and hydropower to overcome the energy crises (especially regarding the decentralized electrification of rural areas) and fuel economic development. However, this is yet another matter of substantial, unmatched investment demand as climate finance is one of the key deadlocks within UN climate negotiations.

Despite this dire situation, African countries’ national positions within global climate negotiations can be as diverse as the continent itself: Countries like Cabo Verde, which is a member of the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), is calling for the most ambitious targets as their survival may be threatened by temperature increases above 1.5°C. At the UNFCCC Conference in Copenhagen in 2009, countries had agreed to limit global warming to a 2°C increase. Many scientists, however, believe that this goal cannot be reached any longer and the UN estimates that current INDCs lock in global warming at 2.7°C. A 1.5°C target would require 70-96% reduction in emissions by 2050 and the achievement of net zero emissions between 2060 and 2080.
other end of the spectrum are oil-exporting OPEC countries like Nigeria that will lose revenue from decreasing fossil fuel demand, or South Africa, the continent’s largest greenhouse gas emitter. The least common denominator between them could be summarised as ‘adaptation, agriculture, energy and financial compensation’.

In order to harmonize their priorities and translate them into a continental position, African National Ministers of Environment meet every two years at the African Ministerial Conference on the Environment (AMCEN). The results are then presented at international meetings by the African Group of Negotiators (AGN). In March 2015, AMCEN adopted the Cairo Declaration which backs an ambitious 1.5°C target for the UN Climate Negotiations in Paris (COP21) and calls for a more equal recognition of adaptation and mitigation within the new global climate deal currently under negotiation. Furthermore, the African union has drafted a comprehensive African Strategy on Climate Change which is pending adoption by January 2016. In line with the G77, which is currently chaired by South Africa, AGN wants the new global climate deal to be legally binding, predictable and based on a principle-based reference framework. This would indeed mean stick-

ing to the developed and developing countries division established in the Kyoto Protocol. Even though AGN acknowledges the importance of mitigation commitments, it stresses that they should only be binding for developed countries, while they should depend on the climate finance provided for others. As previously much attention had been paid to assess country’s vulnerabilities, the group calls to move now towards the effective implementation of National Adaptation Programmes of Action (NAPAs). In order to do so, the continent will need a massive scale-up in financial, technical and institutional support, far beyond mainstreaming adaptation into development programs.

Since the Copenhagen summit in 2009, where African countries presented a unified negotiation position for the first time, African nations have made substantial progress towards formulating a harmonized position. However, time will mark whether this will be sufficient to overcome their low geopolitical status and lack of capacity for agenda-setting. Chairing the G77 may increase negotiation leverage, as will be the repetition of concerted action within the African Pavilion at the Le Bourget conference center. However, this will only hold if unity can be preserved and conflicting national needs and interests be aligned. Furthermore, transporting this harmonized position into other international alliances such as the EU-led high ambition coalition will be even more decisive: The newly formed alliance between the European Union and 79 African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) Countries brings more than 100 countries and the majority of parties to the table in order to bridge the gap between developing and developed countries, whether they are big or small, rich or poor, fast-growing emitters or at severe risk of rising sea-levels. Unified action will be particularly important as global climate negotiations have become more and more fragmented within the last years, with bilateral deals and decisions taken in other, more exclusive international fora increasingly influencing the effective implementation of an international climate deal. Confronted with this even wider array of actors and issues (and consequently less negotiation leverage), the high ambition coalition might have been Africa’s safest bet for a legally-binding and verifiable international agreement that reflects the continent’s genuine interests, ensuring the climate finance needed for a carbon-friendly development of the continent - just as it has been the EU’s smartest bet for avoiding another climate summit failure on European soil.

This article was written in November 2015.

References


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by Kocra Lossina Assoua*

Since the introduction of multiparty democracy in Africa at the end of the 1980s, electoral competitions have become a norm in most African countries. The popular and normative expectation that the holding of free, fair, regular periodic elections would necessarily signify the presence of democracy has however quickly vanished after almost four decades of election cycles. With very few exceptions, over the last couple of decades, election processes in Africa have been marred by extreme controversy and dispute leading often to the death of many citizens. This was the case of the 2010 presidential elections held in Côte d’Ivoire and Guinea.

Judging from this experience, the 2015 presidential elections in both countries were expected to result in conflict and were labeled therefore by political analysts as high risk elections. The elections were, however, relatively peaceful and both incumbent leaders, Alassane D. Ouattara and Alpha Condé, were declared the winners with 84% and 58% respectively of the vote casts in the first round. Surprisingly, no violent confrontations were registered after the proclamation of the election results amidst plenty of suspicion about the electoral arrangements. Most observers evaluated both elections as free, fair and transparent. In both cases, the fear outweighed the hurt.

Beyond these peaceful elections, an analysis of the electoral data and both election processes however suggests that the legitimacy of both regimes might be questionable. With an estimated population size of 23,848,945, the turnout vote in Côte d’Ivoire was 52,38%. Only 3,330,928 of the registered citizens (6,300,142) participated to the 2015 presidential election.

1 See: http://allafrica.com/stories/201510071700.html, retrieved on 03/12/2015.


3 The number of registered citizens for the 2010 election was 5,700,000; which means an increase of 9,5% within five years.
In Guinea, the voter turnout was higher (68%). Incumbent president Conde won 58% of the ballot casts while his challenger, C. D. Diallo, gained over 31%. With an estimated total population size of about 12,384,178, almost 6,042,634 (48,79%) citizens were registered and about 4,131,046 (35,06%) really participated in the presidential elections. Final results published by the Independent National Electoral Commission showed that Conde won an outright majority with nearly 2.9 million votes which equates to 55% of the estimated Voting-Age population of 5,256,768.

Guinean opposition parties’ allegation of widespread fraud however questioned the fairness of the election process. Several pre-election clashes between supporters of competing parties leading to dozens of death were registered before the elections; this evidenced the low level trust of the opposition in the electoral commission.

In both cases, the legitimacy of election still remains problematic. Criticism from opposition about the unequal access to state-media, the composition and impartiality of electoral bodies as well as many organizational problems, including voter registration and enrollment reveals a great deal about the acceptance and legitimacy of electoral process and especially election management bodies.

In this context, evaluating and validating elections becomes more perplexing as the international election observers validated the elections outcomes in both countries as free and fair. This lies in the fact that the latter solely focus on the election outcomes and put less emphasis on election processes which are often rigged and biased. Hence, adopting an outcome-oriented approach instead of a process-oriented approach in evaluating and validating election might be misleading.

Indeed, “the legitimacy of election results rests on the institutionalization of procedural certainty to secure substantive uncertainty of election outcomes”¹⁰. It is obvious that, political actors will only accept to participate in electoral competition if they are certain that the rules for organizing the competition do not pre-determine the outcomes. Ensuring trust in election process is therefore crucial to building voters’ and political actor’s confidence in election outcome. Lack of trust and confidence in electoral process can affect citizens’ perceptions of the legitimacy of both election outcome, and thus undermine the consolidation of democracy in emerging African democracies.


4. This means that only 300,000 new voters were registered on the voting list. See also https://www.cesi-i.org/news/69, retrieved on 29/11/2015.

5. In Côte d’Ivoire the withdrawal of most well-known and serious challengers from the competitions, the legitimacy and fairness of the electoral process in Côte d’Ivoire has been questioned. Although this was not necessarily instrumental for the easy victory of both incumbent presidents, it however undermines the legitimacy of the regime. At this stage, it is hereby worth pointing out that other factors such as the fragmentation of the opposition, the inconsistent and ineffective call for boycott and the lack of common strategy of opposition leaders paved the way for the victory of A. Ouattara.


8.01/12/2015.

9. Interestingly, a recent survey published by Afrobarometer reveals that a majority of Ivorians (57%) have little trust in the electoral bodies.

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In October 2015, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) extended the peacekeeping force ECOMIB (Economic Community of West African States Security Mission in Guinea-Bissau) in Bissau for another six months. The decision was a result of the deliberations of the extraordinary summit of Heads of State and Government, held in Dakar, the Senegalese capital on the same date. ECOMIB consists of military and police forces of ECOWAS countries such as Burkina Faso, Senegal, Nigeria, Ivory Coast and Togo. The mandate of this small peacekeeping force in Guinea-Bissau is to put in place peace and stability after a coup in the West African state in April 2012.

Initially, the ECOWAS force was made up of around 600 soldiers. It was deployed in May 2012 for six months. The ECOWAS force was deployed after an Angolan force of the same size had been obliged to leave. The Angolan soldiers had arrived in March 2011 by invitation of the legal government that was overthrown by the coup.

The official reason for the deployment of the ECOWAS force was to support and help pave the way for a peaceful transition and return to constitutional democracy, after the electoral process was interrupted in April between the first and second rounds of the presidential election which were then underway. However, according to some analysts, there are underlying political interests, particularly by Senegal and Nigeria, as opposed to Angola. Until the election of a new government and President of the Republic in April and May 2014, respectively, the balance of the mission was not considered very positive given that the political, economic and social situation seems to have continued to deteriorate and there was no apparent end in sight to Guinea-Bissau’s role as a significant hub in drug trafficking between Latin America, especially Colombia, and Europe. With the new government of Domingos Simões Pereira the above scenario begins to change and the situation begins to visibly improve in accordance with national and international reports.

However, with the dismissal of the prime minister and the appointment of a government of presidential initiative in August 2015, the President of the Republic staged a sort of coup d’etat that had not been practiced in Guinea Bissau: a constitutional state coup. This allowed the Supreme Court to rule on the situation – by declaring it unconstitutional – which could not have happened in case of another military coup. So, the first conclusion to be drawn from the presence of the ECOWAS peacekeeping force is that it contributed to the non-involvement of the national armed forces into a political crisis. It is recalled that the extraordinary meeting in October 2015 also set up a working group to mediate in the political crisis, which is led by the Presidents of Senegal, Macky Sall, and Guinea, Alpha Condé, and also of the former President of Nigeria, Olusegun Obasanjo. In fact, the mission in Bissau reflects ECOWAS’ larger role as a conflict manager in West Africa. Regarding the military coup of April 2012, the biggest criticism that ECOWAS received by the so-called “international community” had to do with the fact that the organization had recognized and cooperated with a government that emerged from a coup. In fact one can question the nature of the ECOWAS intervention, and some authors argue that the fact that ECOWAS intervened at all probably looks better than if it had simply remained passive. However, this cannot jeopardize the ECOWAS legitimacy to intervene in general. For example, in the extraordinary summit of 24 December 2010 in Abuja, ECOWAS threatened to use force against the outgoing Ivorian President, Laurent Gbagbo if he refused to relinquish power after losing the presidential election in Côte d’Ivoire. Irrespective of the fact that ECOWAS did not carry out this threat, it was legally possible as it was possible in Guinea Bissau. The ECOWAS Protocol on the Mechanism of Prevention, Management and Conflict Resolution for the Maintenance of Peace and Security legalizes the decision of ECOWAS.
This volume analyzes European-African relations against the background of a changing notion of security. It focuses on three questions. First, has the EU become a security policy actor in Africa? Second, what characterizes decision-making processes in the context of EU Africa policy? Third, which motives have driven changes in the framework of EU Africa policy?

The book was published in the series: Schriften des Zentrum für Europäische Integrationsforschung (ZEI), as Volume 76.
Burkina Faso is slowly emerging from a tumultuous period marked by the popular uprising of October 2014 and the troubled political transition, which will formally end with the swearing-in of the new institutions, elected on 29th November 2015.

These dual presidential and legislative elections, the first after the ousting of former president Blaise Compaoré, were organized in a peaceful atmosphere and the results have been accepted by all. The new president, Roch Marc Christian Kaboré, won the elections in the first round with 53.49% of the vote, according to the provisional results announced on 30th November by the National Independent Electoral Commission (CENI). His party, the People’s Movement for progress (MPP) also got 55 out of the 127 members of the next Parliament.

However, beyond these elections, the post-Compaoré, post-uprising and post-transition Burkina Faso will continue to face many socio-economic, political and security challenges. As a reminder, on 31st October 2014 President Blaise Compaoré was ousted following a popular uprising, which was the tipping point of an opposition that had been raging for months against his attempts to modify the constitution to extend his term in office. This created an institutional vacuum that was quickly filled by the army as the transitional leader.

In contrary to other cases of coup d’état, such as Mali and Guinea Bissau in 2012, following this takeover of power by the army, Burkina Faso was neither suspended by the African Union (AU) nor by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Instead, the AU gave the military a two week deadline to relinquish power to a civilian government. While the regional organizations decisions may have been perceived by some analysts as an inconsistent application of their zero tolerance policy towards unconstitutional change of government, Burkina Faso’s came particularly from the fact that the military takeover was the result of an institutional vacuum that was created following a popular uprising. While the AU threatened the country with sanctions in the event of non-respect of the deadline, ECOWAS called for restraint and a peaceful resolution of the crisis through mediation and dialogue.

Notwithstanding, ECOWAS and the AU were actively involved in the diplomatic efforts that led to the establishment of a political transition and to the transfer of power to a civilian leadership. On 16th November 2014, after talks involving all the national stakeholders (political parties -both from the former majority and from the former opposition-, civil society, religious lead-
ers, and the army), a Charter of the Transition, which acted as an interim constitution was adopted. On 21st November 2014, a National Transitional Council (CNT) and a transitional government were put in place. The transition was mainly tasked with the organisation of credible elections.

Alongside other political and socioeconomic challenges, the transition has been characterized by tensions between the Prime Minister Zida and the RSP. In fact, the RSP interfered in the political process on several occasions: in December 2014 - by interrupting a cabinet meeting -, in February 2015 - by preventing the holding of a cabinet meeting -, in June 2015 - when it demanded the resignation of all military representatives from the transition institutions, including the Prime Minister Isaac Zida - and in September 2015 with a coup attempt. The September coup attempt disrupted the transition and raised fears regarding the timely organization of elections initially scheduled for the 11th October. In response, the international community reacted swiftly and unanimously condemned the coup. ECOWAS, through its current chairman, the Senegalese President Macky Sall, initiated efforts to prevent an escalation of the crisis and restore the transitional authorities. On 20th September this mediation resulted in a 13-points draft proposal to end the crisis. This proposal, especially its provisions on amnesty for the putschists and participation of some personalities from the former regime - who had been barred by the Constitutional Council from taking part in the upcoming elections for their support to former President Compaore’s contested constitutional amendment - in the upcoming elections has, however, been strongly opposed by most Burkinabe stakeholders.

The situation on the ground evolved when, on 21st September, some units of the national armed forces, whose position during the coup had been uncleared, moved from the countryside to the capital, Ouaga-dougou, to disarm the RSP. This brought about a significant shift in the balance of power, to the disadvantage of the RSP. It also exacerbated tensions and raised fears of a possible military confrontation. A clash of this kind was, however, prevented after the RSP and the armed forces signed an agreement on the night of 21 September, under the auspices of the Mogho Naba, the traditional authority of the Mossi. The coup ended on 23 September, in part thanks to the intervention of the ECOWAS mediation team, who convinced coup leader General Gilbert Dienderé to hand over power to the transitional government.

Since then the RSP has been formally disbanded and many detentions in relation to the coup have been made. They include coup leader Dienderé and General Djibril Bassolé, former foreign minister under Blaise Compaore. In addition, the tran-
sitional government established a Commission of inquiry to ‘allocate responsibility [and] identify the perpetrators, accomplices, soldiers and civilians involved in the attempted coup’. The commission handed over its report to the transition Prime Minister Zida on 12th November, a report that has not been made public yet.

The recent elections mark the beginning of much-wanted change. Many issues demanding immediate attention remain. These include the socio-economic situation, with increasing youth unemployment, improving education and the healthcare system; governance and political reform especially the adoption of a new Constitution; the fight against impunity and improving the judicial system; reconciling Burkinabe, particularly the political class; and national security as a result of the threat caused by terrorist groups operating in neighbouring Mali.

In order to address these issues, the new government will require the support of Burkinabe who have become actively engaged in making their demands heard. The international community’s assistance will also be key in helping Burkina Faso’s new authorities respond to their populations numerous aspirations.

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