Future of Europe Observer

I. Soft Power Projection of the EU: the Case of Jordan

For the purposes of promoting international security and economic prosperity, the European Union as a democratically constituted system aims to promote gender equality as an expression of its ambition of being a soft power. The topic has long been an issue of high importance for the EU, with gender equality being one of the fundamental rights. Mentioned in the Global Strategy for the EU of 2016, as well as under social cooperation actions, such as the bilateral association agreements undergone between the EU and its neighbouring Mediterranean countries, the promotion of the role of women in both social and economic development is vital. Furthermore, the EU has shown its support for the cause in the Middle East and North Africa region (MENA) through a variety of frameworks under the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and within the agenda of the Union for the Mediterranean. Moreover, promoting gender equality beyond the EU is one of the ten policy priorities of the European Commission for 2015-2019, which includes fighting discrimination. In terms of development cooperation, the EU abides to a twin-track approach pursued through gender mainstreaming and gender-specific actions in terms of capacity-building, supporting women organisations and disseminating information through raising awareness and best practices (EU Commission, 2017).

Frustration due to extremely high youth unemployment rates in the MENA region has proven to be one of the main drivers that led to the outbreak of the ‘Arab Spring’ in 2011, which demanded sweeping social, political and economic change. Geopolitical tensions across the region remain an unpredictable factor that has caused deteriorating economic conditions not only of failed states or nations with civil war, but also of neighbouring countries whose economies are dependent on trade with the surrounding markets. The global financial crisis of 2008 combined with geo-political regional turbulences, energy crisis, increasing food and oil prices and the closure of import and export routes have collectively put a significant strain on the economic and fiscal drivers of many countries in the region. These challenges have particularly acute implications on youth and women, where youth unemployment rates in the region have reached around 30 percent in 2017 (ILO, 2018), with the situation being even worse for young Arab girls for whom unemployment reached 51 percent (ILO, 2016).

Jordan, which currently holds the Southern co-presidency in the Union for the Mediterranean is considered an important regional partner for the EU. However, around 70 percent of its citizens are aged 30 years or under, which makes youth unemployment a critical issue that must be addressed immediately (UN Jordan, 2019). The overall
unemployment rate in the country stands at 18.6 percent. However, the youth unemployment rate for the year of 2018 in Jordan stands at a staggering 37.2 percent, which is noted to be one of the highest figures in the past 30 years and among the highest globally (The World Bank, 2019). The World Economic Forum’s 2018 Global Gender Gap Index indicates that Jordan has one of the lowest female labour force participation rates in the world.

Under the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) and for the timeframe of 2017-2020, the EU’s bilateral assistance to Jordan has an allocation of 335.5 million euro - 410.1 million euro, and mainly focuses on three priorities: (i) enhancing Jordan’s social and economic development, (ii) strengthening the rule of law, and (iii) upgrading border management and preventing violent extremism. The EU also aims to provide complementary support for capacity-building and civil society. Gender equality tends to be treated in most of these plans as a ‘cross-cutting’ issue, with constant emphasis being placed on its importance (EU Commission, 2019a).

Throughout the past decades great progress has been made in terms of increasing the number of Jordanian women in the labour market, nevertheless, many challenges persist. These disparities stem from a wide range of overarching factors on the one hand, and region-specific and demographic factors on the other hand, including the area of residence, age, income, level of educational attainment, healthcare, marital status as well as spousal support.

In terms of education, Jordan achieved gender parity in 1999 and has maintained that parity ever since. It has even become one of eight MENA countries to have a ‘reverse gender gap’ in tertiary education, with more females than males attending higher education facilities. Nevertheless, these improvements have resulted in what is described as the ‘MENA paradox’ where; despite having a slightly higher ratio of educated females to males in Jordan, the female labour force participation rate is only at 14 percent (ILO, 2017). Advancements in terms of healthcare and educational attainment within Jordan appear to have been accompanied with more females fulfilling their maternal and reproductive stereotypical roles instead of entering the job market. Due to certain determinants women are faced with a variety of hindrances ranging from fewer employment opportunities, gender biases, social and cultural obstacles, gender segregation across sectoral and occupational dimensions, discriminatory work practices to a significant wage gap.

The EU has often collaborated with stakeholders within the country such as governmental entities, educational entities and civil-society organisations in order to address the issue of gender inequality. Now, more than ever, Jordan needs support to utilise the full capacity of its human capital. Without the active engagement of nearly half of its population, the country will continue to lag behind in terms of economic development, which will continue to have a negative impact on the country’s stability as a whole. Low female labour force participation rates are among the main factors hindering the country’s growth. According to estimates, Jordan’s GDP could grow by 5 percent annually if women’s participation in the labour market was increased to 25 percent (UNICEF Jordan, 2019). It is important to address this issue from multiple facets while considering the roles of different national and EU actors.

In the face of growing turmoil in its neighbourhood, the EU has downscaled its ambition from using soft power to transform its neighbours to its own image and switched instead to a defensive mode, focusing on stability and resilience. Although the European Neighbourhood Policy was set-up through the lens of establishing security in the region neighbouring the EU, the EU must realise that economic stability carves the foundation of safeguarding this security. Ensuring the mobilisation of the second half of an educated population in Jordan presents huge potential as one of the key factors of economic stability in a dynamic region. The EU must help in supporting the only stable country within a region of high turbulence to ensure its own security and the stability of its neighbourhood. Different actions must be supported on a national level, including through raising awareness within the Jordanian society on a grassroots’ level through media, advocacy and awareness campaigns. In addition, ensuring that the educational system actively promotes gender equality should be a priority, in order to help change societal views regarding stereotypical gender constructs, in terms of the roles associated with masculinity and femininity as top-down reforms alone will have a limited impact. This could be accomplished through increasing female representation in decision-making positions, capacity building and skill enhancement to provide female graduates with the training that employers require, while enhancing public-private-partnerships and other reforms.

Different actions must be taken on the EU level as well. The approach of viewing gender as a cross-cutting issue
is very important, however, during the implementation of many development projects the component of gender has simply been added or even imposed, most often at the end. It is important to emphasise the objective of gender equality as a core target and not only as a cross-cutting issue. The EU should improve its reporting mechanisms by further specification and quantification with concise numbers such as the gender of the beneficiaries of EU allocated funds and concretise the evaluation of the impact of the implemented initiatives on gender equality as a whole. Adopting a clear, results-driven approach that sets quality standards for reporting, evaluation and accountability will help in promoting the EU’s evidence-based goals in transforming its neighbourhood.

Furthermore, coordinating European efforts in external action is vital to achieve substantive progress. Instead of having separate development agencies from EU member states carry on different projects, a coordinated plan will help avoid any duplication of efforts. At 74.4 billion euro, the EU and its member states were the world’s leading provider of official development assistance in 2018 (EU Commission, 2019b). The number of activities and projects, both from the EU and member states’ development agencies, is impressive but the progress achieved so far is limited due to the focus of initiatives and activities being widely dispersed; both in terms of the parts of the problem that are addressed as well as by the target groups. Leaving the choice to development agencies from member states to decide which of the Jordanian organisations or governmental agencies to work with is important, but increased EU coordination would help in ensuring that the funds and initiatives are not resulting in inefficiencies due to replicated efforts. Collective and coherent European action could be accomplished through tasking groups of member states with diplomatic and operational activities on behalf of the EU, as this could further enhance a sense of ownership for the goals at hand, while not overstepping the member states’ competencies.

The EU must realise that its main priorities in terms of establishing security within its neighbourhood will be unfulfilled if rising unemployment rates are not addressed adequately. Gender equality is not a goal but a human right that the Union stands for, and female empowerment is a major factor contributing to economic prosperity and stability within the MENA region.

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II. Turkey as a European and Mediterranean Trade Power

Relations between the EU and Turkey date back to the Ankara Agreement in 1963, which introduced a legal and political association regime. The Agreement commenced the long historical relationship culminating in the EU-Turkey Customs Union in 1996. This way, Turkey aligned itself to the world’s largest trading block (European Commission).

The Agreement envisages three phases for Turkey’s integration into the Community: the preparatory (1964-1973), the transitional (1973-1995), and the final one (1996). The final phase was not only about completing the Customs Union (CU) between the European Communities (‘EC’) and Turkey, but also aimed to initiate the way to accession. The framework of the CU was already enacted with the Ankara Agreement of 1963, but the Additional Protocol (1973) laid down further details. Moreover, during the preparatory and transitional phases decisive measures and timetables were put into force towards the removal of prohibitive entry barriers to trade. The Contracting Parties committed themselves to fulfilling the necessary conditions for the establishment of the CU, and thus adopted the Decision No 1/95 of the EC-Turkey Association Council on implementing the final phase of the Customs Union on the 22nd of December 1995 (Customs Union Decision).

The Decision introduced a number of requirements for Turkey. Most importantly, Turkey has to adopt all Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) that the EU has signed with third countries. These FTAs are fundamental for Turkey to align itself to the EU’s Common External Tariffs (CET). Nevertheless, insufficient coordination and consultation resulted in friction between the Parties. In most cases, third countries did not want to conclude an FTA with Turkey since their trade agreement with the EU allows them to enter the free circulation area with preferential tariffs, thereby granting them access to the CU zone even without offering a preferential regime to Turkey. The resulting diversion of trade traffic away from Turkey has had a negative impact highlighting that the current legal provisions lack the potential of providing a coordinated solution.

The CU has reinforced more extensive trade policy commitments for Turkey compared to the ones made under the World Trade Organization (‘WTO’) system. First, the CU mandates the duty-free treatment for industrial goods within the customs area. Second, Tur-
key consequently had to start negotiations on many of the other FTAs that the EU had already concluded with third countries, thus also extending preferential tariff regimes to these countries. (Bown, 2013, 6)

So far, Turkey has concluded FTAs with 36 countries, of which 11 were repealed due to the accession of these countries to the EU. Currently, Turkey has 20 FTAs in force, eight of which (Albania, Morocco, Palestine, Israel, Egypt, Tunisia, Jordan and Syria) are concluded with Mediterranean and Middle Eastern partners under the umbrella of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP). As of now, the Turkey-Jordan FTA has been repealed in 2018, whereas the one between Turkey and Syria was suspended in 2011 (Turkish Ministry of Trade 2019).

The CU with the European Communities that entered into force on 1 January 1996 achieved a high-level of integration between the Parties. The Decision was fundamental in its depth because it encapsulated every segment of the society including the business communities and the middle-class consumers on both sides. (Vesterbye and Akman, 2017, 3)

Evidently, the EU and Turkey established their CU with the perspective of Turkey's full membership in the European Union. Nevertheless, it has demonstrated many design deficiencies such as a limited scope, an external asymmetry, regulatory exclusion, regulatory challenges, transport problems, lingering disputes and gaps in implementation. At the same, both Parties frequently resorted to trade defence instruments such as anti-dumping and safeguard measures, as well as visa barriers impeding the CU’s actual goal. The CU in place excludes services, basic agricultural goods, public procurement and the right of establishment. Hakura asserts that “its primary function is to remove tariffs on goods, but it does little to reduce or abolish non-tariff barriers” (2018, 3-5).

On the one hand, unprecedented developments in global trade force the EU and Turkey to sign more comprehensive FTAs (labelled ‘new generation’ agreements by the EU since 2006) than just customs unions. Their reach typically goes beyond cutting tariffs goods trade whilst also covering services and public procurement. For example, the FTAs with South Korea and Canada contain provisions on heightened investment liberalisation. CETA in addition covers investment protection (although not yet provisionally applied) and regulatory cooperation (EU Commission, 2018, 15). On the other hand, the current trade challenges have induced Turkey to suspend those trade deals found to be dissatisfactory, as experienced in Turkey-Jordan trade arrangement.

The Process of the Union for the Mediterranean and Current Developments

Turkey is a member of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership ('EMP'), which originates in the Barcelona Process. It was launched in 1995 with the adoption of the Barcelona Declaration approved by the Euro-Mediterranean Foreign Ministers Conference. According to the Barcelona Declaration, the EMP has three dimensions: a “political and security partnership”, an “economic and financial” pillar and as well as a “partnership in social, cultural, and human affairs”. One of the most concrete targets of the Declaration was the creation of a free trade area within the Euro-Med region consisting of Turkey, EU, Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine, and Syria until 2010. (https://ufmsecretariat.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Declaracion-de-Barcelona-1995.pdf)

So far, the stakeholders have built a web of free trade agreements between the EU as a supranational entity and the individual countries mentioned, resulting in the gradual establishment of the proclaimed area. All these FTA have to observe the WTO's obligations. Unfortunately, the conflict of interest based on diverging economic values up to now prevents the initiative from being successful. As a recent development, the FTA between Turkey and Jordan repealed on 22 November 2018 based on allegations of the Jordan side of having to face ‘unequal competition’ with Turkish industries. The Parties had launched the nullified trade agreement in 2011. According to the trade figures, in 2010 - a year before the FTA was ready - Turkey’s imports from Jordan were 42 million US dollars. This figure increased by 165 per cent until 2017 to 113 million US dollars. At the same time, Turkey’s exports to Jordan were at 571 million US dollars in 2010 and subsequently rose by 19 per cent until 2017 to 682 million US dollars. (https://biruni.tuik.gov.tr/disticaretapp/menu.zul) Although the trade balance is in favour of Turkey, Jordan’s overall increase rate is quite high. At this point, it would not be far-fetched to claim the relations between Turkey and Jordan are still evolving despite new political constraints and challenges ahead that would potentially diminish the benefits of a free trade area target.

On the other hand, a recent framework agreement for a Joint Economic Committee (JEC) signed by Turkey and Jordan on 01 October 2019 confirms that both Parties are willing to boost bilateral trade and economic relations through JEC even without reducing trade barriers as efficiently used in FTAs. The trade-related developments between the EU and Jordan concerning the EU’s overall political and economic relations with
Jordan will likely advance in the form of additional agreements on agricultural, agri-food and fisheries products, as well as with a bilateral Dispute Settlement Mechanism. Furthermore, in December 2018, the EU and Jordan agreed on the initiation of simplifying the ‘rules of origin’, which is part of the EU’s support for Jordan in the context of the ongoing Syrian refugee crisis. The initiative aims to make it easier for Jordan to export to the EU (European Commission, May 2019).

Trade liberalisation efforts of EMP countries have improved in two directions: the first concerns the GATT/WTO membership pertaining to the multilateral engagement, whereas the second one is about regionalisation as a relief road. Turkey, with her membership in the GATT/WTO, has both taken the globalisation road plus going ahead with efforts of completing regional agreements such as the CU with the EU, a modernised FTA with EFTA countries, the membership in the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (‘BSEC’) and the Developing-8 (‘D-8’) as well as in the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (‘OIC’). As Ulgen (2004, 18) states with respect to the CU, “this long historical relationship, combined with the unique status of a customs union between an existing regional trading block and an independent country, have contributed to the establishment of a successful, but also highly complex regional arrangement”.

Nevertheless, unprecedented changes in the trade environment, as well as the level of integration in the EU reiterated the importance of the EU-Turkey trade relations in terms of implementing uniform trade policies with third countries. Within this perspective, Turkey’s adoption of the EU’s Common External Tariff and the respective FTAs comprise the most critical part of the common commercial policy applied towards third countries.

In the end, it needs to be emphasised that the legal texts of the CU (see Article 16) bind Turkey in its trade relations with third countries. Because of the unnecessary friction stemming from the legal framework, Turkey has been suffering from the latecomer effect. The solution lies with the institutional coordination and cooperation to eliminate the existing divergence between the Parties.

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**FTAs:**

1. Albania  
2. Bosnia & Herzegovina  
3. South Korea  
4. Egypt  
5. Georgia  
6. Iceland  
7. Israel  
8. Lichtenstein  
9. Macedonia  
10. Morocco  
11. Norway  
12. Palestine  
13. Switzerland  
14. Syria  
15. Tunisia  
16. Montenegro  
17. Serbia  
18. Chile  
19. Jordan  
20. Mauritius  
21. Malaysia  
22. Lebanon*  
23. Kosovo*  
24. Ghana*  
25. Moldova*  
26. Faroe Islands*

*Source: Ministry of Economy  
*In ratification process
III. The Arab Spring and the Rule of Law

The Arab Spring - failed aspirations?

In 2010, the desperate actions of a street vendor in Tunisia helped spark the revolutionary uprising that became known as the Arab Spring. Suffering from widespread unemployment and general discontent towards the political elite the Arab masses across the region took to the streets demanding immediate political and economic reform. Protests erupted in Algeria, Jordan, Egypt, Syria and Libya. Aspiring for better economic prospects and democratic governance, the Arab world marched against the socio-economic conditions perpetuated by repressive authoritarian regimes (Lynch 2018, 116-126).

Almost a decade has passed since the Arab Spring. The ardour and avidity for democratisation and socio-economic justice in the southern and eastern Mediterranean is steadily fading away. In addition, the emergence of violent non-state actors pose a threat that undermines a prosperous outlook in the region. This paper argues that a rule of law approach to security and stability is a possible solution to the regional instability in the Mediterranean. The European Union’s role in allocating critical funds towards the region will be examined. (Lynch 2018, 116-126)

The Mediterranean basin is dominated by long-festering wounds caused by long-standing conflicts. The territorial rivalry between Morocco and Algeria over West Sahara; the ongoing dispute between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots; and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are three such examples (Calleya 2013, 128-132). However, the uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa region (MENA) have created new zones of active hostilities between state and non-state actors. Although the initial expectations of the uprisings were largely emancipatory, not all the protests brought positive change for the working-class people. In certain cases, the Arab Spring protest did result in regime changes. However, in other cases religious extremists like ISIS coopted the uprisings. As a result, when governments toppled in places like Syria and Libya, armed militias stepped in to fill the power vacuum using coercive military tactics and even resorting to terrorism in some cases. (Salem 2015, 65)

While democratisation and serious economic reforms have been sidelined, the role of the military in several Arab countries that experienced protests and civil unrest have been bolstered in an attempt to break the cycle of unpredictability and make way for stability. The emerging realities, including in Syria and Libya have changed the traditional understanding of conflict in the Mediterranean. These challenges to peace and security have permeated national borders and affected the entire region. This means that traditional approaches to securitising the region will not only weaken democratisation but will most likely also continue to be ineffective in providing sustainable peace and security (Calleya 2013, 128-132).

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In this paper, Ludger Kühnhardt argues that Overseas Countries and Territories (OCTs) attached to France, the Netherlands and Denmark can only become a strategic asset for the European Union, if the EU puts them on an equal footing with its outermost regions (ORs).
Addressing the key challenge

There are many possible solutions to this key challenge framing the landscape of the Mediterranean. Achieving peace and security through the rule of law is one possible solution to the conflictual nature of the southern and eastern Mediterranean. The rule of law safeguards the mechanisms of international law and the principles of justice found therein, which apply equally to all states. Article 1 of the Charter of the United Nations, notes that the international community must work together and cooperate in order to “bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace” (United Nations 1945, Article 1.1.). Strengthening the rule of law for the purpose of protecting the original aspirations of the Arab Spring serves as an alternate channel, which in turn serves to prevent and to reduce violent crime and conflict. As an alternate channel to further militarisation, the rule of law offers legitimate systems that help societies face the challenges associated with accounting for past abuses and constructing a new constitutional order and social contract. Aristotle famously said that “for man, when perfected, is the best of animals; but, when separated from law and justice, he is the worst of all” (United Nations, n.d.). 70 years ago, Europe was sinking into the depths of depravity as the Second World War was ending. One of the most notable forces in Europe during the post-war transition was the prominence of legal regimes designed to maintain the law, order and justice. Various legal instruments gradually erected the pillars of the rule of law in Europe:


Similarly, countries in the MENA region must now establish institutions designed to uphold the rule of law and closely cooperate with regional institutions, like for example the International Institute for Justice and The Rule of Law (IIJ). The IIJ for example, is mandated to provide rule of law-based training to all justice sector personnel on how to mitigate the security challenges of transnational criminal activities within a rule of law framework.

The Role of the European Union

Although law and justice are key drivers of smooth post-war transition, such elements remain only one aspect of many other influential forces. After the Second World War, the United States’ government launched the European Recovery Program - more commonly known as the Marshall Plan. During the post-war transition, the USA put forward a substantial financial-aid package designed to help rebuild European economies. Similarly, the EU must now help stimulate and regenerate the economies of the southern and eastern Mediterranean. In mobilising a critical mass of its financial resources, the EU can help modernise the region’s infrastructure and stimulate the necessary growth to combat the high unemployment rates. In addition, this will create the necessary conditions in the region to attract foreign direct investment (Calleya 2013, 128-132). Existing institutional frameworks such as the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) have the capacity to act as instruments to channel this financial aid. However, if the EU provides financial support, this could not be effectively given in the form of aid due to the absence of governance and the rule of law in some of the recipient countries. Therefore, this implies that the rule of law becomes the precursor to political, social and economic development because it provides the orderly framework that is necessary for the aspired development to occur.

Conclusion

The aspirations of the Arab Spring have by large failed to materialise. In addition to previous long-standing conflicts, the emergence of non-state actors has further destabilised the southern and eastern Mediterranean region. This paper argues that a rule of law approach to security and stability is a possible solution to this challenge. Throughout the analysis, the emancipatory aspirations that acted as drivers to the Arab Spring were kept in clear sight, while it was identified that the European Union has a key role to play in allocating critical funds towards the region. The final remarks emphasised the instrumental value of the rule of law to achieve socio-economic development.

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The political relationship between the European Union (EU) and the non-EU Mediterranean countries has mostly proven to be mutually beneficial. Its strategic role will further increase due to the geographic proximity of the region to the EU. It would be in the interest of both sides to address the key factors of human development. One key element in this context is to look for best practices in the field of skills policy as North African countries and sub-Saharan regions are a major source of migrants and migrant workers for Europe. The poor economic development in the Maghreb states often does not keep pace with an increased growth in population, which causes pressures for emigration. To manage the resulting migratory movements to the European Union, Global Skill Partnerships (GSP) as entrenched in the “Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration” can make a substantial difference. The example of a joint Belgian-Moroccan project discussed below offers a case-in-point. The Global Compact has been endorsed by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 19 December 2018. In Article 34, the compact stipulates the objective of establishing GSPs. These refer to arrangements that support "training capacities of national authorities and relevant stakeholders, including the private sector and trade unions, and [that] foster[s] skills development of workers in countries of origin and migrants in countries of destination with a view to preparing trainees for employability in the labor markets of all participating countries" (United Nations, 2018). Furthermore, objective 18 of the Global Compact points to the need of "invest[ing] in skills development and facilitate mutual recognition of skills, qualifications and competences" (United Nations, 2018). In this context, policymakers should take the need for an inclusive and equitable quality education as well as for lifelong learning opportunities into utmost consideration as outlined in the fourth UN Sustainable Development Growth Goal (SDG).

To live up to the SDGs, further and deeper regional integration is required to resolve some of the biggest challenges posed by cross-border migration as well as to address its opportunities. This is why it is time to rethink the administrative borders of education and labour market policy as well as to acknowledge that policies regarding these areas have a significant effect that go beyond the individual countries. Indeed, emigration and immigration both deeply affect the education systems and the employment markets in the countries of origin, transit and destination. This social phenomenon creates both positive and negative results. On the one hand, migration can increase knowledge and human capital transfer as well as intercultural understanding. On the other, it can also result in brain drains, expose migrants to severe de-skilling, or cut them out of further personal, training and development opportunities due to unintended exclusionary policies and administrative measures. Previously marginalised groups of both youth and adults can significantly improve their social inclusion when, for instance, given the opportunity to acquire specific education and technical training as well as to upgrade existing skills. By virtue of effectively investing long-term in human capital, education and skills enhancement plays a pivotal role in fostering sustainable economic growth and development and is, therefore, a good starting point for further partnerships between developed and developing countries. Countries all over the Mediterranean and in Europe experience labour shortages in specific market segments and are in need of a more innovative approach to vocational training exchange partnerships and labour market mobility.

With regard to the EU’s migration policy, it is noteworthy that such GSP agreements create a significant spillover effect on irregular migration: an increase in legal migration pathways towards Europe could – if carefully managed and combined with sufficient (but not excessively repressive) border control measures – have the potential to reduce irregular migration (Barslund, Di Salvo and Ludolph, 2019). An important aspect of this approach is that it could decrease irregular migration without unintentionally increasing migrant vulnerability. Nor is it likely to foster illegal smuggling as repressive border control measures often do by their lack of response to the demand of smuggling services and the root causes of migration (Auriol and Mesnard, 2016). In other words, whereas an exclusive focus on measures resulting in the securitisation of migration policy allows smugglers to maximise their profits by setting even higher prices for transport, policy makers can counteract human traffickers by reshaping the market structure and introducing a more flexible and labour market-oriented visa policy.

Based on tested labour and trainee mobility models, Michael Clemens – Director of Migration, Displacement, and Humanitarian Policy and Senior Fellow at the Center for Global Development – in 2014 developed an innovative concept of Global Skill Partnership that aims to link skill creation with skill mobility in a way that
benefits both sending and recipient countries (Clemens, 2014). While Clemens's model contains many complex aspects, the summary below outlines the main elements for the purpose of this article:

1. A developed and a developing country sign a bilateral agreement on GSP and agree – prior to the migration of a labour force – on how they are going to share the costs of training and fostering the creation of skills in the sending country.

2. After determining a common market segment, in which each partner faces labour shortages, experts from both countries – including public and private stakeholders – meet to discuss the profile of the trainees and the curriculum that they will be taught.

3. Training facilities are created in the sending countries (which allows developed countries to save money on training) and technical vocational training is provided.

4. After successfully completing the training, candidates will be supported in their search for a work placement in the sending or in the receiving country by the respective employment agencies: the goal is to connect employers to employees in the most efficient way possible.

It is noteworthy that this model stresses the need for training in the country of origin and the necessity of offering the candidates a “home-track” possibility with the goal of integrating some of the candidates trained in these special vocational training programmes into the local labour market. This way, many would not feel compelled to emigrate to the EU. These two aspects highlight the development component of the Global Skill Partnership approach and the way it directly fosters the transfer of knowledge.

The only currently implemented model reflecting the GSP approach is the PALIM project of the Belgian Development Agency (Enabel). It receives its funding from the Mobility Partnership Facility (MPF) – an EU initiative that is financed by instruments of the EU’s budget (the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF), the Internal Security Fund for Police Cooperation (ISF-Police) and the Internal Security Fund for Borders and Visa) . The International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD) has the mandate for implementing the MPF. The ICMPD is an international organisation of 17 member states based in Vienna, which was founded in 1993 on the initiative of Austria and Switzerland. The PALIM project originates in a call for proposals launched by the MPF. Specifically, it establishes a model of migration policy that links the
development of the IT sector in Morocco and the labour market shortages of adequately trained IT specialists in Flanders. The project is implemented in close cooperation with the following key partners: the Flemish and the Moroccan employment agencies (VDAB and ANAPEC), the Flemish employers’ federation VOKA, the General Confederation of the Moroccan Industry (CGEM), the Moroccan IT Federation APEBI and the Belgian IT Federation AGORIA. Enabel is based on the assumption that “labour mobility can only benefit the parties when potential employees are able to find a qualified job both in their country of origin and in the country of destination” (Enabel, 2019). In order to avoid a brain drain, only unemployed candidates possessing high skills in English (but without an IT diploma) were chosen to undergo further English and technical IT training in Morocco in order to obtain a Junior Java Developer Certificate. The training will last 4.5 months, of which two weeks are devoted to intercultural and soft skills training as well as a recruitment session. PALIM is trying to show the way by creating an example of how to link European labour market needs with development cooperation initiatives. Both Belgium and Morocco wish to receive a rate of return on the investment they have agreed upon, hence transforming the relationship between developing and developed countries – often negatively influenced by an aid-centric vision – into a partnership of equals. One of the most innovative aspects of PALIM is the creation of a training system that will be automatically recognised in Europe, thus avoiding the long process of recognising foreign qualifications. Furthermore, the increase of the source country’s human capital is made more effective in the PALIM project by the possibility of the home track introduced by Clemens. It is still too early to properly assess the success of the PALIM project as it started in March 2019 with an implementation period of 18 months (03/2019-08/2010). Nevertheless, such an innovative idea is worth pursuing as it has the potential of reshaping and giving a new input not only to migration management policies, but also to the regional partnerships between the EU and, for instance, the Mediterranean countries.

Lastly, the GSP approach taken by PALIM allows to match the economic priorities of both the sending and the receiving countries, thereby taking account of migrants’ personal development goals in the education and employment sector. This could ultimately make regular migration more attractive to migrants. In fact, it improves the learning outcomes of the selected candidates and facilitates their work placement. By doing so, this approach acknowledges an important aspect of migration: as Castles puts it, the migrant is an autonomous social actor, taking independent decisions based on the set of choices they are presented to in a specific time and place (Castles, S., de Haar, H. and Miller, 2013). Given specific circumstances, the individual cost-benefit calculus of migration equals a solid investment in life chances. This is a decision that many persons throughout history have chosen to take.

Consequently, in order to effectively regain control over migration inflows, policymakers and member states should focus less on how to stop migration and more on how to better manage it. This requires policy measures that properly assess the perspective of the migrants and tackle the root causes of migration. GSPs allow for a more sustainable form of migration management and could, therefore complement the EU’s migration policy strategies in an effective way.

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MEDAC Publications in Mediterranean IR and Diplomacy

This edited publication entitled ‘Transatlantic Relations and the Mediterranean’ sheds light on key security challenges. It has emerged from a Mediterranean Academy of Diplomatic Studies (MEDAC) postgraduate seminar funded by the German Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the German Chair for Peace Studies and Conflict Prevention project at MEDAC.
The “Our Common Future Report”, also known as the Brundtland Report, defines sustainable development as the “development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs”. The concept has been of growing importance in international cooperation. This led to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and its 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The SDGs have specific objectives, which are to be accomplished by 2030. As discussions about sustainable development progress, the issue of migration and its relevance towards social, economic and environmental factors of sustainable development have been acknowledged for the first time (United Nations 2012).

There are different causes of migration and asylum, including but not limited a lack of employment opportunities in countries of origin, fear of persecution in countries of origin or natural disasters that left people with nothing to hold onto. One of the underlying reasons why the SDGs were created is to shed light on the issues that the world is facing, and give directions in order to achieve sustainability.

Internal and external migration has gradually been recognised as a positive element for development, where migrants potentially shift their knowledge and skills to both countries of origin and destination, opening investments and strengthen economic linkages and business opportunities between countries and regions. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) underlines this statement by claiming that “global migration contributed to a global gain of $356 billion difference in wages, decreased unemployment and enriched human capital” (UNITAR, 2012).

However, this phenomenon is also creating challenges in destination countries, including in local labour markets. While it helps the country of origin by reducing the unemployment rate to a certain extent, it could balance labour surpluses in host countries. However, it can only do so, if countries of destination offer sustainable measures that offer the same opportunities to foreigners and natives. This is where an effective integration policy comes into place. The stronger an integration policy a country has, the more immigrants contribute to the host society’s economy (UN 2012). However, if resources are not allocated effectively, this can result in unemployment or underemployment, which can feed populism (IOM, n.d.).

Most of the migrants that cross the Mediterranean and arrive on European shores are either low- or semi-skilled workers, often vulnerable to unfair exploitation or human rights violations. Especially women are vulnerable to human trafficking. Generally there has been an increase in women leaving their country of origin to find better employment opportunities and can be seen as a positive development. Firstly, women tend to send more remittances to their families, meaning more money is being sent to migrant-origin communities (United Nations 2012). This is one of the goals that SDG 5 (target 5.2) is trying to achieve.

Overall, the movement of workers can lead to ‘brain waste’ or ‘brain drain’ for countries of origin and destination. The latter can effect developing countries, including those in the Mediterranean as it effects a country’s economic and social growth. Brain waste can be experienced by countries of origin when for example the labour market is not functioning efficient enough with workers being unemployed or underemployed, leading to a move to another country.

However, the receiving state could also experience a brain waste if foreigners end-up in lower paid employment than they would qualify for (UNCSD Secretariat, 2012). For instance, across the EU, workers can move freely due to the Single Market. Nevertheless, if a qualified doctor from a third party country such as Egypt migrates to Malta he or she is not able to work as a doctor since his or her qualifications might not be directly recognised in Malta. To be able to practice medicine a doctor would have to pay to be potentially assessed and authorised. The argument here is not against assessing what an individual knows, but that one has to pay for it, considering that a migrant could potentially not afford the process. Could a particular country in the EU adjust their integration policy with the needs that arise from the immigrant’s point of view? Certainly, if the doctor started working then he or she could potentially live a comfortable life and contribute to Malta’s economy but could additionally send financial means back to his or her country.

Remittances, in general, could positively influence migrate-sending communities. They could also be used for consumer goods and investments in education and health and help in raising the standard of living. Increasing financial resources could further lead to a decline in child labour as well as help households be better prepared for unfavourable environmental shocks.
such as drought and earthquakes (UNCSD 2012). A study once showed that „on average, a 10% increase in the share of international remittances in a country’s GDP will lead to a 1.6 percent decline in the share of people living in poverty” (Adams and Page 2005).

The more explicit and better implemented an integration policy is, the more sustainability can be promoted and achieved. Figure 1 shows the SDGs with their correspondent target related to migration and what integration policy should tackle according to the IOM. Amongst the mentioned SDGs, the third SDG regards health. Migrants tend to be vulnerable towards health risks, with the worst-case scenario being that migrants do not have adequate access to safe, effective and affordable healthcare services. These services include sexual and reproductive healthcare services such as family planning and information (Taran et al. 2016, 1-12).

Secondly, the SDG related to education is very important, as every child should have at least access to primary and secondary education. Through this, children will have the opportunity to grow and be able to be independent. In the long term, this goal is crucial for Europe, a continent having an ageing population. Moreover, everyone should have the opportunity to study abroad at least for a semester (IOM, 2016). Through this initiative, multiculturalism would be more enhanced within a particular society, leading to the improvement of values such as tolerance. With this indicator for example, one can then tackle racism and islamophobia. Two components behind the rise of populist parties across the world, but especially in EU member states.

Thirdly, SDG 8, which regards productive employment and decent work is also linked to SDG 5 based on its relation to every migrant having the right of a

### HOW MIGRATION IS REFLECTED IN THE 2030 AGENDA FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

**Migration in the declaration**

- Highlights impact of humanitarian crises and forced displacement of people on development progress.
- Calls for the empowerment of vulnerable groups, including refugees, internally displaced persons and migrants.
- Calls for access by all—including migrants—to lifelong learning opportunities.
- Commits to eradicating forced labour and human trafficking and to end child labour.
- Recognises the positive contribution of migrants for inclusive growth and sustainable development.

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decent job within a particular society. This relates to learning new skills and feeling a sense of belonging to a specific community. Moreover, this SDG is about the goal of promoting worker’s rights and safety in the workplace (IOM, 2016). This SDG can also lead to the establishment of a policy promoting the recruitment of migrant workers and applying international labour standards in all workplaces (Taran et al. 2016, 1-16).

Furthermore, SDG 10 primarily targets migration. It proposes better-regulated migration policies as well as the facilitation of orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration. When it comes to better-regulated migration policies, it targets the creation of more consistent actions amongst different institutions within a country. Here, a government would work in a „whole-of-government“ approach where ministries would work in cooperation with relevant stakeholders, NGOs, private sector, and the public as a whole to implement the SDGs (Taran et al. 2016, 1-16). SDG 10 is further aiming to reduce the transaction costs of migrant remittances to less than 3 per cent. Hence, it regards the setting and monitoring of cost ceilings, which can lead to an increase in the value of the remittances and help empower communities (Sustainable Development Knowledge Platform, 2016). This is also reflected in the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM).

The GCM continues to emphasise the strong link between migration and development. One link for example, includes: that if one SDGs – such as having clean water or poverty is eradicated, while sustainable jobs for all is accomplished, then immigration would decrease as those who move in search of a better standards of living would potentially stay in their country of origin where standards could rise.

Climate change is increasingly one of the push factors for migration that is targeted by SDG 13. “By 2050, some 200 million people may be forced to leave their homes due to environmental degradation and water shortages caused by climate change”. If one works towards reducing the effects of climate change then the rate of migration based on natural or environmental disasters would decline (UNITAR, 2012). Of course, climate change effects are still going to happen. Thus, governments should support those people who have no other choice but move based on those reasons.

The cooperation between ZEI and MEDAC dates back to the origins of both institutions in the late 1990s. Since 2010, ZEI and MEDAC hold annual workshops in Bonn on the most burning issues of the Mediterranean agenda including as asylum, economic and security policies. These bring together ZEI Master Fellows with young diplomats studying at MEDAC. Particular attention is being paid to ongoing transformation processes in the Euro-Med region.

Lastly, SDG 17 global partnership and better cooperation between organisations, including different international organisations synergising their commitments within several agreements, including the 2030 Agenda, the Paris Climate Change Agreement, as well as the GCM (IOM, 2017). This underlines that global issues need global solutions and that only multilateralism can lead towards more sustainability.

In conclusion, the intentions behind the SDGs are good. However, the implementation of change is up to national governments. Furthermore, without a specific and robust integration policy, none of the SDGs and their objectives could be fully achieved. However, if the SDGs were a success, then migration could potentially no longer be a necessity but an option for everyone (Catholic News Agency, 2017).

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The Arab Spring constituted an important moment in the history of democratisation. Some scholars had the idea that a bottom-up approach of democratisation could not work in the Arab world due to a so-called “Arab exceptionalism,” which believes that there is an Arab cultural resistance to the principles and values of democracy. Almost ten years after the outbreak of this major wave of change, which affected several countries in the southern Mediterranean, including Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Syria, Tunisia, the starting point of the Arab Spring, is assessed as a successful Arab democracy. The question that might arise here is whether the European Union, the first partner of Tunisia, is doing enough in order to support the democratisation processes in the country.

One of the conditions that paved the way for a regime change in Tunisia was the fact that it had a large middle class. This large middle class was the result of economic development. According to Lipset’s modernisation theory on democratisation, economic development leads to democratisation as it enlarges the middle class (Lipset 1959, 69-105, 75). According to Samuel Huntington, the middle class is the most rebellious social class (Huntington 1996, 289). The Tunisian middle class in 2010 represented 89.5 percent of the total population (African Development Bank Group 2011, 2). However, following the revolution, the Tunisian economy has been witnessing serious challenges. The economic problems within the country and the region are damaging the purchasing power of the population, which could result in the shrinking of the middle class in the long-term. Linking this to the modernisation theory: a democracy is less likely to be sustainable with such economic issues. This puts the fragile nascent democracy of the southern Mediterranean under serious threat.

The EU, which has always presented itself as a normative promoter for democracy, is expected to support Tunisia at this turning point in its history. In fact, the EU has shown support to Tunisia after the revolution. The first southern Mediterranean country to sign an association agreement and a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) on manufactured goods has been granted the status of privileged partner to the EU in 2012. This further initiated negotiations for the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA), which would cover agriculture and services. Furthermore, Tunisia has in the past also benefitted from grants and funds in order to support the nascent democracy. For instance, from an initial grant planned for € 540 million for the period 2007 and 2013, Tunisia has benefited € 775 million. Other grants have been channelled in order to sustain the Tunisian civil society and capacity building along with helping the government to deal with problems in public finances (European Parliament 2016, 7).

Yet, the policies that the EU has been adopting towards Tunisia are not specifically tailored for it. They are still under the umbrella of the EU policy towards its near neighbourhood. The EU was expected to develop specific policies that would meet the challenges that this historical event has created. These fit to all policies have proved their limitations. For example, the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA) is still an unpopular agreement among the Tunisian society. EU negotiators and officials have to take into consideration the delicate socio-economic situation of the country. Moreover, the grants have shown little efficiency, as the results remain very limited.
What would be expected from the EU is to have unprecedented revolutionary measures that take into consideration the historical moment. These measures have to be unconditioned. Being unconditioned does not mean that the EU has no benefit in them. The building of a democracy in the southern Mediterranean has been on the EU agenda for many decades and this opportunity must not be lost.

Tunisia is in need for a structured funding program. In other words, a “Marshall Plan” could make the Tunisian democratisation process more sustainable. It is true that Tunisia would never be a member of the EU, but a structural program similar to the one applied to the potential members of the EU could in theory have miraculous results on a small country like Tunisia.

Having a prosperous democratic country in the south Mediterranean can also have a variety of significant benefits on the EU. This would create another success story of a deep cooperation and partnership between two parties that share commonalities. It could also bring solutions for issues like irregular migration, fundamentalism and terrorism.

In sum, the EU policies towards Tunisia after the outbreak of the Arab Spring are important, but remain far from what could have been accomplished. In essence, investments would have to be drastically increased in order for the serious challenges facing the nascent democracy being addressed. Unprecedented events in history have to be faced by unprecedented policy measured.

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