


**Obituary: A great loss for Europe -
Zoran Djindjic did not die in vain**

Europe, and moreover his Serbian fatherland, is mourning the loss of a great personality. I am mourning the loss of a friend over many years. I will never forget my first encounter with Zoran Djindjic. It took place on November 7, 1989 in Wolfenbüttel, where both of us attended an academic conference in the famous „Herzog August Library“... We were young scholars and proud to talk about human rights to a seminar which included famous scholars like Jeanne Hersch and Leszek Kolakowski.

Late into the night, Zoran Djindjic and I discussed the escalating situation in communist Europe. The wall in Berlin, he was sure, would fall soon, followed by the fall of artificial communist states such as the GDR, the Soviet Union and his home Yugoslavia. This might well lead to trouble and violence, most of all in Yugoslavia, he said. To my great astonishment, Djindjic insisted that the worst turn of events would occur in Yugoslavia, „because we are the most immoral people in Europe“.

When I asked him to explain his astonishing remark, he said that nowhere else the historical fault lines of the Ottoman and the Austro-Hungarian empires, with ingredients of Venetian Catholicism and Russian Orthodoxy are so evident. As long as Tito kept the whole country together with the promise of economic well being, stability was possible. In times of trouble, however, the exploitation of divergent identities could escalate easily, because hardly anybody would be stabilized through a strong and yet non-aggressive identity.

Such a development could split families apart, which used to live together in the best of harmony in spite of their cultural and religious differences. No modern European identity would exist so far in Yugoslavia to absorb the forces of evil, which could easily unleash soon. He explained to me the behavioural differences between Northerners and Southerners in his country, based on ligatures, which date back to the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian past. He gave moving examples of intra-Yugoslavian quarrels among „Mafiosi“ of all sorts, which were even present in the Germany of the 1980s. With hindsight knowledge, Zoran Djindjic's assessment of November 1989 did not only come true in the most dramatic way. Its consequences did kill this most impressive, intelligent, charming and courageous man.

Zoran Djindjic has become

the martyr of the struggle for freedom, democracy and European integration in Serbia, the most difficult heartland of South Eastern Europe. To visit him in the Prime Ministers office in Belgrade meant to pass long corridors heavily protected and observed by bodyguards. Yet, in the midst of a most unnatural atmosphere - the buildings around his office being bombed during the Kosovo air raids - stood this unique man in full daily swing. Busy schedules, an overload of paper work at his desk, never ending telephone calls and streams of visitors could not undermine his concentration and commitment to work in sober perspective for a European Serbia. Quiet, resting in his intellectual strength and will-

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power, committed to a long march with many daily challenges, relaxed and yet in full control of the complex and complicated circumstances in which he stood, Zoran Djindjic remained himself. An icon of hope for Serbia and the idea of good in public life for the whole of Europe. A hero who maintained the most exceptional balance between strong intellectual clarity and depth on the one hand and impressive managerial skills on the other.

He was fully aware that to be a European meant to live a European life-style and not only to express a European rhetoric, as he once told me. He described his country as a mixture of Central Europe and, in regard to the high public depth, Africa.

It was always obvious that his strong mind did not only generate friendship among his own people. He was always sharp, fast, dialectic and deeply committed to the overall goal of bringing a legal state to Serbia and thus bringing Serbia into Europe. His only regret in the midst of any busy day: not having enough time for his family and his two young children.

He knew the price of his struggle for freedom only too well. He even knew that his life was endangered. Yet he kept walking his path of destiny, which set a most impressive sign of courage in his country and for the whole of Europe after a century of ideological seduction and political violence. It had to be an anti-ideological intellectual who

buried the last ideological regime in Europe. Such a man, non-ideological, anti-ideological and yet full of passion for pluralism, liberty and Europe was Zoran Djindjic. At the end, the vulgar forces of hate and crime killed him before he could fully achieve his mission. But Serbia has achieved a great deal to get a European face after a decade of perverse violence and ideological hate. In spite of all shortcomings and new uncertainties: Serbia's European face is and it will always remain the face of Zoran Djindjic.

On March 12, 1998, to the day five years before his coward assassination in front of his office in Belgrade, Zoran Djindjic spoke at the Center for European Integration Studies in Bonn. I was deeply enthusiastic about the visit by this courageous opponent of Milosevic, because I wanted to demonstrate to a huge German audience that Europe cannot be complete without a Europeanized Serbia and without Europe recognizing Serbia as an indispensable part of it. His analysis of the forces that determined the Balkan past was well thought through, clear and honest. After the break down of contesting empires, after failed communism, artificial nation-state formation and perverted nationalism, the problem of integration remained the key challenge for his home region: internal integration in a non exclusive way and European integration without destroying national identities. He concluded his fascinating lecture with an emotional message to his attentive audience at the premises of ZEI:

„We in the Balkans are part of Europe, and Europe is not completed without the Balkans. If you have a difficult child in your family, you will have to deal with that child more than with the nice and easy ones, whether you like it or not. This might be unjust, but it is the reality. Please think about the pan-European question and the

role of the Balkans in it even when the media do not report about it. Not only an acute crisis shall generate reflections about the Balkans. We are part of your life as it has been developing over the past twelve centuries. Since the different tribes started to settle our region, our and your destiny in the rest of Europe have become one. This is my message. Please think also of us once we will have resolved the most pressing problems and once we will become a normal member of Europe. May be we will then need even more support as ever.“

This assessment has become true after the fall of Milosevic - which happened thanks to the courage and commitment of Zoran Djindjic and his friends. This has become true in a world in which Serbia has begun to develop a normal European face - thanks to Zoran Djindjic and his commitment to democracy and the rule of law. This remains true more than ever after the horrible assassination of Zoran Djindjic. Europe will remain incomplete without Serbia and Serbia will remain obliged to pursue Zoran Djindjic's vision of becoming a normal European state in a normal European region. The words and the deeds of this most European of political leaders the Balkans have seen so far will remain the guiding star for all those who mean well for Serbia and fEurope as a whole.

Prof. Dr. Ludger Kühnhardt,
Director, ZEI

The full text of the presentation of Djindjic at ZEI was printed in Zoran Djindjic: Serbiens Zukunft in Europa, ZEI Discussion Paper C10/1998 (www.zei.de).

Enlargement after Enlargement – the Future of the Accession Process

It was an elevating picture: the enlarged European family of the future 25 members, represented by their Heads of State and Government, celebrating one of the indeed historic achievements of post Cold War history: the signing of the Accession Protocol by the ten candidates from former Soviet dominated Eastern Europe, thus sealing a ten year period of eastward enlargement of the European Union. Beneath the Acropolis, they evoked one of the major roots of European

identity, the ancient Greek heritage.

However, for many spectators this harmony somehow contradicted reality: Did not at the same time the Iraq war split this family apart and endanger its very foundation as never before? Others shied at the sheer perspective of having so many statesmen trying to find common ground on issues of vital national interest, recognizing for the first time just how many members this family photo revealed who tried to find a place around the enlarged European Council meeting for the first time in Athens.

Evoking history surely is much easier than

managing a future which is uncertain by definition. True, everything appears to run smoothly up to now. Just before the Copenhagen Summit in December, the major stumbling blocs could be removed: the second Irish referendum allowed the Nice Treaty to come into force as a formal pre-requisite for enlargement; EU members finally agreed on a common position concerning the future of CAP and the structural funds, though placing before the candidates a "take it or leave it" position; the EU and Russia could solve

their dispute on the transit modalities to Kaliningrad; and in Slovakia the elections did not return Meciar to power. In Copenhagen, some final nasty bickering, provoked especially by the Polish side, took place; however, it could not really stop the process "from Copenhagen to Copenhagen". Now, as the referenda and ratification procedures have started, still the train appears to be on track: in Malta, Slovenia and Hungary the electorate voted in favour of accession, the European Parliament gave its assent and the Treaty could be signed as planned in Athens on April, 16. Only the low voter turnout in Hungary (45 per cent) and the break-up of the last-minute Cyprus negotiations due to the intransigence of Denktasch were setbacks. Politicians muster strong will when push comes to shove.

For many, after Copenhagen and Athens the enlargement process is almost completed. Political attention is already shifting elsewhere. However, the hurdles ahead should not be underestimated. The instability of the whole process is striking. Three aspects merit attention: the ratification process until the actual accession on May 1, 2004; the target date 2007 for Bulgaria and Romania; and the "rendezvous clause" for Turkey, postponing a decision on this invitation until the end of 2004.

The ratification process

Each EU parliament and the European Parliament will have to ratify the Accession Protocol. One veto can stop the whole process. Some critical questions will be asked by all parliaments (costs of enlargement, effect on unemployment, future capacity to act of the Union), others by individual countries (Benes decrees, Temelin, immigration etc.). Backdrops should be expected if for example in such sensitive sectors like food safety, nuclear energy or pollution, serious, potentially trans-national disruptions occur. Unfortunately, public opinion in the EU is hardly prepared for enlargement. No serious public debate has taken place on the issue. Especially in Germany and France the number of critics is considerable. All in all uncertainty, scepticism and diffuse anxieties are prevailing, paired with a feeling that this process is anyway inevitable.

Also, ratification will have to take place in all accession countries. A negative vote will stop the accession for the respective country, as happened with Norway in 1995. Some of

the most risky referenda are still ahead. In several accession countries like in Estonia or Latvia there is no majority in favour of enlargement according to Eurobarometer polls. Public information campaigns have hardly taken place in most countries. The number of undecided is noticeable, making the public mood vulnerable to demagogues and extreme oscillation of sentiment. Disillusionment has risen, due to the social costs of transformation (poverty, lay-offs, loss of subsidies), the long duration of the enlargement process and unrealistic rhetoric by politicians from all sides. Critical questions will be asked in these parliaments, too: about the closure of whole industries and further unemployment, about the sell-out of land to foreigners, about direct subsidies to peasants, and overall about the tendency to treat the accession candidates as "second-rate citizens".

The Irish referendum on Nice vividly demonstrated once again the uncertainties of such a process. In the first attempt, the government hardly campaigned before, leaving the opposition ample room to attack the referendum. The second attempt saw the government more resolute, but the debate concentrated on completely different issues, especially the deep crisis of confidence the Irish government had fallen into and the feared loss of neutrality. Thus, the enlargement process can still derail before May 2004, at least in individual countries.

Uncertainties for 2007

More serious are the quiet doubts of those who question whether the EU will have another round of enlargement already in 2007. Looking at the Copenhagen Communiqué, the EU has formulated a carefully drafted text, which leaves the major responsibility with the governments in Sofia and Bucharest, avoiding to commit itself in advance. A decision would have to be taken already in 2005, in order to leave enough time for treaty drafting and ratification.

This is hardly a realistic target date, for several reasons. Firstly, Romania will have a very hard time to finish the many still open chapters of the Acquis so rapidly, Bulgaria less. Both of them are partners of secondary significance compared to Poland or Hungary for most EU governments. As after the Madrid invitations of NATO in 1997, the interest in the whole process will dwindle for a certain time.

Secondly, nobody can foresee how the enlargement of ten countries in 2004, which is without precedent, will affect the entire structure and decision-making of the Union. Most analysts expect the effect to be much more profound than today admitted: the area of the Union will increase by 30 per cent, the population by 75 million, the GDP will shrink by 16 per cent, unemployment will rise and the agricultural sector increase significantly. The working mechanisms of the EU organs will change, the composition of the organs will expand considerably, the markets will adapt. Also, some divisive questions are left open: the incorporation in the CAP will take place successively until 2013, 190 transition measures will have to come to an end, and the inclusion in the Schengen system and the Euro zone will have to be managed.



Athen, April 16: the signing ceremony

Thirdly, the new members will themselves have to bear the consequences of accession. The more complications occur, the more second thoughts will arise concerning Bulgaria and Romania. The more smoothly the process turns out, the better for both.

Finally, the EU will have major projects to tackle in the next two or three years which will command full attention: the European Convention and the subsequent Intergovernmental Conference with the aim of reaching consensus on the future architecture and competences of the Union; the European Security and Defence Policy after the devastating effects of the Iraq war; the quarrel in 2005, with the new members now as full participants, on the budget 2006-2013. Bulgaria and Romania do not really fit into this agenda, to say the least. The temptation to wait for countries like Croatia or even Turkey might be substantial, also in order to have a more compact round given the bureaucratic efforts this involves.

Turkey - identity and scope of a future Union

Turkey will remain at the center of debate, with a new climax to be expected before the next envisioned decision in late 2004, with Cyprus figuring prominently. Everyone will once again hope then that the chalice will pass by. However, this state of affairs is not durable in the long run. The lack of clear direction, the wavering and staggering in this process is striking. The evolution since Turkey's association treaty in 1963 has been full of contradictions and dishonesties. The number of dedicated proponents of this process is small in the EU, also in Turkey itself, but since the Helsinki Summit in 1999 when Turkey was awarded the candidate status it all seemed to be so far away. The debate on whether the country should really join the Union started only afterwards, with the Commission remaining sceptical and the German government now spectacularly switching sides. All the time, the signals to Ankara indicated it would only be a question of time until the invitation is extended; yet internally a fundamental debate on the Turkish membership perspective started. Everyone knows, with the invitation to accede to the Union the Rubicon would be crossed.

At stake is much more than just human rights in Turkey, civil control of

the military, or the Western orientation of the country. At stake is the final geographic scope of the Union. Turkey will set the pace. This is why a profound debate is so absolutely necessary which cannot be pushed aside by simplistic arguments about Christianity versus Islam. Inviting Turkey means including a country with less than 10 per cent of its territory on European soil, which was for many centuries not perceived as part of the European culture, which is bordering trouble spots like Iraq, Iran and Syria.

Up until 1989 the final scope of the at that time EC was pre-determined by geography and politics: the Atlantic in the West, the Mediterranean in the South, the Barent Sea in the North, the Iron Curtain in the East. The fall of the Berlin Wall shattered this worldview and opened up a vast landmass in the east for NATO and EU enlargement. Thus, the entire coordinate system for the enlargement process has been revolutionized. Up to now, the EU has not really grasped the consequences of this process and formulated a coherent response. Four answers seem to be possible: To define Europe as a Christian-occidental entity, the landmass where Reformation, Enlightenment and Renaissance took place - which would be the smallest common denominator for a future EU; to take the geographic borders of Europe as

guidelines - which would incorporate Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia, though with a question mark concerning Russia and uncertain borders in the Caucasus; to take criteria of balance of power - which would hardly allow for Russia to be invited into the EU; or to make stability transfer the prior benchmark for the future of the enlargement process - which would allow, following American interest, an enlargement not only to Turkey but also in the Caucasus.

It would be wise if Europe would start a discussion in earnest on this question of identity for the EU: What do we have in common? What makes us different from others? What do we want to keep? Without such a debate, the risks are considerable that the EU will end in an OSCE-like shape of maximum membership, however accompanied by widening differentiation, with centers of gravity, a risk of marginalizing the smaller members and subsequently growing friction. The alternative would be to limit future membership according to one of the concepts mentioned above, and to complement this, as proposed by the Commission already in 1993, by creating different levels of association with the new neighbours and a pragmatic, varying cooperation on topics of trans-national interest.

Dr. Rafael Biermann, ZEI

Assessment of the Stabilisation and Association Process

Despite new global challenges the EU is more substantially engaged in the Balkans than ever before. However, new political priorities, financial constraints, and the expected implications of EU enlargement require a thorough re-conceptualisation of its strategies and goals. The Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP) serves as the centrepiece of the Union's long-term strategy for stabilisation and approximation of the Western Balkans. But since Croatia has, in February 2003, officially applied for EU membership, this unified strategic approach toward the region needs to be adapted to the new circumstances.

The SAP aims at the five South Eastern European countries which are, since the Feira European Council in June 2000, considered „potential members“ of the Union, i.e. Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia-Montenegro and Macedonia. At the Zagreb summit in November 2000, the EU confirmed the goal of gradual integration of the Balkans into Europe and set the seal on the SAP.

The centrepiece of the SAP is the conclusion of a Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA). It is supported by an assistance programme (CARDS), aiming at achieving progress towards the requirements of EU membership.

The SAA represents the commitment to complete a formal association with the EU over a transition period. The EU signed the first SAA agreement with Macedonia in April 2001, and with Croatia in October 2001. However, these agreements have not yet been ratified by all EU member states and have thus not yet come into force. Only the Interim Agreements, covering trade and trade-related measures that were concluded in parallel with the SAA, have already taken effect.

Prospects for other countries are gloomy: Only Albania has started negotiations early this year, while the remaining countries are still at a much earlier stage of the process. Sarajevo still needs to work on fulfilling the obligations of a „road map“ in order to qualify for a feasibility study.

In Serbia-Montenegro a Consultative Task Force (CTF) has been established; however progress is hampered by unresolved issues such as creating conditions for a common market and unified tariff and monetary systems. Whether or not Kosovo, which legally forms part of Serbia-Montenegro, will be included in the SAP still needs to be decided.

Commentators have presented different views with regard to the potential merits of the SAP. The advocates of the process stress the SAP's ability to draw the countries of the region closer to the EU by the gradual implementation of a free trade area and reforms designed to achieve the adoption of EU standards. Countries in the region have, however, voiced concerns that the SAAs would simply turn into an instrument to keep the SEE countries out of the European integration process. This paper argues that there is a dangerous tendency to overestimate the potentials of the SAP, that it would need to be developed in

certain areas and complemented by additional tools. In a nutshell, the accession process is no panacea for state-building, conflict resolution, and economic growth. First, the SAP is a long-term policy aimed at structural reforms, which underpin membership of the Union and strengthen capabilities to implement an SAA. The emphasis is thus on activities such as harmonising trade policies, improving border management, and building administrative capacity. The basic assumption is that by setting the frame for structural change the resolution of political issues will naturally follow. Instead, urgent problems, such as ethnic conflicts or security dangers, require immediate and targeted action, which goes beyond the aims and means of the SAP. In Macedonia, for instance, where SAP conditions had

European Commission:
Second Annual Report,
Brussels, March 26, 2003,
see: [www.europa.eu.int/
comm/external-relations/
see/sap/rep2/index.htm](http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/external-relations/see/sap/rep2/index.htm)

W. van Meurs/A. Yannis,
The European Union and
the Balkans,
Center for Applied Policy
Research, Sept. 2002
see: [www.cap.uni-
muenchen.de](http://www.cap.uni-muenchen.de)

been thoroughly reviewed, violent conflict broke out shortly after the country signed the SAA. In the first annual report on the SAP the Commission therefore acknowledges that this instrument „has not cured the region of many of its pressing political, economic and social problems“.

Second, with regard to the SAP, Southeast European aspirants face a structural dilemma: The SAAs draw heavily on the Europe Agreements with the candidate countries, and the experience of the enlargement process. Emphasis is on meeting EU standards and harmonising with EU policies which underpin membership of the Union - an approach which may be well suited for established market economies, but less appropriate for the conflict ridden, institutionally weak and economically less developed countries in the Balkans. They are in great need to implement immediate policies to bring about sustainable economic growth, rather than laying the foundations for EU standards at the first

place. It should be noted that higher financial assistance to the region will not solve the problem, as some analysts have claimed. Already now, up to two thirds of available European funding cannot be translated into concrete projects because of institutional weaknesses and limited absorptive capacity of the recipients. While financial support is crucial to any reform process in the region, evidence does not point toward larger assistance but toward far more efficient and targeted use of resources.

Thirdly, the SAP lacks a substantial regional dimension. Although the Zagreb summit has concluded that „rapprochement with EU will go hand in hand with this process of developing regional cooperation“, each country is expected to progress at its own pace (regatta principle), and the requirements of trans-border cooperation as a condition for an SAA remain vague. Moreover, although the SAP is conceived of being „both bilateral and regional“, it has played a limited role in promoting cross-border cooperation. Only 10 per cent of the CARDS appropriation is dedicated to regional instead of national projects under individual country strategies. Lack of communication and an inherent struggle over competencies have so far prevented a coherent division of labour with other processes, such as the Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe. Basically, the Commission is of the view that „The Stability Pact has an important role to play ... in complementing and reinforcing the SAP“, rather than seeing the two processes as potentially complementary and mutually reinforcing instruments. Much more needs to be done in order to stimulate co-operation among SEE countries, for instance by increasing the financial appropriation for regional programming in CARDS.

Fourth, the SAP is not coherently linked with the enlargement process. The EU has so far refused to answer the question as to what should happen once a country has successfully concluded and implemented an SAA. What would be the next steps in order to get candidate status and start negotiations on membership? The EU would still need to confirm that no additional contractual framework will be required between the implementation of the SAA and accession to the EU. Against this background, Croatia has proactively presented its official application for membership of the EU in February 2003, triggering controversial discussions among member states about an appropriate reaction. While countries of the region call for a „road map“ to integration, the Union still needs to make up its mind when it comes to enlargement. Precisely, there is yet no

answer to the question as to how the negative impacts of accession by an advanced Western Balkan state on the rest of the region could be alleviated. For the time being, entry conditions with regard to membership tend to draw new lines of exclusion between applicants and their neighbours, for instance with regard to effects on free movement of people and consequently cross-border co-operation.

Last but not least, countries of the region have called for giving the SAP a clearer accession-oriented dimension. This could be achieved by bolstering the SAP with instruments used in the enlargement process, such as twinning, increased participation in Community programmes and improved monitoring mechanisms on the implementation of commitments.

The critical issues mentioned above need to be addressed in light of the next annual SAP review due in March 2003. The upcoming EU-Western Balkans summit meeting in Thessalonica on 21 June 2003 (Zagreb II) opens up a window of opportunity for redefining the policy agenda. The Greek EU Presidency has already communicated that it intends to further develop the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP) and adapt it to the upcoming challenges after enlargement. Moreover, the establishment of an institutionalised political dialogue, the „Balkan European Integration Process“, is on the agenda as a new mechanism for enhanced political dialogue and regional cooperation with SAP participants. This process shall bring together leaders of the region and the EU counterparts at ministerial level and would potentially add an important political dimension to the SAP. Last but not least, regional co-operation and related initiatives such as the Stability Pact shall be promoted.

In summary, the SAP has given the region a sense of direction - towards membership of the EU. Nevertheless, priority goals and instruments used need to be reassessed on a constant basis with a view to identifying shortcomings of Community action. Countries of the region, on the other hand, need to demonstrate their determination to effectively drive the process of stabilisation, cooperation and reform forward. Otherwise EU enlargement in 2004 will have significant negative political, economic, and psychological implications for the Balkans.

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Bulgaria and Romania at 2007 in the EU – Difficult Tasks Ahead

At the signing ceremony of the EU Accession Treaties by the 10 new EU members in April 2003 in Athens there were not only happy faces to be seen. The Prime ministers of Bulgaria and Romania congratulated their colleagues from the 10 candidate countries with mixed feelings. The biggest enlargement in the EU history was already a fact, but only 10 of the 12 candidate countries with which the European Commission started negotiations managed to reach the goal successfully.

Bulgaria and Romania failed in their endeavour, but nevertheless retain the reassurance that in 2007, the newly enlarged EU is willing to welcome the two countries as the next two new members. However, this reassurance is far from a guarantee, and considerable efforts together with good political climate and timing are necessary in order to see this promised welcome becoming real in 2007.

From Helsinki 1999 to Copenhagen 2002

The two countries belong to the so-called Helsinki group of candidates, which entered the negotiation process in March 2000. Four of them (Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia and Malta) succeeded to close the gap with the Luxembourg group of candidates, which started negotiations in 1998. Bulgaria and Romania could not manage this, due to different factors, stemming mainly from their considerably lower level of economic and social reforms at the time of their invitation to start the negotiation process – the EU Helsinki summit at the end of 1999. Both countries were quite far from fulfilling the Copenhagen criteria and were invited mainly because of their behaviour during the Kosovo crisis.

The invitation was a push for speedier reforms, while the negotiation process set the necessary framework to catch hold with the rest of the candidates and discover the areas where extra efforts were needed. The Commission country reports produced every autumn provided the objective “state of the art” about their achievements and shortcomings on the way toward full membership. Thus, in autumn 2002, Bulgaria and Romania had to swallow the bitter pill that the so called 10+2 division among the candidates countries was final, leaving no chances to enter the Un-

ion with the other ten candidates in 2004.

At the same time they were pleased with their achievements making the assurance of 2007 as the entry date possible. Especially the Bulgarian successes were remarkable. The report stated that the country has already established a functioning market economy and should be able in a middle term to sustain the competition within the EU, provided a successful continuation of the reforms. The country managed to open all 31 negotiation chapters and to close 22 of them. Romania was in a slightly worse shape than its southern neighbour with opening only 27 chapters and closing provisionally 13. Nevertheless, the report stated that the country is on the way to becoming a functioning market economy. Moreover, in 2002 the Romanian citizens were granted the right to travel without visas in the EU Schengen area like the citizens of all other candidate countries.

For sure a number of shortcomings were mentioned like inadequacy in the public administration and in the judicial system, where both countries should have to make considerable efforts. Again the critics toward Romania were stronger, like the necessity to improve the law adaptation and implementation procedures, to enforce profound reforms in the judicial system and in public administration, to increase the fight against inflation and improve the macroeconomic data.

The roadmap and the Accession Partnership

The mixed feelings were somehow muted at the Copenhagen EU summit in December 2002, where both countries were once more reassured about their membership perspective in 2007. So they got not only a clear time horizon, but also a roadmap with all the benchmarks until 2007 to be reached in order to make the 2007 accession a reality. Bulgaria and Romania were promised also additional financial assistance from the EU pre-accession funds. Substantial increases are expected in the framework of the PHARE, SAPARD and IPSA programmes. In March 2003 a revised Accession Partnership document was published by the Commission to complement the roadmaps for Bulgaria and Romania. Taken together the roadmap and

the Accession Partnership are going to be the main tools guiding both countries' efforts for meeting the target date for accession – 2007.

The purpose is to set out in a single framework the priority areas for further activities as identified in the Commission report and the financial means for helping to implement these priorities. The revised Accession Partnership provides also the basis for a number of policy instruments to be used to help both countries in their preparations for membership, like the pre-accession fiscal surveillance procedure, the pre-accession Economic programme, the pre-accession pact on organized crime as well as the so called National Development Plans, the Rural Developments Plans and sectoral plans necessary for the participation in the Structural Funds after membership and for the implementation of ISPA and SAPARD before accession.

The Accession Partnership further develops the short and medium term issues identified in the roadmap, identifying priorities that it is realistic to expect that the two countries can complete or take forward substantially over the period 2003-2004.

The main priorities, as identified for each of the two countries, relate to their abilities to take on the obligations of meeting the Copenhagen criteria. The Copenhagen EU summit in December 2002 stressed again the importance of judicial and administrative reform to help bring forward Bulgaria's and Romania's overall preparation for membership.

In the case of Bulgaria both in the roadmap and in the Accession Partnership, the Commission report stressed again that the country continues to fulfil the political criteria and is a functioning market economy. However, it is not yet able to cope with the competitive pressure and the market forces within the Union. As for Romania, the report highlighted that the country continues to fulfil the political criteria, and although it has registered progress towards becoming a functioning market economy, it does not meet the Copenhagen economic criteria.

Bulgaria and Romania do not yet fully meet the *acquis* criteria. In order to prepare successfully for membership, the two countries need to continue their efforts to transpose, implement

and enforce the *acquis*. They also need to continue the reform of the public administration and judiciary in order to have the necessary administrative and judicial capacity for this. The roadmaps provide benchmarks against which Bulgaria's and Romania's progress can be monitored. These cover both alignment of legislation and development of administrative capacity.

European Commission:
Roadmaps for Bulgaria and
Romania,
Nov. 13, 2002

Accession Partnership
March 26, 2003

2002 Regular Reports,

see: europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement.

So among the immediate tasks ahead in the field of the political criteria for Bulgaria, a preparation of a fully comprehensive public administration reform strategy, including an action plan, in 2003 is envisaged. For Romania in the same field more has to be done: a revision of the 1999 law on civil servants, an introduction of the necessary secondary legislation and establishment of implementation mechanisms and structures.

In the judicial field Bulgaria needs to continue the reform of the judicial system by reducing the excessive length of the court procedures and ensuring the implementation of fundamental rights in penal cases and also to continue to implement the National Anti-corruption Strategy. In the same field, Romania needs to ensure full independence of the judiciary, enhance the professionalism of the judiciary, improve the administration of courts and step up the fight against corruption. In the human rights field, Bulgaria is advised to improve living conditions in the mental health care system and to speed up the implementation of the Roma Framework Programme. Romania needs to improve the reform of the child-care system and also to improve the situation of Roma.

In the economic field, Bulgaria is advised to maintain the high degree of macroeconomic stability achieved over recent years and to make further efforts in the privatisation pro-

gramme, in developing small and medium-sized enterprises and in reforming customs and tax administrations. Romania should continue to reduce the rate of inflation, to improve the budgetary procedures and the management of public expenditures and to advance significantly the privatisation of the banking sector.

2007- some doubts

A comparison between the two roadmaps and the two Accession Partnership documents reveals a significant volume of immediate tasks to be done in 2003/2004. The implementation of these tasks will be subject to close monitoring on which the EU financial assistance will depend. The target date for joining the EU is the same for both countries, but Romania needs to invest much more effort to catch up with Bulgaria and to meet the Copenhagen and Madrid criteria. For the sake of preventing the divergence from the 10+2 group to a 10+1+1 group, leaving Romania in isolation, a compromise was arranged giving Romania the chance to retain its perspectives and Bulgaria some more time to prepare better for the challenges of full membership. Additional financial assistance will make this preparatory period more acceptable not only for the governments, but also for the general public in both countries.

There are but some developments real or hypothetical, internal or external, which can cast a shadow over the so well calculated timetable. The public opinion in both countries is not immune against some euro-sceptical feelings as the situation in some other candidate countries has indicated. Consequently, in Bulgaria there is a considerable opposition on all levels against the decision of the government to close four of the six reactors of the nuclear power plant in Kozlodui by the end of 2006. First the parliament voted in favour of a linkage between the closure of the reactors and the EU accession of Bulgaria. Then the High Administrative Court proclaimed the closure illegal. The government is under pressure to ask the EU Commission for renegotiation on this issue.

After the EU summit in Copenhagen there is a virtual standstill in the negotiation process. Probably no chapter is going to be closed during the Greek presidency, a fact that compels both countries to reschedule their internal negotiation plans. Bulgaria hopes to end the negotiations by the end of 2003 during the Irish presidency. Romania also expected to

end the negotiations by the end of 2004. Having in mind that more than half of the chapters are not yet open, it seems a very risky prognosis. Both countries advocated for having the same negotiation and admission procedures like the other 10 candidates and to end all technicalities for the accession during the mandate of the Prodi Commission. But the time is already running out for such considerations. The fate of the 13th candidate country Turkey is not yet decided. One more country, Croatia applied during the Greek presidency for a candidate status. If the Commission decides to start negotiations with the two newcomers on the waiting list, an establishment of a new group of four candidates might be the result with certain delay for the accession of Bulgaria and Romania as a repercussion.

The year 2007 could also be overshadowed by some problems within the newly enlarged EU. Bringing 10 new members in the Union needs for sure an adaptation period during which certain turbulences are going to be something unexceptional. It is quite possible that the 25 put aside for some time new accessions for the sake of rearranging the newly enlarged union and making it function better. The divisions between the 15 recent EU members on the eve and during the war in Iraq indicated that deviations in national interests are quite able to undermine any far reaching project like the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy.

For their support for the American policy toward Iraq, Bulgaria and Romania even received the reprimand of French president Chirac in a much harsher tone than expected, raising the fears that too independent behaviour on a hot political issue may ruin years of substantial efforts toward creating a mutual trust and a common value system. In the lessons learned after Iraq, the conclusion that deep divisions on vital issues concerning the future of the EU, between old and new, small and big EU members are not only possible, but also probable and may endanger any roadmap and any timetable, also applies fully to the issue concerning the accession of Bulgaria and Romania in 2007. That is why a full compliance with the roadmaps and Accession Partnership is the only argument that counts for both countries in the years until 2007 and the only tool to ensure their future EU membership.

Dr. Emil Mintchev, ZEI

Croatia After the EU Application: Accelerated Implementation of the Agreement

After submitting the application for EU membership in February 2003, Croatia continued the accelerated implementation of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA). Progress in implementation will be among the most important factors for a positive stance from the EU, while the success will depend on how Croatia proves its efficiency in implementing reforms and accepting the European standards in practice. Integration is the common goal in Croatia. As a preparation for application all the parliamentary parties adopted the Resolution on the Accession to the EU in December 2002. The SAA has been ratified by the Parliament of Croatia and the European Parliament. The ratification process is expected to be finalised by the end of the year since more than a half of the EU member states already ratified the Agreement.

Since its signature in October 2001, Croatia has been meeting the obligations within the SAA. In its last Stabilisation and Association Report for Croatia (presented in April 2003), the European Commission recognised that the political situation in the country remained generally stable, the economic situation continued to improve while the Government has adopted an ambitious programme for the integration of Croatia into the EU. It underlined that the implementation of the SAA is being co-ordinated in a highly efficient and professional way. The Implementation Plan for the SAA that Croatia adopted before signing the Agreement has been updated regularly. Presently, it consists of more than 400 measures, with clearly defined deadlines and bodies responsible for implementation. Until the end of March 2003, Croatia fulfilled almost 60 per cent of it.

The implementation of the SAA has been made transparent through regular monthly and yearly reports. Reports showed progress in adopting European standards, although there were certain delays regarding the Implementation Plan, but it did not bring into question the deadlines envisaged by the SAA (due to the fact that the Plan followed an accelerated implementation agenda).

Progress has been made in implementing the specific political preconditions (legal framework for minority rights, co-operation with the ICTY, media reform, reform of

judiciary, etc.), although it is a process in which continued work is necessary, particularly regarding the implementation and law enforcement in all areas. Regional co-operation with the SAP countries has been enhanced. Through different bilateral and multilateral mechanisms Croatia is contributing to the stability and co-operation in South-Eastern Europe.

Trade liberalisation, which started through entrance into the WTO, has continued by implementation of the Interim Agreement, as well as other bilateral and multilateral free trade agreements. Currently, Croatia has free trade agreements with some thirty countries, meaning that (apart from the SAA) the country has signed agreements with the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP) countries, the accession countries and EFTA. Croatia also joined CEFTA in March 2003. The expected access to the pan-European accumulation of rules of origin would facilitate the process of economic integration into the EU. This is important not only for Croatia, but also for the other SAP countries. Legal harmonisation started in priority areas defined by the SAA: market



Tonino Picula in Brussels, February 2003

competition and state aid; intellectual, industrial and commercial property rights; public procurement; technical legislation; consumer protection. All future regulations from these areas will have to be harmonised with the corresponding EU regulations while the approximation of legislation will gradually extend to other parts of the *acquis*. The National Programme for Integration of Croatia into the EU has been prepared for 2003 as a roadmap

for legal harmonisation. Mechanisms for co-ordinating, programming and management of the CARDS programme have been established, and the implementation of CARDS is under way. Progress has been achieved in analytical work regarding the impact of EU integration, information dissemination, translation, education and training on EU integration issues. As it was underlined by the EU report, *The Western Balkans in Transition* (European Economy, January 2003), Croatia is the largest in economic terms among the SAP countries with a GDP amounting to half of the total GDP of the region (over 5000 US\$ *per capita*). With the present level of inflation (2,5 per cent in 2002) and its stable currency, Croatia meets most of the Maastricht criteria. The level of public debt in 2002 (52 per cent of GDP in 2002) was still within the Maastricht margins, but with a rising tendency. However, the level of the budget deficit (4,8 per cent of GDP in 2002) was above the EU margin, although most of the acceding countries had similar problems, except Slovenia, which keeps within the Maastricht deficit level of 3 per cent.

Although Croatia made significant progress in implementing the SAA, there is still a lot of work to be done. However, if progress continues at present speed, it could be expected that the country will achieve its *internal goal* to reach readiness for accession by 2006. This requires serious work to continue the accelerated implementation of the SAA obligations and the internal reforms conducive to a functioning market economy.

Speeding up the internal reforms (particularly in judiciary, public administration, privatisation, fiscal consolidation, and some other areas) and continuing the SAA implementation and the law enforcement are the key preconditions for the success of joining Bulgaria and Romania in the next wave of enlargement in 2007. The EU approach to the SAP countries, evaluating their individual progress, achievements and capacities will hopefully enhance Croatia's chances to catch up to the mentioned remaining candidates in their efforts to become EU members. The progress of reforms and the level of readiness for negotiations will be evaluated by the *avis*, after preparing

the answers on the comprehensive EU questionnaire, which is expected in June 2003. Croatia plans to prepare the answers by early autumn 2003, which means that the *avis* might be ready within the next 12 months. It will hopefully reflect the EU intention to recognise positive achievement on an individual basis, opening the process in the future for the rest of the region, once the other countries fulfil the necessary preconditions. The candidate status should enable Croatia to continue the internal reforms more effectively with the pre-accession support from the EU side. There are many reasons why it is im-

portant for Croatia to become a candidate for EU membership (using the additional mechanisms that might foster the SAA implementation, eligibility for other technical assistance programmes, access to TAIEX, starting of screening process, etc). Since EU integration is a convincing motive for change and the strongest cohesion factor in the SEE countries, Croatia's future candidate status has enormous importance for the region. Finally, it is not less important for the EU since the long-term success of the Stabilisation and Association Process will depend on the extent to which it will be able to generate new can-

didates. The Thessalonica Summit in June 2003 is seen as the opportunity to transform the SAP into a pre-accession process - through bringing more enlargement kind elements and new necessary instruments for the countries of the SAP region into the process.

Dr. Visnja Samardzija
Vice Minister of the
Ministry for European Integration
Republic of Croatia

Albania Starts Negotiating with the EU Commission

Albania has just started negotiations for concluding a Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) with the European Union. On its path towards European integration, Albania lost much time, the reasons being manifold: backwardness and poverty inherited from the communist regime, as well as negative regional developments, conflicts, and continuous crises. But the most responsible factor for this historical delay is the Albanian political class of the recent years which was involved in a big "crush" for power, irrespective of the rules and democratic standards of governance and political behavior in Europe, which led to a frequent lack of political stability in the country. The recognition of the road followed so far is a prerequisite for making the positive experience accelerate Albania's European integration process, avoiding the repetition of the past mistakes.

Thus, the negotiations for the SAA will relatively take longer than the EU negotiations with Croatia and FYROM. This will happen for two main reasons. In the negotiating process, Albania may be enabled to intensify the process of reforms in some priority fields: firstly, in order to bring the country to the level of required standards for signing an SAA; secondly, in order to build a system of control so that the reform process will not only avoid the risk of serious setbacks but will allow to be monitored until its complete implementation. The process of integration in general and that of Stabilization and Association as another step for Albania towards the EU will not be easy,

but rather full of obligations. For some years, these requirements have been set, and they will remain for a relatively long period of time on the agenda of discussions between the Albanian government and the EU. The modest scope of this article does not allow for a broad treatment of all the issues in discussion due to which reason even the comments will be concentrated on the main fields of reform required.

In April 2003, the European Commission published the second report evaluating the process of

Based on the Plan of Action, a milestone in the relations between Albania and the EU, monthly reports have been issued by the Albanian Government for assessing progress so far on implementing the obligations for opening the negotiations. The reports are a detailed inventory of realizations in a variety of fields. One of the most significant features is the institutionalized dialogue between the EU and Albania on the main issues concerning the Stabilization and Association Process and the beginning of negotiations for signing the SAA. The SAP is a European Strategy of a regional dimension. It has offered Albania and other participating countries the perspective of gradual integration into the EU, support for the consolidation of democracy and the rule of law, economic development and reforms, assistance for suitable administrative structures and for regional cooperation, the establishment of an official framework for political dialogue, encouragement of economic relations, of trade, investments, entrepreneur policy, transport, setting up of free trade zones, insurance of a basis for co-operation in the field of justice and public order, the establishment of a foundation for cooperation in the economic, social, civil, educational scientific, technological, energy, environmental, and cultural field, etc. Process of the Stabilization and Association as well as the SAA, as its composite part, will bring for Albania a new dimension in the relations with the EU and will prepare it to come to the final phase of membership. Yet, in order to reach this key objective,



R. Prodi and deputy prime minister Meta

Stabilization and Association with Albania. The Report contains a critical analysis of the political and economic situation as well as the implementation of the Stabilization and Association process in Albania. Both this current and last year's report constitute the two fundamental, referent and recognition documents for the country.

it is indispensable for the entire Albanian society, specifically for the institutions of the Albanian state, to understand the core of the process. Furthermore, all Albanians must be continuously and responsibly involved in the step-by-step realization of all obligations and criteria according to the European standards resulting from participation in this process. Unfortunately, the majority of the political spectrum has so far perceived European integration as a slogan in the internal political struggle and in the electoral campaigns. The political parties in Albania have manifested an open jealousy towards every success of their rivals, which might have also been an achievement for the country as a whole. It is worth greeting the fact that these days, in the new political climate created, the opening of SAA negotiations is being considered a victory and is welcomed as a success of all in Albania. The start of negotiations must be understood as a message and common duty for pushing the process of integration ahead with determination towards its logical end.

It is necessary as well to develop intensive relations with the public in order to combat a naïve perception as well as expectations that Albanians may have of the EU, especially now in the Process of Stabilization and Association. Albanians should be prepared to face the first shock of disillusion that may arise when they face the effects of contractual obligations with the opening up of the market, etc. which will not be in harmony with previous naïve promises from the political class during the more than ten years of transition. This expected disappearance of enthusiasm, peculiar even to the other countries of Central and Eastern Europe involved in this process prior to Albania, should be carefully and competently handled in order to inform Albanians that European integration is first and foremost a long process of investment and not a gift, that it is a serious contractual agreement with many partners and strictly defined rules to the game.

Albania has many challenges to face in the SAP, among which the following must be especially highlighted: political stability; public administration able to understand the process, to implement the reforms completely based on European standards; incessant and determined fight against corruption, organized crime and illicit traffic; and a regio-

nal cooperation with European perspective.

The Process of Stabilization and Association is neither unilateral nor a duty of the aspirant countries to the EU only. It is a bilateral process with involvement and responsibilities of the leading EU institutions and of its member states as well. Exactly because of this reason, many mechanisms exist, which encourage the discussions and monitor the implementation of the reforms. In the relations with Albania, these mechanisms have functioned and have given a valuable contribution to the orientation of the country, urging it to concentrate on the fundamental problems ahead. Yet, better understanding is needed for the Albanian characteristics of development, in order to find and implement adequate reforms and policies.

The process of Stabilization and Association does not render Albania European for the reason of its geographic, historical, linguistic, cultural positions and generally the traditions. Albania has been and still is European. What Albania needs today is assistance in order to catch the quick train of modern Europeanisation, so that it can gradually and safely reach the other countries. A better-prepared and better-defined European strategy is needed. The SAP is a strategy for the five countries of the Western Balkans, not only for Albania. Among the countries there are different patterns of development; there are specifics, which result from history and traditions.

The SAP defines some general principles, which are detailed in the Agreements of Stabilization and Association. The negotiation of such an agreement between Albania and the EU must not be simply "a copy" of the SAA signed with FYROM and Croatia. It must bear the Albanian seal of negotiating and it must be an authentic document that will guide the process of necessary reforms for Albania.

It is crucial that the SAA project with Albania be negotiated with the greatest responsibility by both parties: The Commission should not try to find the needle in the haystack and not impose standards and quotas which do not take into consideration the Albanian reality and perspective. The Albanian government, and the special negotiating SAA group specifically, has to analyze the draft agreement in detail, has to study it

in small groups of specialists in every relevant issue, and has to define, in cooperation with the Commission, the expected objectives through much work and continuous involvement. The pressure to say "yes" to every proposal coming from the Commission without first having studied it will be strong. However, such behavior would be a rash investment; it would compromise the process, the Albanian negotiating and administrative capacities as well as the European integration of Albania in itself.

In order to guarantee a normal and not a fictitious development, the EU has anticipated instruments that would monitor the process of implementation of the SAA and of reforms in the main fields included. The EU has clearly transmitted the message that as long as the Commission and the Council are not convinced of the Albanian administrative capacities to implement the anticipated reforms, the SAA negotiations will not be finalized.

With the intention of further encouraging the integration of the Southeast European countries into the EU, and as part of this strategy, the Stability Pact also was initiated. But unfortunately, the Pact so far has not justified the hopes and optimism radiating in the time when it was created. It has turned out that it is rather a political initiative without the required mechanisms to implement the ambitious projects proclaimed in its three tables, especially in that on economy. Nevertheless, it is not the time to sing its Tedeum. There are still efforts to be undertaken so that the Pact may adapt itself to the regional needs, to cooperate more closely with other initiatives, and to accomplish functions, especially in the field of human rights and in security. Albania as a country benefiting from the Pact has been active right from the very beginning. It still considers the Pact as a mechanism that helps in the implementation of the Stabilization and Association Process and in further rapprochement with the EU.

The opening up of negotiations for signing the SAA scores the beginning of an important and new chapter in the history of Albania's integration into the EU. Like in every beginning let us wish: 'safe journey in this long and difficult process'.

Prof. Dr. Paskal Milo
former Minister of Foreign and of European Affairs
MP of the Republic of Albania

Task Force South Eastern Europe

Europe at Schools in South Eastern Europe – a project report

In May 2001, during the 3rd annual conference of the "Network of European Studies in South Eastern Europe" in Thessalonica, the participants expressed the desire to form a special working group on "Europe at Schools in South Eastern Europe". The participants agreed that the dissemination of knowledge about Europe, raising the awareness of a European identity as early as the school level as well as promoting teacher education in this respect is an urgent priority. Rather than only concentrating on the university level, focusing also on the school level would allow to reach, in principle, the whole future generations of countries, which will more and more have to internalise the rationale, the working mechanisms and the common bonds of the integrating Europe.

In 2002, four main goals were then defined during a meeting of the new Working Group at the Institute for Globalisation and Intercultural Learning (IGI) in Zagreb:

- To assess as profoundly as possible the current state of affairs concerning the European dimension of the school education process in the participant countries. This would permit the cultivation of a sound database for deciding on all future activities. We wanted to include all the countries of the region in this stock-taking endeavour and look at all the countries individually. Authors would be nationals from the respective countries with background. Their research would be based on a catalogue of criteria, which were developed jointly to allow for comparabil-

ity of the reports. Each report would contain an assessment about strengths and deficits.

- To examine closely the German state of affairs concerning the European dimension at schools. Thus it would be possible to present one example of how a core EU country has established over decades a versatile European education system at schools. We determined that this should take place not in a theoretical, abstract or even instructing manner but with very practical, creative examples, allowing for a transfer of know-how.

- To produce an interdisciplinary curriculum which might serve as a basis both for individual Train the Trainer courses on Europe at Schools and as a full-fledged programme to be adopted by interested institutions. The curriculum for "Europe at Schools" would be adopted by the *International Center for European Teacher Education*, which is in the process of being established at the University of Zagreb.

- To assist in establishing this International Center, including a European Documentation Center, which will start operating in the winter term 2004/05. The programme *Master of European Education* will train advisers and multipliers for a Europe-oriented reform in schools and teacher education throughout the region.

The Working Group had further meetings in Zagreb (IGI) and at the Center for European Studies (ATAUM) of Ankara University. A considerable network has grown including school principals, researchers and administration

officials in all the countries of the region. A sub-group was formed between the Universities of Münster (Department of Educational Sciences, supervised by Prof. Dr. Marianne Krüger-Potratz) and Zagreb (working group of the Teacher Education Academy of Zagreb University and the Faculty of Philosophy, led by Dr. Siegfried Gehrman) in order to draft the curriculum.

At the moment all three publications of the Working Group are in the printing process. The first, the "country profiles", contains in-depth articles on Europe at Schools in Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Romania and Serbia, based on substantial first-hand research. The second, called "Europe at Schools in Germany", contains a general introduction and articles by two German teachers about the efforts of their respective schools to insert a European dimension into the teaching process. The third, called "Europe at Schools in South Eastern Europe - Core Curriculum for a Master of European Integration", contains comprehensive course descriptions and basic literature for five modules with further sub-units ranging from European identity to new media and school management. The texts are available for downloading (www.zei.de) and can also be obtained without charge from ZEI.

The working group was financed by the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs. A second phase of the project is envisioned.

Dr. Rafael Bierman, ZEI

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