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Europe and America
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Europe and America

For over 70 years since the end of World War II, the US and Europe have been bound together in a unique and unprecedented relationship. While there have been many times of friction, there were never doubts regarding the core foundation of this relationship. It was common practice for all US presidents to emphasize the importance of European security and prosperity to America and affirm the common values between the two. Also, the US has shown its support at every step of European integration, viewing a united Europe as good for America. Two years into the Trump presidency, relations between the US and Europe are in disarray. Like no other American president before him, Donald Trump has undermined the credibility of the US in Europe and cast severe doubts on the reliability of America as an ally. He not only lumped the EU together with Russia and China and called it a “foe”.1 He also repeatedly questioned US membership of NATO, if not the value of the organization as a whole.2 But not only that: Rhetoric has also led to policy shifts in a number of areas, which have alienated the transatlantic partners, if not brought them head-to-head.

Government officials, representatives of international organizations, foreign policy pundits, and news commentators have tried to read beyond Trump’s


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outbursts against America’s European allies: Are all these signs that the US is turning its back on Europe? And, will this be the “new American normal”\(^3\), where the US is no longer willing to lead the Western world? Or is this just an aberration in transatlantic relations under Trump and his administration?

To assess the state of the relationship between the US and Europe it is important to cut through the noise of Trump’s Twitter feeds and take a closer look at some of the policies of his administration, the issues he has raised vis-à-vis Europe, and the impact this has had on the relationship.

1. On 1 June 2017, Trump followed through on his campaign promise to withdraw from the Paris Climate Accord, calling it a “bad deal”\(^4\) which cost the US billions. The Accord had been won after a decade of negotiations where both the EU and the US under Obama played a strong role. While the US departure will not become formally effective until the end of 2020, the decision’s immediate effect was that the EU stepped up its efforts to keep the deal alive by signing a climate vision with China and Canada. It also lobbied the BRICS countries to stay committed to the Accord. Furthermore, it made clear to countries considering a withdrawal that it will not sign trade agreements with them unless they are part of the Accord.\(^5\)

Within the US, Trump’s decision was backed by his party, but has rallied state governors, mayors and business leaders in support of the Accord. So far, over 2,700 states, cities and businesses, equivalent to the size of the third largest economy in the world, have committed to the emissions goals and

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Europe and America

targets. Thus, while the US on a national level has isolated itself and lost its influence on the negotiating table over a major agreement impacting its future, commitment to the deal has at least stayed alive on the state and local level. The date the US is set to formally leave the Accord coincides with the next US presidential elections. While a different US president (especially from the Democrats) may renew the commitment, there have already been three damaging effects attributed to Trump’s withdrawal: a) US federal rollbacks have made fossil fuel investments globally more attractive again, b) the US has set a precedent for others to follow suit (Russia and Turkey have yet to ratify) or abandon measures to comply (Australia), and c) by not paying the $2 billion the US had pledged for the Green Climate Fund and developed countries’ opposition to reporting how they will scale up their financial commitments, climate finance is in the balance while distrust between developing and developed countries has grown. These effects are showing that the US plays a vital role in shaping global policies to climate change. It remains to be seen to what extent the EU and its members, in concert with other countries, can fill the void the US has left.

2. In October 2017, Trump decided to stop certifying that Iran was compliant with the 2015 nuclear deal (formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action or JCPOA), requesting a renegotiation of its terms or termination. After eight months of limbo, and in spite of intense EU lobbying, he announced the withdrawal of the US from the agreement altogether. It was not that the US had found Iran in breach of the deal. On the contrary, even Trump administration officials confirmed that Iran was abiding by it. Instead, Trump cited reasons outside the scope of the JCPOA, such as Iran’s anti-ballistic missiles program, state-sponsored terrorism, and the country’s involvement in regional conflicts including Syria, Yemen, and

6 Nathan Hultman and Paul Bodnar, “Trump tried to kill the Paris agreement, but the effect has been the opposite”, Brookings PlanetPolicy, 1 June 2018. Online at: https://www.brookings.edu/blog/planetpolicy/2018/06/01/trump-tried-to-kill-the-paris-agreement-but-the-effect-has-been-the-opposite/.

Iraq. Washington’s unilateral withdrawal and imposition of sanctions put an end to a deal that marked “perhaps the most significant success of transatlantic cooperation in the 21st century.” The European signatories of the deal, Germany, France, and the UK (also known as the E3) have since been torn between going their own way and falling in line with the US. First, while they have vowed to stay committed to the deal, and even gone head-to-head with the US by creating INSTEX – a special financial vehicle designed to continue trading with Iran outside the dollar –, they have limited its focus to humanitarian trade only, as this is not sanctioned by the US. Given that the US has threatened the exclusion of any companies continuing to do business with Iran from the US market, it is doubtful that the special purpose vehicle will get used more widely and other than by small businesses with little to no US exposure. The many major European companies that have left Iran since last May for fear of being locked out of the US market so far attests to that. Second, while the E3 cold-shouldered the US in either only sending low-level diplomats to its Middle East conference in Warsaw or leaving early, they did follow the US in demanding that Iran curb its missile program.

Finally, the EU imposed its own new sanctions on Iranian individuals tied to assassination plots and Germany banned Mahan Air, an Iranian airline connected by the US Treasury Department with supporting international terrorism. Interestingly, at the end of February 2019, as the Trump administration prepared new sanctions against Hezbollah, the UK decided to ban the Iranian-backed group in its entirety, not just its military wing. In doing so, the UK has deviated from the stance of its French and German E3 partners allowing it to target Iran indirectly. By coming around to the US’ view of Hezbollah as a terrorist organization, the UK can thus “satisfy the United States’ desire to counter Tehran’s destabilization of the Middle East […] without undermining the EU’s goal of preventing the Islamic Republic from abandoning the deal.”

Through 2019, the US is likely to increase the pressure on Iran to re-negotiate and on the E3/EU to fall in line with its approach. Although the Europeans are also not entirely satisfied with the deal, they appear to play for time, trying to balance continuing to engage with, and incentivize, Iran without deepening the rift with the US. Iran appears to stay committed for now, but it is losing confidence in the Europeans to stand up to Trump and rescue the deal.

3. Unlike any of his predecessors, Trump has not shied away from using hostile language regarding the EU. In his view, shaped by his businessman perspective, the EU “was formed to take advantage of us on trade”\textsuperscript{20} and is therefore nothing but a competitor, if not a “foe” – just like Russia and China. Fact is that with over US $ 1.1 trillion the US and the EU have the largest trade relationship worldwide.\textsuperscript{21} When looking at the import and export flows between the two, the US has a trade deficit of between US $ 101 billion and US $ 153 billion.\textsuperscript{22} This trade imbalance is why Trump believes that the US “loses” and it has therefore been his frequent target. In attacking trade with the EU, he has especially singled out Germany as the EU country with by far the largest US exports\textsuperscript{23} and the biggest beneficiary in this trade relationship.\textsuperscript{24}

Having suspended talks on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) in 2017, Trump started taking measures regarding trade in early 2018, risking a trade war. In his view, “trade wars are good and easy to win”.\textsuperscript{25} Without involving Congress and violating WTO rules, Trump imposed a 25 % tariff on steel and 10 % tariff on aluminum imports on 23 March 2018 citing “national security”. While the EU was originally exempted, the tariffs also became effective in Europe on 1 June 2018.

\textsuperscript{23} Office of the United States Trade Representative, European Union. Online at: https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/europe-middle-east/europe/european-union.
\textsuperscript{25} @realDonaldTrump, 2 March 2018 2:50 AM. Online at: https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/969525362580484098?lang=en.
Although economists urged restraint, the EU reacted in line with the WTO Agreement on Safeguards by suspending trade concessions on certain steel imports as well as select goods roughly equal to the amount that the US tariffs on steel and aluminum incur on EU countries. Duties were especially raised on products manufactured in Republican-run or critical swing states, such as bourbon whiskey, orange juice, tobacco, peanut butter, motorbikes, and jeans. Meanwhile, Trump also threatened to raise the tariff on European cars from currently 2.5% to 20%, eying Germany in particular, whose automobile industry would be hit hardest. In a meeting between Trump and EU Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker at the end of July 2018, the two sides reached a “semi-truce”. Neither backed down from the existing tariffs, but Trump backed off from introducing car tariffs while the EU conceded to buy more soybeans and liquefied natural gas. The two also vowed to work toward an agreement on “zero tariffs, zero non-tariff barriers, and zero subsidies on non-auto industrial goods”, drawing criticism that the EU reneged on the pledge that it would only discuss trade agreements with countries that are signatories of the Paris Climate Accord while also


27 WTO Council for Trade in Goods and Committee on Safeguards, Immediate Notification under Article 12.5 of the Agreement on Safeguards to the Council for Trade in Goods of proposed suspension of concessions and other obligations referred to in Paragraph 2 of Article 8 of the Agreement on Safeguards, G/L/1237, G/SG/N/12/EU/1, 18 May 2018. Online at: http://docs.dpaq.de/13629-eu-anmeldung_der_m_glichen_veregeltungsz_lle_bei_der_wto.pdf.


29 Europe currently imposes a tariff of 10% on cars imported from the US. Ewing, 21 June 2018.


igniting hope that TTIP could be revived.\textsuperscript{32} Both sides also agreed to pursue reform of the WTO, address unfair trading practices, forced technology transfer and industrial subsidies.\textsuperscript{33}

While the trade conflict continued into 2019, Trump’s goal of reducing the US trade deficit with the EU has so far backfired.\textsuperscript{34} Also, as companies such as Harley-Davidson started to consider transferring some of their production abroad, his “America First” agenda has come under threat.\textsuperscript{35} US soybean producers, on the other hand, have had reason to cheer. Their imports to the EU have increased 112\% in the second half of 2018 and are likely to increase further if the EU authorizes soybean use for biofuel.\textsuperscript{36} The increased soybean trade is important as the EU has effectively stepped in to replace China, which cut its US soybean imports as a result of its trade war with the US. Furthermore, with its WTO filing on 2 January 2019 for the extension of its provisional safeguard measures on steel imports from all trading partners, the EU appears to have signaled that it supports “a broader US policy agenda to bargain hard vis-à-vis China within the multilateral system”.\textsuperscript{37}

As of March 2019, talks between the US Trade Representative and EU Trade Commissioner have remained stuck in disagreement about the issues to negotiate. While the EU only wants to discuss tariffs on industrial goods and


\textsuperscript{33} Wemer, 26 July 2018.


\textsuperscript{37} Matthews, 9 January 2019.
easing the conformity assessment of technical standards, the US insists on including agriculture as well. It is unclear when talks will resume given that the European Parliament has rejected opening trade talks on March 14th, and some EU member countries prefer to wait until the end of May, when elections to the European Parliament are over.\textsuperscript{38} Meanwhile, time is running out before Trump has to decide on the imposition of car tariffs on May 18th which, in spite of intense warnings from the US automotive industry, have become a real possibility.\textsuperscript{39}

Aside from starting a trade conflict, Trump has also sought to sow division within the EU and stoke anti-EU sentiments within its member states. Whereas previous presidents wanted the UK in Europe to expedite trade into continental Europe and counter any actions by EU members that were against US interests, Trump repeatedly said he favored Brexit.\textsuperscript{40} His reasons appear threefold: First, Brexiteers – like his supporters – have voted to take back sovereignty over their country and its borders. Second, Brexit may boost US leverage to claim economic concessions from a weakened EU. Third, it opens the potential for a bilateral trade agreement with the UK.\textsuperscript{41} In addition to getting involved in the Brexit debate, Trump also sympathized with far-right parties during national election campaigns in France and Germany as he saw an overlap of their goals and his anti-immigrant views. For the same reason, he has been praising Eastern European autocrats in Hungary and Poland as well as the populist government in Italy for their tough migration and refugee policies. The leaders of Hungary and Italy also


share Trump’s disdain for the EU and admiration for Vladimir Putin, and agree with him that sanctions against Russia should be lifted. In this climate, Europeans have become “unsure of whom to talk to in Washington”\textsuperscript{42} and none of the leaders of America’s key European allies has struck up a meaningful relationship with Trump.

The election of Trump caused a significant increase in the EU’s popularity in Europe immediately after November 2016.\textsuperscript{43} However, the arduous Brexit negotiations, and disputes among EU members over sovereignty and migration (all issues that Trump has added his voice to), have weakened the EU and its cohesiveness.\textsuperscript{44} While initiatives for a new “European renewal”\textsuperscript{45} are very laudable, the reality is that EU members have also turned more inward and become more parochial. The outcome of the upcoming elections to the European Parliament will provide a good indication of where Europe is headed. That said, the current US administration is likely to maintain its narrow and protectionist economic focus vis-à-vis the EU and try to use any cracks among its members to its advantage.

4. By repeatedly calling NATO obsolete and even threatening to leave the organization, Trump has raised doubts over the last two years whether the US would honor Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and come to the defense of an ally under attack.\textsuperscript{46} His rhetoric always came with a scolding that the European allies, and particularly Germany, were not spending enough for


their defense as well as the insistence that they meet NATO’s target of spending 2 % of GDP (without saying that the goal is set for 2024). While Defense Secretary Mattis also repeatedly urged European allies to increase their defense spending, he was always clear in affirming the US administration’s commitment to the Alliance. In Congress, Trump’s disregard for NATO caused senators from both parties to twice sponsor a bill seeking to prevent any US president from withdrawing from the alliance without two-thirds approval in the Senate.47

And in spite of his more recent reassurance that the US “will be with NATO 100 %”,48 the House of Representatives also passed a bill with overwhelming bipartisan support prohibiting the use of federal funds to leave the organization.49

Trump has not followed up his rhetoric with a reduced US engagement in Europe. He affirmed the commitment of the US to the defense efforts of the Baltic states and Poland, where the US leads NATO’s multinational battalion.50


During his presidency, funding for the European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) has gone from US $ 3.4 billion in 2017 to US $ 4.8 billion in 2018 and US $ 6.5 billion in 2019.\(^1\) As part of the EDI, Operation Atlantic Resolve was significantly strengthened in early 2017 when the first rotational brigade transferred to Europe with tanks and armored vehicles.\(^2\) The US has now the biggest contingent of tanks and fighting equipment in Europe since the end of the Cold War\(^3\) and NATO appears “stronger, more agile, and more engaged”.\(^4\) US criticisms over their military expenditure have led to increases in European allies’ defense budgets and six are spending 2 percent or more of GDP in 2019 (compared to three in 2017). The spending increases in the Baltic states and Poland may however primarily be attributable to their concerns over Russian military aggression.\(^5\)


Europe and America

members appear on track to meet the goal by 2024, the latest German financial plans mean that Germany will remain far below it.56

Trump’s wavering commitment to NATO’s Article 5, has also sparked debates on the EU’s own defense. Following the NATO and G7 summits in 2017, German Chancellor Angela Merkel famously called on the Europeans to take their fate into their own hands57 while her Foreign Minister Heiko Maas said that “our common response to ‘America First’ today must be ‘Europe United’!”58 Merkel has so far failed to spell out what her words actually mean.59 Maas on the other hand has added at least some substance to his “Europe United” calling for “a balanced partnership” and the creation of “a new alliance of multilateralists” to “form a counterweight when the US crosses red lines”.60 More boldly, the French president Emmanuel Macron has proposed a “European Intervention Initiative” that envisages the assembly of troops from willing partners that can be deployed pragmatically, depending on demand and outside of the decision-making processes of the EU and NATO.61 In November 2018, he went as far as calling for a “true European army” to make Europe autonomous from the US and allow Europeans to protect themselves “with respect to China, Russia and even the

60  Buras and Janning, December 2018, p. 10.
In contrast to these multilateral approaches, Poland, reassured by the continuing engagement of the US in Eastern Europe, has accepted that “Trump has fundamentally changed the way that international politics works” and concluded that it “needs to adapt to this new reality”. As a result, it has sought to strengthen its bilateral bonds with the US and signed a declaration on a US-Polish strategic partnership. It is also seeing any European initiatives as complementing NATO. Finally, while the UK has always been a strong proponent of NATO, and therefore been skeptical of EU defense and security initiatives, British Prime Minister Theresa May sought a “deep and special partnership” between the UK and the EU post-Brexit to ensure continued security coordination.

In spite of these differences among the European allies, Trump’s ambiguity has led to a number of new European defense initiatives designed to make Europe more strategically autonomous from the US: 1) In December 2017, 25 EU member states – except Denmark, Malta, and the UK – agreed on a new defense cooperation. The Permanent Structured Cooperation, or PESCO, includes commitments and specific projects to harmonize defense, pool resources, build up faster response forces, and improve intelligence exchanges. 2) In June 2018, nine EU member countries – including the UK – signed an agreement to build a crisis intervention force. As this initiative

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63 Buras and Janning, December 2018, pp. 10 and 12.


Europe and America

is outside the EU, it allows for full involvement of the UK even after Brexit.66

3) In November 2018, the European Parliament voted in favor of the European Defense Fund which, if approved by the Council, will provide 13 billion Euros for collaborative defense research and development projects for new technologies and equipment.67

While growing doubts over American commitment have led to promising new European initiatives, the last two years have also laid bare considerable differences within Europe when it comes to a common defense. And when (or if?) Britain leaves the EU, military spending of the remaining European allies will be a mere 20% compared to the combined spending of the US, Canada, and the UK.68 Europe will remain dependent on the US for its security and US leadership in moving NATO forward. While Trump has given up “strong, principled leadership”69 of NATO, officials in his administration, as well as Congress, have shown that the US is not abdicating its role in Europe.

5. While European allies could feel assured with previous presidents that the US would have their security interests at heart in dealing with Russia, Trump has caused unease, if not fear, that his meetings with Putin could lead to concessions impacting their security and domestic stability.


69 Lute and Burns, p. 2.
These fears are grounded in Trump’s fondness of the Russian leader, his as yet unclear private interests and entanglements in Russia, and his repeated denials of Russian meddling in the 2016 US presidential elections.\(^70\) Also, in causing disunion within NATO and the EU, and starting a transatlantic trade conflict, Trump has played into Russia’s hands and helped further its designs to dismantle the transatlantic alliance and the rules-based international order.\(^71\) Even though he called Russia a “foe”, he appeared ready to leave the field to it (and Iran) in Syria with his announced pull-back,\(^72\) has suggested re-admitting the country into the G7 in spite of the ongoing conflict in Ukraine,\(^73\) and has been waverling between punishing Russia and letting it get away with its behavior with his sanctions policy on the country.\(^74\)

With his views and approach on Russia, Trump has not been in sync with officials in his own administration and Congress.\(^75\) During his 2-year tenure, former Defense Secretary Mattis was unequivocal in condemning Russia for attempting to redraw international borders by force and in pushing back

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Europe and America

against Russia. He was also instrumental in getting Trump to approve the sale of defensive lethal weapons to Ukraine. Likewise, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo has strongly condemned Russia’s aggressive behavior since coming to office at the end of April 2018, and insisted that Crimea must be returned to Ukraine. He also called for increasing US engagement in Central and Eastern Europe.

In the last 2 years, legislators from both parties passed various resolutions a) condemning Russian aggression in Ukraine and urging the US government to take action; b) emphasizing the need for transparency regarding meetings between Trump and Putin, and c) demanding to hold Russia accountable for its election interference in 2016. More specifically, in August 2017, Congress passed legislation, known as Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), with an overwhelming bipartisan majority, imposing new sanctions on Russia for its cyber activities, election interference and intervention in Syria while also preventing Trump from scaling back existing measures.

On 12 March 2019, the House of Representatives passed legislation prohibiting the US government to recognize the Russian annexation of the Crimean peninsula and on the 13th it passed a bill urging the government to

investigate Putin’s wealth and links to corruption and money laundering.83 Furthermore, in the Kremlin Act, the House is seeking National Intelligence assessments on a) potential Russian military action against NATO members, b) potential Russian responses to US and NATO military presence in eastern Europe and US support for allies and partners in the region, and c) potential areas where Russia could “exploit weaknesses and divisions among the governments of its Western adversaries”.84

Congressional activities and new initiatives such as these, together with the steadying voices and policies of some of his cabinet members, have provided a moderating effect on Trump’s views on Russia. They have also helped allaying some of Europe’s fears, especially in the Baltics and Poland, where the threat perception of Russia is acute and a stronger US response is desired.85 However, a more recent decision of the Trump administration vis-à-vis Russia is playing with fire with European security. This concerns Trump’s announcement in February 2019 to withdraw from the INF Treaty in August if Russia does not verifiably destroy the ground-based mid-range cruise missiles it covertly produced within the next six months.86 While NATO issued a statement agreeing with the US assessment that Russia violated the treaty,87 many European allies, fearing the start of an arms race, would have preferred the US not to serve notice and continue attempts at bringing Russia back into compliance by staying itself committed. Since it first announced its intent to withdraw back in October 2018, they had urged the US to continue the dialogue with Russia, but did not come up with

specific suggestions as to how to get it to comply. Meanwhile, the EU (which includes six members that are not in NATO) has not managed to produce a joint statement on the issue of its own. Moreover, the renewed discussions about the INF Treaty, and the implications of its potential collapse, have brought to the fore the significant differences between the European allies on how to achieve European security. While Poland appears supportive of deploying American missiles in Europe, this is complete anathema to Germany whose foreign minister is holding out hope for a new multilateral arms control treaty. Given this and other disunities over the treaty within Europe, and the fact that the US has also harbored intentions to start building land-based mid-range missiles again to counter China, it is unlikely that the treaty will survive.

The fallout for relations between the US and Europe will be immense if this leads to a new arms race on the European continent. A new treaty, if ever there is one, will take years to negotiate, especially as it will need to include more countries with nuclear arsenals to have any meaning in an international environment that has significantly changed since the INF Treaty was concluded in 1987. Meanwhile, Europe will need to start speaking with one voice and work out its differences over deterrence, missile defense, and an increase of conventional forces. As with NATO, the Russia approach and policy of the US has presented a paradox. For all his coziness with Putin,
Trump so far had to largely go along with measures devised by his cabinet members, or in Congress, that countered Russian military aggression and its cyber activities. At the same time, the rifts the Trump administration’s Russia policy caused with Europe have put into starker relief Europe’s own divisions regarding how to deal with Russia.

For the last two years, Europe’s relations with the US have been almost continuously stress-tested by Trump and his administration. As a result, the two sides have become estranged and alienated in key areas of common interest and cooperation. While the problem of “transatlantic divergence” was there before Trump, it had a different quality. With Trump, a new way of doing foreign policy arrived in the White House that upended old principles, the concept of alliances, and the meaning of treaties. Before Trump, a core pillar of American internationalism was the idea that US foreign policy should be a positive-sum endeavor whereas in Trump’s view, international relations are zero-sum. With such a competitive approach, strength is important and existing alliances do not matter for their own sake. Unilateralism is a preference, but leadership in the international arena is not necessarily abandoned.

In focusing on his “America First” agenda, Trump has not advocated retreat, but purely emphasized narrower US interests: a strong military backed up by a strong economy. In terms of his policies, this has meant giving up leadership in areas that do not fit the agenda (climate change), but continuing to stay at the helm of NATO. It has also meant that categories of allies and rivals become blurred: old allies can be seen more as competitors (trade conflict with the EU), they may be treated less favorably (demands to pay more for defense), they may be played against each other (sowing division in Europe), and joint agreements with them can be walked away from if they are seen as a constraint (Paris Accord, threatening European security by

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96 See also Brands, 2018, p. 85.
walking away from the INF Treaty) or a better deal may be had (Iran). Likewise, it has meant that ideology, a shared history, long held values, and a rules-based order all matter less, if at all. Finally, it has meant being more uncompromising, less diplomatic, and taking unilateral decisions where needed to get the deal done.

So, what does this mean for Europe and the US in the medium-to-long term, the time after the next presidential elections in 2020, when a new president might enter the White House, or the ones in 2024 at the latest? As many observers have pointed out, Trump is part of a wider backlash against the effects of globalization highlighting “the growing sense that American internationalism has become unmoored from American nationalism”.97 This development started in the Bush era and intensified in the following elections resulting in an America “ever increasingly inward-looking” and “less willing to compromise in the interests of alliance politics.”98 While transatlantic relations are bigger than any sitting president,99 things will not return to what is perceived by the European allies as the “old normal”. Put bluntly, the “Atlantic alliance as we know it is dead”.100 Trump is extreme, and a lot will depend whether his manner of doing foreign policy proves effective, and if future presidents will therefore adopt and extend it, or whether they will revert to more traditional approaches. Meanwhile, the European allies should not sit on the sidelines, but work on overcoming their internal divisions, take on more of the responsibilities, and commit to a more equal partnership.101

97 Brands, 2018, p. 96.

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Europe and America
