

Regional Integration Observer

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
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Editorial

Human security has become a key feature of the global rhetoric on good governance. Human security encompasses a multitude of issues. Definitively, the challenges of human security transcend borders, hence, human security is a core component of sustainable regional integration. Regional integration can contribute to the advancement of human security as much as human security requires functioning regional cooperation and, if possible, integration.

This ZEI "Regional Integration Observer" looks into several aspects and approaches to security in the context of regional integration efforts worldwide. ZEI junior fellow Matthias Vogl introduces the topic with an analytical reflection on the notion of security and its meaning for regional integration. ZEI partners and colleagues cover specific issues and relate the general topic to their own home region. Of special interest are the insights of Georgia which had hoped for peaceful regional integration in the context of the Commonwealth of Independent States before it was attacked by Russia. In the meantime, Georgia has left the CIS and looks for better ways to connect with the Euro-Atlantic security structures as represented by EU and NATO.

Other regions around the globe are confronted with their genuine own agenda, taking as examples the relative success of the African Union in Africa or South Asia and the Middle East still struggling to find their own way to guarantee a sustainable peace. In these efforts around the world, we are united in the desire to enhance human security as a fundamental value and norm of the public management of modern life.



Prof. Dr. Ludger Kühnhardt
Director at ZEI



Baroness Catherine Ashton is the new High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. Before she was EU Commissioner for Trade.
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Regional Integration and Security

* Matthias Vogl

Since the 17th century when the so-called Westphalian system was established after the end of the Thirty Years' War, security was generally defined as the security of the state, with the state's military power being the principal promoter of security in response to external threats. Terms like national sovereignty, territorial integrity and national interest are closely linked to this traditional understanding. At this moment of history, none of the European nation states could conceive that hostilities could be resolved by merging together into a regular and institutionalized setup.

Although the so-called Concert of Europe installed at the Congress of Vienna in 1814/15, is often seen as the first European security institution, it was actually volatile. Participating states used it more as a forum to communicate with each other and to keep revolutionary tendencies within their countries down. The First World War made clear that this forum did not have the strength to overcome deep reservations

based on strong nationalism and an underlying aspiration to gain absolute power. This concept of security combined with the even more enforcing effect of ideology finally led to the Second World War and, as a result, to the almost total collapse of continental Europe. The emergence of the idea of regional security cannot be fully understood without regarding this historical background.

The European approach

Today, when talking about European integration, three major achievements always come to the fore. These are: peace, growth and prosperity. These aspects are closely interlinked and can be referred to altogether as contributing to one even more basic need, security.

The reasons why states that had been enemies for centuries came together to cooperate were manifold. The first reason was the devastating situation within Europe at the end of the Second World War, which made political leaders realize that something had to be run completely diffe-

rent in the future.

The second reason was the fact that at the same time there was a group of political leaders like Robert Schuman, Konrad Adenauer, Jean Monnet and others in office that had actually internalized this mindset of change. The third reason finally was the external pressure, exerted particularly by the United States, who not only wanted to avoid the outbreak of another war within Europe but who also saw a united Europe as a bastion against the new communist threat posed by the Soviet Union. Hence, there was an internal and an external influence that led to the idea of cooperative security in Europe. This example shows that it is always a mixture of structural constraints and individual interests and convictions that can promote change. This insight is also very important for aspirations of regional integration outside Europe today.

The idea of "human security" which has become a very popular foreign and security policy concept during the last few years and which is challenging the traditional state-centered concept in fact basically corresponds to what has been achieved and promoted throughout the European Integration process since the 50's. It encompasses democratic participation, economic growth through a common market, social welfare, environmental protection and also the protection from external threats. One of the interesting facts about European integration is that to guarantee intra-European security, cooperation has never taken the form of a system of collective security, with which there would have been the opportunity to punish a member state that would threaten security within Europe. Instead peaceful conflict resolution and solidarity among members have become political common sense. Therefore internal deterrence was not necessary.

On the opposite, after the end of the Cold War the integration dynamic expanded even more and led to the foundation of the European Union and to its development as an autonomous security policy actor. This process had four principal driving forces.

The first driving force was the occurrence of the new security threats that came to the fore after the end of the East-West conflict. The most important examples for those threats are transnational terrorism, asymmetric conflicts, migration pressure triggered by failing states, environmental devastation or as a consequence of climate change, cybercrime, organized crime, shadow globalization and others. Those threats are harder to detect and more difficult to confront than the classical military threat.

The second driving force, which is directly linked to the first one, was the increase of worldwide interdependencies, which have grown enormously in the wake of globali-

zation processes since the 1970's. As a consequence, potential negative effects of "external shocks" on Europe, be they economic, military or political have increased the vulnerability of European nation states. It is these interdependencies that enable the new threats named above to become a peril without being physically close. This development forced European countries to facilitate a closer cooperation and more regular communication amongst each other, particularly in the field of security policy. Interconnectedness made a coordinated reaction necessary. This is also true for other regions facing similar problems.

The third driving force was the existing European integration dynamic that wanted to complete the "European project" by incrementally adding to the economic union a political union, including security policy.

Finally, the fourth driving force was the collective idea of Europe as a capable global actor or even as a world power emancipating itself from the US junior-partnership during the Cold War.

Until now, the founding of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) in 1999 and the following ESDP missions are the peak of the European reaction to these driving forces. They were initially the result of an "external shock", namely the crisis in the Balkans. In the European Security Strategy (EUSS) of 2003 the EU for the first time gave a written answer to the challenges mentioned above. The EUSS claims that as of today there are no internal armed conflicts anymore in Europe, security policy has to care about the new threats that are often implicit and not directly conceivable. "The first line of defense, therefore, often lies outside Europe." Against this background, the European Union has built up a large set of capacities in crisis management and conflict prevention, which includes military as well as civilian components. Foreign and security policy in general are still ruled by member states. Still, there is a strong and ever growing tendency to act on the European level and to discuss problems with the European partners before acting. The European institutional setup after the Treaty of Lisbon coming into force with the new "High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy" as its frontrunner reflects this gradual Europeanization process.

The regional level

The motivation to act on a regional level is always similar. As already indicated above, in a globalized world, conflicts and security problems know no borders and can influence daily life and the stability of a society. Although those threats may, in general, have global effects, Buzan and Waever argue that their consequences are first and foremost felt on a regional level, hence in the direct surrounding of their occurrence.

Therefore action on a regional level is the first appropriate measure to deal with such cross-border problems because it tackles them on a face-to-face dimension.

Looking at a world map, it is obvious that all important conflicts today have a regional dimension. Be it the Great Lakes, Sudan, the Horn of Africa, Afghanistan or others. Taking the perspective of a regional grouping such conflicts can be perceived either as internal or as external. While the European Union has left the internal perspective and tries to manage security problems outside Europe as one of a few existing global actors in the international system, for most other regional integration systems, these problems are internal. Moreover, there are those regions where intraregional security problems exist but where no mechanism for conflict resolution has yet been found, like on the Korean peninsula, in the Caucasus or the Middle East.

Cultural and religious reservations and a strict focus on national interests still remain the biggest obstacles to regional security cooperation. Often they cannot be overcome until the negative consequences of security problems have truly been felt during a crisis or an external shock. Due to the specific character and circumstances of each conflict, which is also illuminated by the different articles in the course of this "Regional Integration Observer", there is no general approach to facilitate regional security. The European example explained above can provide some guidance but of course it is not 100% applicable to every other region. However, the most important precondition in every case is the recognition by all parties that cooperation on a regional level can effect collective gains. This has to be accompanied by a general political will to allow others to take a share in these gains.

Security policy in general remains a field of "high politics". Nevertheless there are regions like Europe or Africa, where the regional level of action is tending to become at least as important or even more important than the national level. The ever growing body of "brusselized" security institutions in the EU and the formation of the African Union as a system of collective security are good examples. It is a justified question if there is a certain path dependency that will foster integration in other regions on the basis of the different driving forces and preconditions mentioned above. The European Union, in general, is keen on promoting its experience. Although no other region of the world has achieved the EU's intensity of integration until now, it seems obvious that the importance of the regional approach to security problems will increase more and more in the coming years.

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The African Union - Regionalism and Conflicts in Africa

* *Chrysantus Ayangafac*

A collective and coordinated approach to conflict prevention, management and resolution in Africa is premised on the thesis that national and regional security issues are inexorably intertwined. State weakness, porous borders, and the extent to which ethnic groupings lap across colonially imposed borders determine the need for regional solutions to domestic challenges and the extent to which instability in one country affects the neighborhood. Consequently, the African Union (AU) and the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) appear to vindicate regionalization and multilateral security mechanisms as a viable policy response to Africa's complex security challenges. Moreover APSA is premised on the fact that Africa needs to take greater responsibility, autonomy and the imperative to develop indigenous conflict prevention and management capacities. The basic principle that Regional Economic Communities (RECs) are the building blocks of the APSA speaks volumes of how much regionalization has become cannon law and is embedded in African policy circles.

Against this backdrop, APSA is perceived in some quarters as the panacea to crisis situations in Africa. A policy implication of this policy approach has been that over the years there has been an emphasis on strengthening and capacitating APSA and African regional security mechanisms as the most viable and robust mechanisms to stem conflicts on the continent. There is no doubt that APSA, despite its apparent weakness, still affords the continent a sound opportunity to develop an appropriate policy response to address Africa's conflicts. Often in examining the effectiveness of the APSA, one falls into the trap of measuring consequences or reflecting a phenomenon - and in the process demonizes the APSA rather than engages in a critical analysis of its capacity constraints.

Capacitating the African Peace and Security Architecture

Developing the capacity of the APSA is much more than a technical question. It goes beyond resource mobilization, planning, and execution of peace support operations. It is a question of how much AU Member States are willing to pool their sovereignty. Since AU Member States are the foundation and RECs the building blocks of the APSA, one could argue that the APSA's capacity constraints are a reflection of the weakness of African states. AU Member states remain central to both the APSA and regional security mechanisms. Weak states produce weak regional organizations which begs the question of whether one

The picture shows European military staff serving in the European Union Training Mission in Somalia that is running since 2010. This mission aims at building capacity for the Somali security forces. It is part of the EU's wider efforts to deal with African security challenges and to build up AU capacity in this sector.

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can argue that challenges faced by APSA could be traced to domestic African politics. Achieving the African Renaissance, Ujamaa, or Ubuntu requires a strong AU built on functioning and accountable national structures. APSA's lack of political capital to adopt a more robust posture in certain crisis situations is the function of state weakness and how some African states perceive and conceive APSA. While arguing that African political leadership never intended a robust APSA might amount to pessimism, a closer look at the design and function of the AU suggests that the APSA was conceived as a coordinating mechanism without any proper mandate or mechanism to breach state sovereignty. Thus, how APSA impacts the domestic politics of AU member states is critical in ascertaining its capacity to effectively prevent and respond to conflicts. A strong APSA requires solid, functioning, and accountable national structures.

Within this context, there is a strong case for capacitating APSA by enhancing policy convergence in the realm of democratic governance as a shared value that binds the union together. Enhancing convergence in the realm of democratic governance will enhance the structural conflict prevention capacity of the AU. AU policy-making organs have reiterated this policy position that implementing the African governance agenda especially instruments like the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance will enhance the capacity of the Union to take collective actions to address conflicts. However, while over 35 Member states of the AU have signed this instrument, only three have ratified. Also, the donor community has demonstrated a greater appetite for conflict management (peacekeeping) without a proportional investment in conflict prevention. International support for APSA must not take place at the expense of consolidating and promoting the African Governance Agenda, and improvements in domestic political governance. The process of establishing the Af-

frican Governance Architecture provides the best chance for Africa and the international community to develop the appropriate capacity to enhance the capacity of the AU to prevent conflict.

As much as the APSA is no substitute for building, consolidating and promoting democracy, elections and governance across Africa, it is also no substitute for enhancing Africa's participation in the global security architecture, for example the United Nations Security Council. A permanent seat in the UN Security Council is a necessity to enhance the AU's capacity in addressing crisis situation on the continent. From an African perspective, regionalism is about a division of labor and the sharing of responsibilities premised on a range of partnerships that are comprised of African regional arrangements and mechanisms, UN organizations and initiatives, and Africa's development partners.

To conclude, there is need to strengthen the AU's capacity so that it can provide a credible opportunity for the continent to tackle its security problems. The effectiveness of the AU cannot be measured by its objectives or intentions; rather its capacity to execute its mandate is a necessary condition. Most often in examining the effectiveness of the AU, one falls into the trap of measuring consequences or reflecting a phenomenon and in the process demonizing the AU rather than engaging in a critical analysis of its capacity constraints. AU Member States, RECs and development partners must take the hard decision to reorient their focus on building and promoting democracy, governance and human rights at the national and regional level. Moreover, the international community should support Africa's bid for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council.

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Northeast Asian Security - Toward an Open Air High Jump

* Yoola Kim

Northeast Asian security has fluctuated dramatically since the end of World War II with both diverse approach and buttresses. Few regional similarities exist in Northeast Asia, due to its extreme cultures, religions and interests, not to mention the acceptance of nationalism, state-centered loose multilateralism and engagement of the US. In addition, the common threat created during the Cold War era promoted a greater level of distrust among Asian countries. Based on pending territorial conflicts and enduring historical legacies, most of the Asian countries considered themselves in competition with one another.

Seen from this perspective, it is not a surprise that there was no Asian version of NATO created; there was no pressure and no need to establish such an organization. On behalf of Asia's regional security, the US, despite its geographical exclusiveness of the region, has played a major role in Asia for decades. It is quite certain that US influence has far overpowered the endeavor for creating multilateral organizations in Asia. This influence of regional characteristics and complex dynamics evolved into a continuous endeavor for multilateralism, while experiencing asymmetrical advance at a slow pace. In Northeast Asia, there existed a fragile stability and predictability with occasional challenges. Due to the overlapping layers of components containing different degrees of political forces certain embodiments of regional linkage such as the Six Party Talks was established.

Cooperation of Northeast Asian security, in this sense, contains three characteristics: issue-driven involvements, informal networks and an increase of interdependence. First, regional institutions tend to specify boundaries - ARF for security and APEC for economic cooperation. Second, in strong contrast to the European Union containing ever deeper and wider institutionalization and legalization, Northeast Asian security building is based on informal networks. For example, ASEAN's commitments is diluted by ever-changing members, initiation of APEC, ARF (Asian Regional Forum), and APT (ASEAN Plus Three) have not yet brought significant outputs, but have served only as a potential regional linkage. Lastly, despite all of the above, there is a tendency of consistency and path dependency in Asian institution building. Security cooperation leads to a gradual institutional self-reinforcement. Thereby the institutional setup is put on an ever more solid basis.

The security issue between Asia and Europe is too often compared, given that there is rarely anything in common between the

two. Democratic interdependence was a core factor that stabilized Europe and boosted the degree of integration, whereas Asia saw only the emergence of a fragile structure with far less converging consensus. During the post Cold War era, it was not the integration itself but the evolution of strategic agenda that enabled security cooperation in both regions. The combination of regional strategic agenda finally met with new interests on specific issues. Europe could be regarded from various spectrums as a model in the sense of cooperation, yet Europe and Asia are not in the same category as to project one's experience to the other. In Northeast Asia, common interests were focused on economic enhancement, under the discourse of modernization, which unfortunately adopted the negative aspects of nationalism.

Under the influence of both the US umbrella and communist threat during the Cold War, both Europe and Asia experienced a divergent logic of interest that generated a verified dimension of security cooperation.

To put it simply, Northeast Asian security cooperation, both during and after the Cold War mechanism, could be interpreted as under institutionalized but over strategized dynamics while that of Europe, experienced an under/sub strategized but over institutionalized process. Security cooperation in Northeast Asia was overwhelmed by the economic development under nationalism and modernization, which inevitably led to less comprehension of security dynamics. It is not that Northeast Asia made fewer efforts toward collective security; it just had a different combination of features and priorities than Europe.

Consequently, if comparing Asian security cooperation to the high jump in sports, the game so far tried to reach higher beneath the ceiling indoors. When the match gets open in the air with all members attending with systemized rules for certain goals, Asian security cooperation would demonstrate an exhilarating process and results.

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New book release:

Ludger Kühnhardt

Region-Building



Vol. I: The Global Proliferation of Regional Integration

Oxford/New York: Berghahn Books, 2010, 491 pages with bibliography and index
ISBN 978-1-84545-654-2

Vol. II: Regional Integration in the World: Documents

Oxford/New York: Berghahn Books, 2010 501 pages
ISBN 978-84545-1-655-9

After two centuries of nation-building, the world has entered an era of region-building in search of political stability, cultural cohesion, and socio-economic development. The regional structures and integration schemes emerging in most regions of the world are deepening their ambitions, with Europe's integration experience often used as an experimental template or theoretical model. These are the main thesis of the comprehensive analysis published by ZEI Director Prof. Dr. Ludger Kühnhardt, based on several years of field research and studies.

Volume I provides a political-analytical framework for recognizing the central role of the European Union not only as a conceptual model but also a normative engine in the global proliferation of regional integration. It also gives a comprehensive treatment of the focus, motives, and objectives of non-European integration efforts. Volume II offers a unique collection of documents that give the best available overview of the legal and political evolution of region-building based on official documents and stated objectives of the relevant regional groupings across all continents since the mid-20th century until today. Together, these volumes are important contributions for understanding the evolution of global affairs in an age when power shifts provide new challenges and opportunities for transatlantic partners and the world community.

Achieving Security in South Asia through Regional Economic Integration

* *Gulshan Sachdeva*

Both the South and Central Asian regions are the least integrated regions in the world. The process of globalization and high economic growth in both regions, however, may push them to integrate. This, in turn, will depend on achieving relative stability in Afghanistan and improvements in relations between India and Pakistan.

In the last two decades, India is making a successful transition from an inward-oriented economy to a globally integrated economy. Despite some serious challenges, like energy security, poverty, infrastructure, regional disparities and internal security, there are strong indications that rapid growth will continue. While major world economies are in a recessionary mode, the Indian economy continues to be one of the strongest growing economies in the world.

Although Asian economies have shown great dynamism in recent decades, a full-fledged Asian economic architecture is still evolving. It is becoming clear that along with China and Japan, India will be playing an important role in an evolving Asian economic architecture. Its role will be further strengthened if its economic relations within South Asia and the Central Asian region become more dynamic. In this case, India needs to work for a strategy in which Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asian republics view the partnership as benefiting them too. This policy framework will also improve India's energy security, as it may finally get access to some of the energy resources in the Eurasian region. It can also fundamentally change India's sea based continental trade. Simultaneously, it can generate new opportunities of trade and transit for Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asia. Indian entrepreneurs can also find investment opportunities in Afghanistan and Central Asia, which in turn can transform their small and medium industries as well as agriculture.

The growing realization of these opportunities has influenced policy makers not just in India, but also in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Many developments, viz., Afghanistan's membership to the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), the signing of South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA), Regional Economic Cooperation Conferences (RECC) on Afghanistan, the emerging India-Kazakhstan partnership, continuous interest in Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) and Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) gas pipelines as well as India's US\$ 1.3 billion contribution to Afghan reconstruction have provided enough inputs to Indian policy makers to shape their newly emerging "Look-West" policy. Since the merging of Central and South Asia un-

der a new bureau in the State Department, linking these two regions has also been a declared US foreign policy objective. This also fits well within the EU policy framework which supports regional cooperation activities in South Asia.

Emerging New Opportunities

It is becoming clear that the costs of difficult India-Pakistan relations are much bigger for both countries than normally estimated in the context of small bilateral or regional trade. With the right initiatives, South and Central Asian regions have the potential to alter the nature and character of India's continental trade. Looking just beyond Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asia; India trades a great deal with other CIS countries, Iran and the European continent. In 2007-08, India's total trade with this whole region amounted to about US\$ 110 billion.

On the basis of past trends, a simple calculation shows that India's trade with this region would be in the range of US\$ 500 to 600 billion by 2015. At the moment, more than 99 per cent of this trade is via sea. If only 20 per cent of this trade is conducted through road, we are talking about US\$ 120 billion of Indian trade passing through Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asia region within a few years. First, for this to happen, a massive effort is needed to rebuild Afghanistan's transport network. From the commitments of the international community and multilateral institutions, it seems that this would happen immediately, once relative political stability is achieved in Afghanistan. Already more than 90 per cent of the Afghan Ring road is complete. A "Friendship Bridge" which connects Afghanistan and Tajikistan has become operational. With a \$ 165 million ADB grant, a railway line will soon connect Afghanistan to Uzbekistan's expansive rail network. So, despite a difficult security situation and limited capacities, Afghanistan could emerge as an important player.

Two major documents, the Afghanistan Compact and Afghanistan National Development Strategy, clearly show that regional economic cooperation is one of the main priorities of the government. Through various conferences and declarations countries in the region have also accepted the centrality of Afghanistan for economic cooperation. It is not just trade, but it has also been pointed out that with enhanced cooperation, land-locked energy-rich Central Asia could be connected to energy deficient South Asia. In January, at the London Conference on Afghanistan, the issue of regional cooperation was further emphasized in the context of long term sustainability of peace and prosperity in Afghanistan and the region.

India-Pakistan Dynamics

The major impediment in realizing this potential, however, is the existing difficult relationship between India and Pakistan. Various terrorist attacks in India emanating from Pakistan in the last few years have slowed down the normalization process significantly. Of late, however, there have been some positive developments. While looking at the regional economic dynamics, it is clear that both India and Pakistan are paying huge economic costs for not working for economic integration strategies. If road and other infrastructural projects end in Pakistan, many of them will never become viable projects because of low volumes. Similarly, India may never be able to restructure its continental trade radically through the International North-South Corridor, which it has built in cooperation with Russia and Iran, bypassing Pakistan. Direct linkages between Central Asia and India will also give a huge boost to all economies in the region.

With significant Indian continental trade moving through its territory, the Pakistani economy is also going to benefit in a major way. Many businesses in Pakistan fear that with Indian goods moving to Afghanistan and Central Asia, markets for Pakistani products may be eroded. Pakistan trade figures, however, show that even without Indian competition, it is not able to export much to Central Asia. It has significant exports only to Afghanistan. A major portion of these exports is unlikely to be affected. In fact, with major infrastructural development and movement of goods and services, both India and Pakistan could be important economic players in Central Asia. In cooperation with each other both India and Pakistan could become significant players in Central Asia. Policy makers in both these countries need to be sensitized toward these opportunities.

Overall, despite major challenges, Afghanistan has the potential to play an important role in facilitating regional integration between South and Central Asia. Regional projects could be implemented through already existing institutions like SAARC (in which Afghanistan, India and Pakistan have membership) or through the RECC on Afghanistan. This would improve chances of peace not only between India and Pakistan but also in the entire Eurasian region. In a typical neo-functional way, success in regional economic cooperation may also lead to cooperation in the security matters. This would be useful for a new regional security structure that may be needed for any post-NATO scenario in Afghanistan.

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Three Questions to Ghia Nodia - Security Situation in the Caucasus

1. About two years ago the conflict between Georgia and Russia was the number one topic in international politics. After a bulk of negotiations, a truce has been agreed upon. Being out of the news channels for a long time now, what is the present situation in the Southern Caucasus today?

As a result of the 2008 war, the separatist conflicts in Georgia are “refrozen” on the new terms. These imply that: 1. Military control of Russia and its local partners over Abkhazia and South Ossetia is now fully consolidated as the war has removed Georgian-populated and Georgian-controlled enclaves of Kodori Valley in Abkhazia and an area in the middle of South Ossetia, as well as extended the area of Russian/South Ossetian control to the district of Akhgori for the first time; 2. Ethnic composition of the separatist territories is consolidated, or, to put it in other terms, the task of ethnic cleansing was advanced, after ethnic Georgian population of the said enclaves was forced to flee; 3. Russia no longer plays the role of mediator but is the sole patron-state of the separatist entities and exerts considerable control over them through military, economic and administrative means; 4. From the Georgian perspective, Russia, rather than local separatists, is now the chief adversary in the conflict, while Abkhazia and South Ossetia are considered occupied territories; 5. While Georgia continues to be committed to its territorial integrity, it is recognized in Georgia that the task of solving the conflict has moved to a long-term perspective and is off the agenda in the short- and probably the mid-term.

This suggests that the situation around the conflict is somewhat less ambiguous – therefore more stable – than it used to be before the war. However, there are at least two sources of serious tensions. First, it is technically very difficult to delimit actual areas of control between Georgian and Russian/Ossetian forces, therefore there are numerous violent incidents. Second, continuous tensions between Russia and Georgia create an ongoing background of insecurity: the former appears to find it difficult to accept the very idea of truly independent Georgian government that is following the path of integration with the West, and is expected to continue efforts to undermine Mikheil Saakashvili’s government through international isolation and fomenting internal unrest. While resumption of open hostilities between Georgia and Russia are not probable in the foreseeable future, any major security crisis in the region may be used as a pretext for unexpected steps in this area. There are other factors that contribute to a general sense on uncertainty, hence insecurity in the region: indistinct and inconsistent attitudes of the USA

and the EU, increasingly active but somewhat confusing Turkish policies and threats inherent in the prospect of nuclear Iran.

2. Which conditions do you think are necessary to achieve a permanent peace in the region? Which role should internal and external actors realistically play? Is there a prospect for a kind of regional security arrangement?

The said uncertainties and insecurities that the region faces boil down to the lack of international consensus on the issue: What could provide the basis for regional security? It is unimaginable that the three recognized states of the Caucasus ever develop some kind of regional security arrangement on their own (and adding the three unrecognized ones to the picture make this unrealistic prospect even more improbable). Unresolved conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh as well as Russia’s persisting claim to dominate the region are two sufficient reasons to make that impossible. Apart from that, the three states lack political gravity and self-



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confidence to develop any workable security arrangement in the foreseeable future.

If we look towards broader security arrangements, the region increasingly looks as if it is in a security vacuum. It is on the margin of the area of democratic peace defined by values and institutions of the West, first of all NATO and the EU. On the other hand, the countries reject Russia’s claim to being the regional hegemon, with Georgia offering the strongest resistance to that claim. Russia itself lacks political, military and economic resources to regulate the situation in the South Caucasus, and it is unlikely that other large international actors will accept that domination anyway. Therefore, especially after the August 2008 war, security relations in the South Caucasus appear to come closer to the rules of the nineteenth

or rather eighteenth century, with local small states being involved in a balancing act between aspirations of Great Powers. All these actors have widely different visions on what the basis for lasting peace in the region should be. How can lasting peace in the Caucasus be achieved then? The only conceivable scenario is that of expanding the area of democratic peace – represented by NATO and the EU – to the South Caucasus. No other international actor has enough political, military and economic resources to do that. However, it is obvious that there is no political will in the West to do this, and it is unlikely to develop any time soon. In the meantime, the best these actors may do is to prevent deterioration of the situation, and encourage positive trends by helping the states to develop their genuine sovereignty and the level of democracy,

3. Looking at the situation in Northern Caucasus, the legacy of the former Soviet Union seems to be crumbling and Russia could experience this process during the metro bombings in Moscow. What prospect do you see for a solution of this other frozen conflict?

There is a notable trend of deterioration of the situation in the Northern Caucasus with Russia running out of options to reverse this trend. Some experts agree that the August 2008 war encouraged anti-systemic actors in the south of Russia. There are long-term demographic and economic trends suggesting that the development gap between the Russian Caucasus and more prosperous parts of Russia is not narrowing (rather the opposite), and ethno-culturally the region becomes less Russian than it used to be in the Soviet Union. This does not necessarily mean that the situation in the Northern Caucasus will descend into a crisis any time soon, or that new secessionist movements will emerge. But if it is true that Russia does not have resources available to reverse the negative trend, its anxiety over the South Caucasus may also increase.

There has been a popular perception among Western analysts that trends of instability in the Northern Caucasus may create ground for cooperation between Russia and countries of the South Caucasus, or between Russia and the West. While this hypothesis appears rational at face value, it has never worked in the past, and it may not work in the future. It is still a wide-spread perception among Russian political elites that instability in the Northern Caucasus is somehow fed from the South, and, ultimately, from the West. Therefore, any crisis in the North Caucasus, if it happens, may strengthen the perception of a zero-sum game between Russia and the West, and between Russia and pro-Western players in the Caucasus.

In April 2001 I proposed to the then newly elected Israeli Foreign Minister, Shimon Peres, that Israel initiate the establishment of an Organization for Security and Cooperation in the Middle East (OSCME) modeled on the OSCE. The days were the darkest days of the war-by-terror waged against Israel by Yasser Arafat, and my colleagues and I – at various government ministries and think tanks – were desperate to kindle some form of diplomatic light that would stem the violence, jumpstart the peace process, and guide all of us in the region, Arabs and Jews, towards peace and security.

My proposal was heartfelt, but hardly original. As early as 1976 Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin called for the Middle East to emulate the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) established in Helsinki just several months earlier. In April 1989, Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir submitted a four-point plan for regional security and cooperation to President George H. W. Bush. Some of the ideas contained in Shamir's plan were then developed by Secretary of State James Baker in the immediate aftermath of the Gulf War, and included in the October 1991 Madrid Peace Conference.

The multilateral track of the Madrid Process sought to reduce tensions and build trust among neighboring adversaries in the Middle East, much as the CSCE had done in Europe through the 1970s and 80s. The creation of five consensus

based Working Groups – on Economic Cooperation and Development; Environment; Water; Refugees; and Arms Control and Regional Security – reflected the same functionalist logic that animated the CSCE. Similar also was Madrid's desire to generate positive spillover effects by facilitating broader human contact between Arabs and Israelis.

An OSCE for the Middle East? Progeny, Problems, and Prospects.

* Amichai Magen

Viewed from Jerusalem, the establishment of a cooperative structure for comprehensive security dialogue in the Middle East makes at least as much sense today as it did in the early to mid 1990s. Renewing multilateral talks will affirm existing peace arrangements between Israel, Egypt and Jordan, and help revitalize diplomatic and economic links between Israel, on the one hand, and Morocco, Kuwait, Qatar, UAE, Oman and Bahrain, on the other.

At a time when the Palestinians are split into rival factions controlling the West Bank and Gaza, a constructive regional initiative would bolster the relatively moderate government of Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) and Salam Fayyad, at the expense of Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad - entities which both the United States and European Union rightly deem to be terrorist

organizations and entrenched spoilers. Moreover, many of the core issues currently being negotiated between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, as part of the proximity talks (security arrangements, refugees, water, environment, governance reform), are in practice impossible to address on a bilateral level alone, so that the prospects for Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking would be substantially improved by the widening of the diplomatic circle through the establishment of an OSCME.

Sunni Arab governments are today genuinely fearful of the growing Iran-Syria-Hezbollah-Hamas axis, and in particular of Iran's relentless nuclear advancement which threatens the regional balance. Might the Arab League – which in March 2007 resolved to promote the Saudi regional peace plan – become persuaded that the time has come to steer the region towards Arab-Israeli cooperation, as a means of providing a sane alternative to Iranian domination of the Middle East? Perhaps. Internationally, the prospects for such a welcome development will depend in large part on whether the Obama Administration – with the backing of the other members of the Quartet (the EU, Russia and the UN) – opts to embrace the sound logic inherent in the establishment of a viable Organization for Security and Cooperation in the Middle East.

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ZEI Academy in Comparative Regional Integration 2010

In July 2010, the Center for European Integration Studies (ZEI) hosted for the fourth time the "ZEI Academy on Comparative Regional Integration". 19 post-graduates and young academics from 14 countries analyzed different aspects of regionalism with the help of a renowned group of scholars and experts from the EU. The participants came from different integration systems from outside Europe (MERCOSUR, CAN, ASEAN, SAARC, SADC, ECOWAS, CEMAC, AU and CARICOM). Under the supervision of ZEI Director Prof. Dr. Ludger Kühnhardt, this unique academy debated the question if and how the EU can serve with its experiences as a role model for other regions in the face of globalization.

The program consisted of a series of lectures – including workshops, group and panel discussions and participant statements – as well as a visit of the European Parliament and Commission in Brussels and diverse cultural activities. Discussing with EU professionals and Members of Parliament, the participants were able to get a profound impression of the structure and procedu-

res of the European Union. In Brussels the group was hosted by the permanent representation of the state of North Rhine-Westphalia. The Academy was sponsored by the DAAD with funds of the German Fe-

deral Foreign Office and supported by In-Went. The picture shows the participants of the ZEI Academy together with ZEI Director Prof. Ludger Kühnhardt and MEP Dr. Jorgo Chatzimarkakis.



Turkish-Armenian Rapprochement

* *Aschot Manutscharjan*

The year 2009 will go down in the history of Turkey and Armenia: it managed no more and no less than the first tentative rapprochement between the two countries and peoples, which have, since the beginning of the "genocide" of the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish aggression against the Republic of Armenia (1918-1920), maintained no inter-state relations. While the Russian-Georgian war over South Ossetia was in full swing, Turkey reappeared suddenly as a mediator in the South Caucasus on 11 August 2008. By suggesting the establishment of a regional "Caucasus Alliance", Ankara wanted to present itself at the international level as a peace-keeping force, especially with regard to the European Union. Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, who envisions a "multidimensional" foreign policy between East and West, is regarded as innovator of the new foreign policy doctrine of "neo-Ottomanism" ("Zero problems with neighbors"). The Turkish advances to Armenia were a sensation. The Armenian government appreciated it as a first step towards the long-desired normalization of Armenian-Turkish relations.

One hoped for a move towards the opening of the border to Turkey and the establishment of normal bilateral diplomatic contacts. What the public did not know: in a secret location in Switzerland, Armenian and Turkish diplomats sought after procedures for the establishment of diplomatic relations. After the Declaration of Independence of Armenia in 1991, Turkey refused to establish diplomatic relations with the neighboring country, unless Yerevan renounced the denial of the Ottoman-Turkish history and the genocide accusation against the Christian Armenians during and after World War I (1915-1923). The withdrawal of Armenian forces from Azerbaijan and the waiving of support for the Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh was the second political condition of the Turkish government for opening the border and establishing diplomatic relations. The Armenian President Serzh Sargsjan rejected categorically these demands. Armenia had not the slightest intention to withdraw their support for the "Republic of

Nagorno-Karabakh".

With the Armenian Deputy Foreign Minister, the historian Arman J. Kirakossian, becoming chief negotiator of the secret negotiations with Turkey, President Sargsjan sent an important message, both internally and externally. Professor Kirakossian is internationally known as editor of archival documents about the massacre of Armenians during the Ottoman Empire as well as the author of numerous monographs on the Armenian question. His appointment was an Armenian signal to Turkey that Yerevan would not pay for the opening of the border with a renunciation of the genocide issue.

Kirakossian managed to convince his Turkish colleagues that Armenia would stick to the demand for recognition of the genocide. This also applies to compensation claims. Besides, Kirakossian rejected the Turkish demand to confirm once more in the logs the "peace treaty" from Kars which was signed under Turkish pressure on 13 October 1921. Thus, Armenia succeeded to obligate Turkey without preconditions to establish diplomatic relations. However, it is also true that there will be no opening of the border without the great interest of Turkey itself to an agreement. In the logs, neither the "genocide" nor Nagorno-Karabakh is mentioned. The development of bilateral relations is the only reason for the agreement of instituting several government commissions, including a sub-committee which will promote a confidence dialogue between the two peoples. "In addition, it will be used to correct the problems by conducting objective scientific research based on historical documents and archives. With the participation of Armenian, Turkish, Swiss and other international experts it is supposed to formulate proposals."

In Zurich on 10 October 2009, the contracting parties signed after long and tough secret negotiations two protocols, which regulate the establishment of diplomatic relations and the opening of border traffic. The U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and their Russian, French and Swiss counterparts took over the patronage. With the agreements in Zurich, the process of rap-

prochement between Armenia and Turkey reached a decisive phase: For Ankara, a normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations could remove one of many obstacles in the way to the EU accession of the country. The opening of the border to the neighboring country is part of the conditions that Ankara has to fulfill at the request of the EU, before joining the Union. However, there is no chance that the current Turkish government is rethinking its stance towards the history and the genocide. The reference to the creation of a "sub commission" which was appointed by one of the two governments and will deal with the history of both nations, met in Armenia and the Armenian diaspora with criticism. Moreover, Prime Minister Tigran Sargsjan emphasized the economic necessity of an open border trade with Turkey. Such a "historic opportunity" to Armenia should not be missed.

Meanwhile, the unrest grew in Azerbaijan with a view to possible consequences of the Armenian-Turkish rapprochement. In Baku in May 2009, Prime Minister Erdogan took sides with Azerbaijan: Turkey would not open its border to Armenia as long as "the occupation of Nagorno-Karabakh" was not ended and that Turkey still stood by the principle of "One nation - Two states". The Azerbaijani extortion to raise gas prices played a decisive role in these statements by Erdogan. Nevertheless, Turkey was anxious to break free from the heavy dependence on Azerbaijan and to conclude a contract with Russia about the construction of a Russian pipeline that is expected to transport gas via Turkey to Southeastern Europe and Italy. The fact that Azerbaijan cannot afford too much criticism of its main ally could be observed after the signing of the Zurich protocols. In a brief opinion, the State Department criticized the Armenian-Turkish rapprochement as a step that contradicts the national interests of Azerbaijan and that is addressed "against the peace and security in the region". The Azerbaijani media spoke unanimously of a betrayal of Turkishness.

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