EU Migration and its complexities.

This issue of the Future of Europe Observer sheds light on the different aspects of the migratory crisis and its consequences for the EU.

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Understanding Migration: Voices from Research

Migration has climbed to the top of the European political agenda, both at the EU level and in the member states. It is also a hot topic in many regions and communes. Who is responsible for what? Behind the acute problems now confronting both policymakers and civil servants, lurk many questions about the appropriate division of functions between states but also between the different levels of government.

People are on the move, but so are national positions. When the idea of a beefed-up agency for border protection (“Frontex plus”) was launched late last year, the overwhelming answer was negative. EU member states are jealous of their national sovereignty, and one of their decisive core competences is the control of their own borders.

Now attitudes have started to shift. If Schengen is to survive, there must be some effective safeguarding of the external borders, and that task cannot be entrusted to a few member states with long coast-lines. Without solidarity and cooperation the common European frontline remains an illusion.

Many parts of the EU system are concerned with migration, from the External Action Service to the general directorates dealing with justice and home affairs, education, social policy and the labour market.

While politicians are busy with urgent migration challenges, scholars seek to enrich the deliberation through a broad spectrum of inquiries. Our understanding of migration has come to draw on research in a surprisingly wide range of disciplines, stretching from the social sciences and the humanities to several fields of science and medicine.

On the push factors of migration, many insights stem from anthropology and the sociology of religion, political mobilisation and nation building. The same disciplines offer interesting insights into the attitudinal shifts linked to movements between different countries. While many migrants assimilate rather easily to their new environments, others deepen their sense of cultural belonging to their original communities. Some groups of secular migrants revert to strong religious beliefs.

Economists are shedding light on both the short term and long term consequences of migration. The refugee streams increase the pressure on public budgets but they also inject a demand stimulus contributing to growth already in the short term. Their impact on the supply of labour depends very much on the pace and forms of integration. Some countries have clearly been more successful than others in absorbing new entrants.
The immediate impact of refugee streams is a loss of economic activity in the exodus countries and some increase in the countries of immigration, but the integration of new manpower is drawn out over a longer period. Demographers help us assess shifts in the age structure and gender balance due to migration.

One effect of migration is a diffusion of skills. Innovations often come about as immigrants apply their expertise in new settings. In the economic history of Europe there has been a substantial transfer of know-how through migratory movements.

Nor is this recent. Archaeologists have discovered surprising patterns of early trade. Important break-throughs in our understanding of pre-historical population movements are built on the cooperation between archaeologists, geneticists, linguists and epidemiologists. In his best-seller Sapiens, Yuval Noah Hariri sums up many of these studies, covering a period of over 150,000 years.

Many researchers studying migration can draw on their own fund of experience. Itinerant scholars dominated European universities long before the age of the Erasmus programme, and mobility in the academic professions has remained high. The international character of academic research is a fundamental condition for many of its achievements.

The time perspective remains crucial for our understanding of migration. While politicians and public administrators are locked up in a short-term time-frame, scholars often enjoy the luxury of taking a longer view. For rational decision-making, however, neither the immediate nor the later effects should be neglected. This is one good reason for a continuous dialogue between policymakers and scholars on the many moot issues of international migration.

Prof. Daniel Tarschys
is a ZEI Senior Fellow and a member of the Swedish Institute of European Policy Studies (SIEPS) Academic Network. His main areas of research are European politics and integration, comparative politics, legislatures, human rights, accountability in politics and public administration.

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**EU-Turkey Migration Agreement (18 March 2016)**

- All new irregular migrants crossing from Turkey to the Greek islands as of the 20th of March 2016 will be returned to Turkey.
- For every Syrian being returned to Turkey from the Greek islands, another Syrian will be resettled to the EU.
- Turkey will take any necessary measures to prevent new sea or land routes for irregular migration opening from Turkey to the EU.
- Once irregular crossings between Turkey and the EU are ending or have been substantially reduced, a Voluntary Humanitarian Admission Scheme will be activated.
- The fulfilment of the visa liberalisation roadmap will be accelerated with a view to lifting the visa requirements for Turkish citizens at the latest by the end of June 2016. Turkey will take all the necessary steps to fulfil the remaining requirements.
- The EU will, in close cooperation with Turkey, further speed up the disbursement of the initially allocated €3 billion under the Facility for Refugees in Turkey. Once these resources are about to be used in full, the EU will mobilise additional funding for the Facility up to an additional €3 billion to the end of 2018.
- The EU and Turkey welcomed the ongoing work on the upgrading of the Customs Union.
- The accession process will be re-energised, with Chapter 33 to be opened during the Dutch Presidency of the Council of the European Union and preparatory work on the opening of other chapters to continue at an accelerated pace.
- The EU and Turkey will work to improve humanitarian conditions inside Syria.
The EU: National Isolation or Mutually Supportive Group?

The EU member states are hampering and denouncing each other rather than solidifying an EU bound solution. More and more, states have started to fall back to sealing their external borders, while inflicting a game of ping-pong on third-country-nationals and stateless persons. In so doing, networks of disaggregation - defying the European dream of solidarity and morality - have appeared in the EU.

In the North, recent strategies are escalating as the Danish Parliament is in the process of evaluating a bill requiring refugees to pay for their accommodation while seeking asylum. The plans entail a surplus of over 10,000 Kroner to be claimed by the government for the financing and cost of stay of each asylum seeker. Furthermore assets such as jewellery are to be pawned for this purpose while sentimental valuables such as wedding rings would remain exempt. Sweden's position towards refugees has made a 180 degree turn as it has reintroduced border controls alongside Finland, although it had previously announced that they are willing to take on a lot more refugees even though they only received half as many applications in comparison to Germany in the third quarter of 2015.

The Eastern European countries Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic and Slovakia (forming the Visegrad Group) are opposed to Germany's refugee policy and have taken steps to close the Greek border together with FYR Macedonia. This is not only contrary to a mutually supportive group; it even goes much further by violating Greece's sovereignty. Hungary has the highest amount of first time asylum applicants, with 108,085 following Germany during the third quarter of 2015. Contrary to that, the Czech Republic only holds 260 and Slovakia only took in a mere 15 asylum seekers. Furthermore Poland has made bold moves seeking to only admit Christian refugees into its country, placing just 195 Syrian refugees behind the influx of Russian and Ukrainian migrants with an overall intake of 3,710 asylum seekers.

The Southern Group's main players are Greece and Italy who have been struck hard by the constant inflow of refugees. The EU has tried to support these border countries through financial means. In 2014 the European Union pledged to spend €3 billion by 2020, a large portion of which is allocated directly to the member states to reallocate where necessary. Greece for example has received €259.4 million through the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF), but a major failure of the funds is that the member states do not have to systematically verify their spending and allocation, once the money has been provided.

Germany and Austria form different leading roles of the Group West and Center and remain central to debates on the continuation of the migration crisis. Austria has limited the number of asylum seekers through the so called “Obergrenze”, reducing the amount of candidates within 2016 to 37,500. By building a border fence with 12 hotspots, possible asylum applications are held to a daily contingent although the asylum law has not been tightened. This violates the EU's foundation through the Dublin III Regulation, as asylum seekers are being rejected and their applications dismissed - refugees who are not in possession of the correct paperwork are ruthlessly sent back to Slovenia. German public opinion has started to retreat from Merkel's migration promises but the German government has remained the ultimate key player involved in crisis management. President Juncker has applauded Merkel's strategy in Germany as exemplary, but until the EU nations can collectively implement a strategy the future of the crisis remains pessimistic. The focus of EU meetings has recently shifted towards the impending Brexit referendum with British politicians filling the European Council Agenda in February showing just how dismantled Europe is during the current crises. The fear of cultural disruption is at the source of the uproar of EU citizens framing and defining the limits of the 'Willkommenskultur' towards third-country-nationals and stateless persons. There is a rise in right-wing populism in all EU states. From Pegida in Germany to the Front National in France and the Polish right-wing government PiS - all these tendencies are causing further tensions and fear. The Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, for example, is putting pressure on the EU.
with a referendum concerning the EU resettlement quotas, a measure which is likely to undermine the Common European Asylum System. In a Union of secular nations Islamophobic tensions are giving rise to the role of religion.

The European dream of integration is crumbling through the EU’s halfhearted commitment to providing aid and asylum to people in need. Indeed, arguments stressing the gain of migrants, such as the possibility of demographic change in the EU to reverse the trend of an aging society, tend to be ignored by many political actors. The economy on the other hand welcomes the influx of new workers to overcome a pressing shortage of craftsmen and to contribute to the pension funds which have been dwindling over the last years. Various political actors from net-donor member states on the other hand warn that Europe’s capacity has been stretched to its limits and that too many benefit recipients will grab their fingers in Europe’s welfare systems. Another point of concern is that sleepers and ISIS militants enter the Schengen zone disguised as refugees. All these aspects are contributing to refugees being put in a state of orbit as the push and pull factors are being executed in the political playing field on a day to day basis. Clear proof of this is the fact that Italy for a long time blocked the payment of €3 billion to Turkey. This is a move of political calculus, as it increases Italy’s bargaining power in relation to the EU3 in the European Council.

There are obvious hardened fronts between Germany as a key player, supported by Juncker, and the hardliner Visegrad Group, with countries such as Denmark playing the middle field. These tensions show just how fragmented the EU has become over solving the refugee crisis, proving its inability to build a united front against ISIS. Solutions are needed urgently. NATO has started to commit to supporting the management by agreeing on an operation to stop smugglers from carrying refugees across dangerous waters. This operation is intended to better control the amount of inflow of migrants and could see safer and legal routes for migrants being developed. At the heart of the security issue is also the use of Eurodac, a biometric database to collect fingerprints from asylum seekers, who have crossed the EU borders without permission. To get to the root of the issue one must however dig much deeper. As one of the main pillars of the Common European Asylum System the Dublin III Regulation forms the basis of the responsibility for asylum seekers in the EU. However the Achilles heel of Dublin III is the systematic weakness of the border countries which allows the responsibility of the third-state citizens to be shifted to the member states where the refugees request asylum. These member states are however impeding Eurodac from gaining responsibility, ignoring the fact that it would support the queried security risks at hand. The future will tell if the European Council can overcome Dublin III’s problematic nature of unequal distribution of responsibility and eventually form a mutually supportive group of nations in the EU.

Kim Förster and Lindsey Brown, “MES Class of 2016”.

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1. All statistical figures are taken from Eurostat 2015.
2. EU3 refers to France, Germany and the United Kingdom.
Limits Of European Solidarity: Supranational EU Strategies

We have heard it all before. Jean-Claude Juncker, President of the European Commission, urging leaders to address the refugee crisis facing the European Union (EU) with unity and solidarity. Yet, in a time overshadowed by a growing dissatisfaction with the unfolding of globalism and European integration itself, this plea seems to repeatedly fall on deaf ears. Instead of member states seeking ground for common action, borders have been closed, policies misused and agreements broken for the purpose of pursuing national interests. Against this backdrop, concerns questioning the inner coherence of the EU are once again appearing on the agenda, suggesting that migration is likely to become the ultimate make-or-break issue for the EU in upcoming years.

The lack of solidarity has repeatedly been claimed to lie at the heart of the EU’s inability to act in a coordinated manner. However, while most member states acknowledge this fundamental value of governance, the definition of ‘European solidarity’ has been up for debate ever since the culmination of the Syrian crisis triggered the biggest humanitarian catastrophe seen in Europe since the Second World War. In the absence of a common understanding of this ambiguous concept, European governments have increasingly started to follow convenient and homemade interpretations of where this shared responsibility ends, resulting in a debate more focused on economic limits of individual countries than on the genuine meaning of political solidarity.

Hence, the unequal reception and integration of over one million refugees can be seen as a new statistical indicator measuring a rapidly vanishing coherence in the EU. Ranging from almost half a million asylum applications in Germany to only a couple of thousand in many post-Soviet states in 2015, the disproportionate distribution of short-term costs between frontier/transit states and countries of final destination cannot be overlooked. As the average annual cost per asylum applicant is estimated to be roughly 12 000 €, the most affected governments will be forced to project several billions of additional public funding to meet the needs of newly arrived refugees and migrants, whereas other more restrictive states plan on single-handedly cutting the fiscal costs near to zero in 2016. Unsurprisingly, the asymmetrical burden-sharing is becoming a major seed of conflict, deepening the pre-existing gap between predominantly Western and Eastern member states.

The Commission’s attempt to counteract the growing imbalances started off ambitiously. Negotiations over mandatory quotas were kicked off, budgets amended and a crisis mechanism adopted, aiming at relocating 160,000 refugees from the overstrained Greek and Italian hotspots. Further, a new partnership with African countries was declared to address the root causes of migration. Even accession talks with Turkey were relaunched to ensure the implementation of a readmission agreement, hoping to stem the influx of migrants and reinforce the EU’s external borders.

However, the outcome of these efforts has been meagre. Whereas the introduction of permanent redistribution quotas stalled at an early stage, the slow implementation of the relocation scheme has come to resemble more of a political farce than any kind of effective crisis response. Meanwhile, the EU’s external border remains highly fragile. While the operational follow-up on third-country cooperation is struggling with financial shortcomings, the Turkey-EU action plan has not been able to reduce the number of illegal entries into the EU, pushing the Western Balkan route to near breaking point.

Still, the biggest disappointment following the implementation of the Commission’s “Agenda on Migration” has been the inability of the 28 European leaders to see beyond their own short-term interests. Consequently, frustration and distrust have become the new trending catchwords describing European politics. So who is to blame for this lack of solidarity? While it is without doubt that a liberal refugee policy is the right choice from an ethical perspective, many European citizens seem to disagree with the level this moral obligation has currently been extended to. As illustrated in
In a recent Eurobarometer survey, the refugee crisis has not only revealed huge differences regarding societal attitudes about migration across Europe. Also, a widespread dissatisfaction regarding the scope of the EU’s involvement in migration policies can be observed among a majority of Central Eastern Europeans, fearing for their economic welfare and safety. In other words, the asymmetrical impact of this crisis cannot only be felt in terms of economic burden-sharing, but also when translated into notions of how much European solidarity can be pursued against the interests of citizens.

Contemplating these circumstances, neither a protectionist renationalisation nor a patronising Europeanisation of migration policies and the refugee issue will solve the external and internal challenges the EU will be facing over the next few years. However, it should at least be worth considering whether the current course of Brussels serves the higher purpose of strengthening European solidarity. Taking into account the growing reluctance among member states to endorse and adhere to common policies, the most pressing issue EU policy-makers should focus on is how to retain the ability to function as an effective polity. This requires first and foremost for the EU to regain its members’ confidence in a European solution to the crisis, since the efficiency of any democracy based policy stands or falls with the support of its citizens. After all, a Europe characterised by mutual distrust is a Europe not benefiting any of the parties involved – neither the newcomers hoping for a fair chance of integration nor the EU itself which in the end has to answer for its actions to its own people.

Sanni Kunnas is a ZEI Fellow, “MES Class of 2016”.

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6. However, the tensions concerning the introduction of daily refugee quotas by the Austrian government in February 2016 has somewhat altered this division, see: Rankin, Jennifer (2016): “Austria dismisses criticism of its plan to limit daily refugee numbers”, The Guardian.
8. So far only about 500 out of the 160,000 have been relocated from Italy and Greece, see: COM (2016): “Communication on the State of Play of Implementation of Priority Actions under the European Agenda on Migration, 85 final”, p. 11.

**New Regional Integration Observer**

If you are interested in comparative regional integration and bi-regional cooperation in Europe and Africa, please have a look at the current edition of the [Regional Integration Observer](http://www.zei.uni-bonn.de/rio), which analyses key policy developments of 2015 and gives an outlook on the challenges ahead for 2016.

www.zei.uni-bonn.de/rio
Flight and forced displacement are among the most serious humanitarian and human rights challenges worldwide. They have also become a sad reality for the European Union (EU). More than one million people have arrived at Europe’s Mediterranean shores in 2015 and over 3,771 have died or perished in their attempt to seek safety and security in Europe\(^1\). This past year will be remembered as the one in which Europe failed in its responsibility to respond to the urgent needs of assistance and protection of hundreds of thousands of vulnerable people\(^2\). The unprecedented number of arrivals has overwhelmed member states to meet EU standards for processing and receiving asylum applications, some reaching the breaking point in their ability to do so, even leading some towards implementing rash and counterproductive measures. The question of responsibility has driven a deep internal division between member states, making the reciprocity thereof—burden sharing—a question which may determine the fate and future of the Union\(^3\).

Tense negotiations between member states regarding policy responses and practical solutions have resulted in little to no progress. Frontline states like Italy and Greece continue to carry the brunt of the disproportionate responsibility, while the agreement that had been reached between EU interior ministers on a redistribution scheme of 120,000 refugees (22nd of September 2015) has evaporated into thin air\(^4\). The current situation within Greece is on the brink of escalating into a full humanitarian crisis with over 122,637 people having arrived in January and February 2016 alone and tensions running high with over 24,000 refugees and migrants sleeping in the open. The situation is exacerbated by general overcrowding leading to shortages of food, shelter, water and sanitation\(^5\).

The failure of member states to forge a united, humane response to desperate people seeking help, while forcing Greece to handle the unprecedented number of arrivals alone, along with securing its external borders, is feeding the already explosive situation. It has to be recognized that while long-term solutions to the European refugee and migration crisis have to be found, imminent action geared towards de-escalation should be at the forefront. It further has to be noted that the failure of burden sharing is two-fold. On the one hand, the EU’s lack of coordination is hampering an immediate and effective crisis response, while on the other hand, the international community has failed to offer any form of meaningful burden sharing to host countries in conflict regions. This has, in turn, led to onward movement and refugees seeking more stable conditions and long-term solutions in Europe’s asylum systems\(^6\).

Fundamentally, it should be understood that hosting large groups of refugees, especially those originating from large-scale crises such as Syria, represents a collective and global good. Within the current situation, this task is by default mostly assumed by Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey as Syria’s neighbors. As such, refugee hosting countries are de facto assuming a global task without the collective support and response that this task would both require and deserve. Thus, the international community and Europe have to recognize that refugee protection constitutes, at its core, a collective responsibility based on the foundations of humanitarian and legal considerations as well as on the consideration of security concerns and stability implications in a truly interconnected world.

While the concept of burden sharing is enshrined into international human rights law as well as international refugee law it also builds the cornerstone of EU law, which recognizes the principle of solidarity in Article 80 TFEU. The 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees is the centerpiece of international refugee protection; the widest adhered to and shared international human rights tool available today. The Preamble to the Convention recognizes that granting asylum “may place unduly heavily burdens on certain countries”, implying the need for international cooperation. Nevertheless, the Convention and its Protocol are limited to the degree that they neither refer to the distribution

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\(^1\) Eurostat, “Migrant arrivals at western Mediterranean Sea entry points 2015,” https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/psb_migration_migrant_arrivals_other_type本报记者2015/12/31


of responsibility between countries (or between the 145 signatories) or how to facilitate a reliable and feasible global responsibility sharing mechanism. However, burden sharing has historically been interpreted as requiring two main sorts of action. Firstly, the provision of financial assistance to countries of asylum in order to support the care of refugees; especially through funding the duties and related activities of the UNHCR—financial burden sharing. Secondly, the distribution and dispersion of refugees between countries—physical burden sharing. This type of burden sharing was successfully implemented in response to the Hungarian uprising of 1956, the situation in Chile in 1973 and the Vietnamese refugee crisis of 1979. Why then is the EU having such difficulties in finding a common approach?

In the context of the international law framework the European toolkit currently in place including Schengen and Dublin has to be looked at. The Convention provides a single definition of a refugee, spells out the kind of legal protection, other than assistance and social rights a refugee is entitled to receive, as well as defines a refugee’s obligation towards host countries. It however does not contain any explanation on whether refugees have to apply for protection in the first safe country they enter (Articles 1A to 1F). The Convention rather includes the indirect assertion that the actual number of countries a refugee enters is irrelevant. Furthermore, Article 31 of the Convention restricts countries from imposing penalties on refugees for entering a country illegally. This in combination with the Convention’s cornerstone, the principle of non-refoulement (Article 33), which prevents States from removing refugees to an unsafe State, does give countries a degree of flexibility to insist upon a safe third country requirement. However, it does not impose the rule that refugees have to apply for protection in the said safe third country. Burden sharing is a global responsibility and the lack thereof has become a global problem particularly evident now that the European Union is facing direct consequences. Maybe its time we fundamentally rethink our policies and remember that the refugee and migration “crisis” surrounding the Mediterranean accounts for only a fraction of global movement, as 86 percent of the world’s refugees are hosted in developing countries, outside of the EU.

Liska Wittenberg is a ZEI Fellow, “MES Class of 2016”.

References:
Migration: Terminology

**Asylum:** A form of protection given by a State on its territory based on the principle of non-refoulement and internationally or nationally recognised refugee rights and which is granted to a person who is unable to seek protection in their country of citizenship and/or residence.

**Asylum Seeker:** A person who has made an application for protection under the Geneva Convention in respect of which a final decision has not yet been taken.

**Compulsory Return:** The process of going back whether in voluntary or enforced compliance with an obligation to return to:

- one’s country of origin
- a country of transit in accordance with EU or bilateral readmission agreements or other arrangements
- another third country, to which the third-country national concerned voluntarily decides to return and in which they will be accepted.


**European Asylum Support Office (EASO):** assists EU States in fulfilling their European and international obligations in the field of asylum.

**European Dactyloscopy (EURODAC):** A computerised central database, agreed upon in 2000, for comparing the fingerprints of asylum applicants in the EU.

**False and Authentic Documents Online (FADO):** An image archiving system established at national level to combat irregular immigration and organised crime. This database facilitates the exchange of information between member states on documents.

**Irregular Migrant:** Derived by the European Migration Network from the definition of ‘illegal stay’ in Art. 3 of Directive 2008/115/EC (Return Directive)

**Migrant:** A person who either:

- establishes their usual residence in the territory of a member state for a period that is, or is expected to be, of at least 12 months, having previously been usually resident in another member state or a third country
- having previously been usually resident in the territory of a member state, ceases to have their usual residence in that member state for a period that is, or is expected to be, of at least 12 months.

**Non-Refoulement:** A core principle of international refugee law that prohibits States from returning refugees in any manner whatsoever to countries or territories in which their lives or freedom may be threatened on account of their race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion. Legal basis: Art. 33 of the Geneva Convention of 1951.

**Refugee:** Either a third-country-national who, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership of a particular social group, is outside the country of nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail themselves of the protection of that country, or a stateless person, who, being outside of the country of former habitual residence for the same reasons as mentioned above, is unable or, owing to such fear, unwilling to return to it, and to whom Art.12 (Exclusion) of Directive 2011/95/EU does not apply. Legal basis: Global context: Art. 1A of the Geneva Convention of 1951, EU context: Art. 2(d) of Directive 2011/95/EU (Recast Qualification Directive).

**Relocation:** The transfer of persons having a status defined by the Geneva Convention of 1951 or subsidiary protection within the meaning of Directive 2011/95/EU from the EU Member State which granted them international protection to another EU Member State where they will be granted similar protection, and of persons having applied for international protection from the EU.
Member State which is responsible for examining their application to another EU Member State where their applications for international protection will be examined.

- **Resettlement**: The transfer, on a request from the UNHCR and based on their need for international protection, of a third-country national or stateless person, from a third country to a Member State, where they are permitted to reside with one of the following statuses:
  - refugee status within the meaning of Art. 2(d) of Directive 2011/95/EU;
  - a status which offers the same rights and benefits under national and EU law as refugee status.

- **Schengen Information System (SIS)**: An EU database, which police and consular agents consult to find out information on individuals, or goods thought to be lost or stolen.

- **Subsidiary Protection**: The protection given to a third-country-national or a stateless person who does not qualify as a refugee but in respect of whom substantial grounds have been shown for believing that the person concerned, if returned to their country of origin, or in the case of a stateless person to their country of former habitual residence, would face a real risk of suffering serious harm as defined in Art.15 of 2011/95/EU, and to whom Art.17(1) and (2) of Directive 2011/95/EU do not apply, and is unable or, owing to such risk, unwilling to avail themselves of the protection of that country.

- **(Civil) War Refugee**: A person who leaves her/his country to escape from the effects of armed conflicts (direct effects of fighting, assaults of combat troops, displacements etc.). In accordance with the EU acquis (notably Directive 2011/95/EU), such a person could be granted refugee status or subsidiary protection status, depending on the grounds on which their application is based (i.e. depending on whether they were compelled to leave as a result of fear of persecution linked to a Convention ground for persecution or serious harm in the context of indiscriminate violence).

The recent, unprecedented influx of people from the Mediterranean into Europe has been described as a “tragedy of epic of proportion”¹ by the United Nations. In the long run, such a trend can only be stopped if continuous short-term reactive measures are replaced by preemptive action to respond proportionately to this international crisis which resembles a complex cobweb. What are the root causes of this seemingly unending migration to Europe? The answer has to be multi-faceted:

- the power play between the United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the European Union (EU);
- a series of unresolved and escalating conflicts in unstable regions, such as in Syria, Northern Nigeria, Central African Republic, Sudan, Libya, amongst others.
- a lack of socio-economic progress due to the debilitating nature of living standards in some Northern and Sub-Saharan African countries.

To put it simply: Too many players, too many conflicts, too many conflicting policies.

Indeed, the European leaders will have to go an extra mile to harmonise existing conflicting policies in migration and the resettlement of refugees. The March 2016 European Union Heads of State Emergency Summit with the Republic of Turkey in Brussels on migration and refugee resettlement with its emphasis on Syrian refugees is a major leap at this point, however, the demands from both sides should be respected and diplomacy tact embraced where there are conflicting interests with regard to the implementations of those demands.
The root causes of migration can be attributed to a myriad of issues, from excessive poverty to a lack of good governance and inclusive democracy – freedom of expression, human rights issues among others, to the role played by the international community in terms of decision-making and some rogue elements in the globalised economies. The role played by NATO and the UN in Libya, for instance, shows the lack of political transition planning by the United Nations to cushion the aftermath of the supposed ‘regime change’ when they resorted to ‘military action’ to resolve the Libyan crisis. Libya had a unilateral system of governance run by Colonel Muammar Gaddafi. There was no clear structure of governance inherent in the system. Toppling this kind of system would have required not just having an immediate structured plan of action but a long-term governance architecture with a detailed political transition plan for the country. This was the proposition of the African Union which foresaw the present crisis and opted for a political solution.

Furthermore, the overarching consequence of the trajectories of conflicts (internal or external) is the primary cause for migration. These can either arise from the deprivation of resources to live on, unemployment for the growing population, lack of a sustainable policy framework to develop infrastructure for states with very weak institutions and also state leaders enmeshed in greed and corruption (as in the case of some African and Middle Eastern countries), all leading to failure in economic welfare delivery for the citizenry. The other kind of conflict is that arising from extreme cases of internal conflict (civil war), for example, Libya, Burundi, Syria, Central African Republic, Sudan, Somalia, Eritrea among others. Migration will simply become a response to these, however, those migrating from some Northern African Countries, like Morocco, Ethiopia and Algeria are seeking ‘greener pastures’, more or less wanting to live and work in an economically stable country with a well-defined standard of living.

A 2015 report by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy suggests that, “the route through the ‘Central Mediterranean’ has shifted from being used by mostly Syrian refugees to being used by migrants from Sub-Saharan and Northern African countries, including countries with internal conflicts such as Eritrea and Libya (20% of total numbers and Somalia 10%)3. Syrian and also Iraqi nationals may be entitled to subsidiary protection if they cannot be protected under the refugee status or through the right to asylum. Those travelling from Sub-Saharan and Northern African countries can be classified as ‘economic migrants’ as their reason for migrating does not meet the legal definition of political persecution. Yet these people are taking substantial risks travelling to Europe and are generally fleeing poverty and deprivation as a result of economic and social instability in states that are unable to meet their basic needs. Alexander Betts, Director of the Refugee Study Centre at the University of Oxford, has described this category of migrants as ‘survival migrants’ 4.

As a Nigerian and one who has traversed the African continent supporting democratic processes, it is my belief that Europe and the United States of America need to reassess and change the target areas of their ‘development support’ to the continent. Furthermore, only deliberate, just and long-term policy measures aimed at improving the standard of living can reduce the migration inflow to Europe. Such policies must address extreme poverty, overexploitation of resources, climate change and conflict management. From my point of view, the West has a clear moral responsibility to provide aid as it contributes to migratory pressure by being both the major consumer of resources from developing countries and the principal source of the causes of migration.

The UK’s recent commitment to spend ‘0.7% of its GNI on Official Development Assistance5 as well as Chancellor Angela Merkel’s readiness to find long-term solutions to the migratory challenges represent major steps in the right direction. However, this should not be done through half-baked ‘top down’ policies but rather take the ‘bottom top approach’. All stakeholders in the countries of origin could then be enabled to shape what kind of economic support ought to be provided this way; the middle class can be discouraged from leaving their country. As for genuinely poor citizens, migration is not an option. Development aid should shift its focus in order to address social needs, investing in job creation,
Finally, I can only reiterate the words of Kofi Annan: “In as much as European States needs to address the legitimate concerns of their citizens regarding the historic influx of migrants since last year, they cannot do so at the expense of their values, ideals and international law”. To me, these ‘values and ideals’ must translate into a paradigm shift to sustainable investment in economic growth and developing nation states’ ownership. These can be important means to help countries whose citizens are crisscrossing the dangerous Mediterranean Sea in search of ‘greener pastures’ that might not really be as ‘green’ as they seem to be. The global call for a “Marshall plan” for Africa and the Middle East could eventually be the right solution after all.

Ignatius Oli is a ZEI Fellow, “MES Class of 2016”.

References:

Supporting entrepreneurship, and strengthening institutions (e.g. educational sector, civil societies and the justice system).

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